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 —ABSTRACT—!
"
"
The current ecological crisis is drawing Humankind’s attention to the 
increasingly blurred divide between the once-stable realms of ‘Nature’ and 
‘Culture.’ The coinage of the “Anthropocene,” the name chosen to designate the 
new geological epoch marked by the material sedimentation of byproducts of 
the human impact on the Earth’s ecosystems, calls into question modern ideals 
of human progress, freedom, and emancipation from ‘Nature.’ Within such a 
context whereby ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ are no longer so easily dissociated, 
traditional academic divisions between the Sciences and the Humanities are 
disturbed, and phenomena usually studied by the latter are increasingly being 
approached by the former (and vice-versa). "
In the particular field of Performance Studies, the new ecological paradigm 
problematises the discipline’s tendency to privilege human, i.e. ‘cultural,’ 
instances of performance. In doing so, it raises a few important questions: 1) 
“can there be performance without humans?” 2) “if so what will it look like?” and 
3) “how will that affect the work of Performance Studies?”"
This dissertation attempts to answer all three of those questions. By ‘thinking 
big’ and making use of a wide variety of bodies of knowledge, from philosophy 
to performance theory, from history of art to ecocriticism, and by reflecting on 
several different encounters between humans and humans, humans and 
nonhumans, and nonhumans and nonhumans, the thesis put forward here 
claims that performance is what allows all kinds of bodies to encounter one 
another despite remaining strangers to each other. In pushing performance 
beyond the human, in giving it a broader than broad spectrum, this dissertation 
claims performance theory to be an important interlocutor in contemporary 
debates beyond the Humanities/Sciences divide, and at a time of deep 
ecological urgencies. "
"
"
"
"
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"
"
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the 
human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island 
of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not 
meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in 
its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the 
piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such 
terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that 
we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly 
light into the peace and safety of a new dark age."
—H.P. Lovecraft "1"
 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu,” in H.P. Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird 1
Stories, ed. S. T. Joshi (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 139. 
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—PRELUDE—!
"
"
"
1978, Wuppertal, Germany. A young and lost woman, her eyes closed, 
struggles to move freely in a darkened German kaffeehaus, her movement 
impaired by both the furniture she encounters on her way, and the walls that 
enclose her.  Again and again she hits the tables and she falls; she stumbles on 
the empty chairs that oscillate between their role as signs of absence and their 
material presence as objects in space. Again and again the audience can hear 
the sound the walls, chairs, and tables make when hit, violently, by her moving 
body. This is Pina Bausch’s Café Müller."
"
   
Fig. 1: Pina Bausch, Café Müller, 1978. Film still.
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"
"
"
"
1986, Chernobyl, Ukrainian SSR. As a result of a complex set of causes that 
include flaws in design, one of four reactors at the local nuclear power plant 
explodes in the early hours of the 26th of April. As a consequence, a huge 
amount of radiation is released, amounting to at least 100 times the radiation of 
the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, leading the accident to 
be widely recognised as the biggest nuclear accident in History, and campaign 
groups such as Greenpeace to predict up to 93,000 extra cancer deaths as a 
result of it. This is the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster."
"
  ""
"
"
"
"
"
"
Fig. 2: Aerial view of the Chernobyl nuclear plant, 1986. Photo: Associated Press.
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"
"
"
"
1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Representatives of the governments of 172 
nations meet for the first ever United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). In an attempt to recognise the impact the continuing 
deterioration of ecosystems is having on the well-being of humankind, and to 
tackle its progression, the conference culminates with the publication of, 
amongst others, Agenda 21, a non-binding action plan for the implementation of 
sustainable development policies at local, national, and global levels. The 
document is then reaffirmed and modified at subsequent UN conferences. This 
is the Earth Summit."
"
  ""
"
"
"
Fig. 3: Dr. Zhelyn Zhelev, President of the Republic of Bulgaria, addresses the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992. Photo: UN 
Photo/Michos Tzovaras.
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"
"
"
"
1993, Venice, Italy. A British filmmaker presents his very small audience at the 
Venice Film Festival with seventy-six minutes of flickering International Klein 
Blue projected on one of the screens at the Palazzo del Cinema. The projection 
is accompanied by ambient sounds and several voices narrating different 
episodes of the artist’s daily battle with HIV and of his struggle with AIDS-
related blindness. This is Derek Jarman’s Blue."
"
  ""
"
"
"
"
"
"
Fig. 4: Derek Jarman, Blue, 1993. Film still."
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"
"
"
"
1997, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. For its first solo exhibition to be held at 
the Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, a Belgian fashion house collaborates 
with a Dutch microbiologist to create a series of eighteen dresses treated with 
different strains of bacteria and moulds that, as the exhibition progresses, are 
responsible for changing the colour and aspect of the garments which dress 
dummies displayed behind a glass wall. This is Maison Martin Margiela’s 
(9/4/1615)."
"
  ""
"
"
"
"
Fig. 5: Maison Martin Margiela, (9/4/1615), 1997. 
Installation view. Photo: Museum Boijmans Van 
Beuningen."
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"
"
"
"
2001, Johannesburg, South Africa. A white man in drag wears an old 
chandelier as if it was a tutu and struggles to balance himself on his 
disproportionately high high-heeled shoes while walking on debris, stones, and 
dirt in one of South Africa’s shanty towns. Around him, workers hired by the 
local authority, armed with crowbars and wearing orange overalls, demolish the 
locals’ dwellings to allow for the construction of the Nelson Mandela bridge. This 
is Steven Cohen’s Chandelier."
"
  ""
Fig. 6: Stephen Cohen, Chandelier, 2001. Photo: 
John Hogg."
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"
"
"
"
2002, Nature, Vol. 415. Dutch Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen publishes an 
article in which he identifies a new epoch in geological time, an epoch which, for 
the first time, coincides with the period in which the scientist writes. That new 
epoch, the “Anthropocene,” is said to have started with the Industrial 
Revolution, when humans became the most important force at play in the 
Earth’s ecosystems. It does not take long for the term “Anthropocene” to enter 
the collective conscious.   "
"
  ""
Fig. 7: Global Change 78 (March 2012). Magazine 
cover.
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"
"
"
"
2008, London, England. After announcing his true identity out loud to a packed 
theatre—“My name is Romeo Castellucci”, he says—the controversial Italian 
theatre director puts on a protection suit whilst a pack of German shepherds are 
led to the stage by their trainers. Once the suit is on, some of the animals are 
released and attack the artist, biting him while he lies, defenceless, on the floor. 
This is the prologue of Socìetas Raffaelo Sanzio’s Inferno."
"
  ""
"
"
Fig. 8: Socìetas Raffaelo Sanzio, Inferno, 2008. Photo: Luca Del Pia.
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"
"
"
"
2010, Ljubljana, Slovenia. A naked female body falls backwards, in slow 
motion, down the red-carpeted eighteen-century oval staircase of the 
Gruberjeva Palace. In its long fall, the body exists in the space between 
mastery and powerlessness, forced to permanently negotiate the unfolding of 
the event with the gravity that pulls it down and the late Baroque staircase that 
directs its fall. This is Kira O’Reilly’s Stair Falling, a strange encounter between 
human body and architecture. "
"
  ""
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Fig. 9: Kira O’Reilly, Stair Falling, 2010. Photo: Nada Zgank."
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"
"
"
"
2011, World Wide Web. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster a 
video appears on YouTube in which an anonymous worker, wearing a protection 
mask and coverall, approaches one of the CCTV cameras of the nuclear power 
plant, points at his contaminated surroundings and then at the centre of the 
camera, in what appears to be a reenactment of Centers, the 1971 performance 
for camera by Vito Acconci. After twenty minutes—the exact same duration of 
Acconci’s original work—the worker stops pointing and walks away. The video 
goes viral. This is the ecological age. "
"
  "
    "
"
"
"
Fig. 10: Anonymous worker points a finger at a monitoring live camera, Fukushima 
1 nuclear plant, 2011. Video still."
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—INTRODUCTION— !
Mapping a Journey!
"
"
"""
‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’"
‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat."
—Lewis Carroll "1"
"
"
"
"
Destination!
What consequences does the ongoing ecological age have for existing 
ontologies of performance? And what effect might such renewed thinking about 
performance have upon Performance Studies, the academic field primarily 
concerned with that particular kind of phenomena? Can Performance Studies 
enter into a productive dialogue with recent philosophical projects that, under 
the umbrella of Speculative Realism, have attempted to think the real in a more 
ecological and less anthropocentric way?"
The above are the guiding questions of the present dissertation. The premise 
upon which they rest is that, once the ecological crisis made humans recognise 
the entanglement of ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture,’ the dreams of human autonomy and 
emancipation set up as part of the Enlightenment project started to 
progressively be called into question. As a result, various scholars in the 
Humanities are, today, reconsidering the certainty of the divide human/
nonhuman on which the geographies of their disciplines have been drawn, 
trying to think more ecologically, and adapting their work to the rediscovered 
reality of a world in which humans, rather than emancipated, are increasingly 
enmeshed with nonhumans. "
 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, with artworks by Yayoi Kusama (London: 1
Penguin Books, 2012), 86.
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As a branch of the Humanities, Performance Studies, too, has not been able to 
avoid the pressures of the ecological age. Some scholars in the field have 
already started rethinking its scope and trying to adapt its scholarship in order to 
better respond to the fall of the ontological wall that, at least since the 
eighteenth century, has, unsuccessfully, tried to keep humans and nonhumans 
apart."
It is in the context of the rediscovered entanglement of ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ 
that the scenes described in the Prelude above appear. As diverse as they 
might seem, those scenes can be said to have one thing in common: they all 
highlight, in one way or another, through scientific or artistic means, the 
complex interconnectedness of humans and nonhumans: "
In Café Müller, Pina Bausch and her dancers struggled to overcome the 
obstacles posed to their movement by the props on stage and the boundaries of 
the set. In the Chernobyl disaster, faulty human design led to a catastrophic 
nonhuman event which had tragic consequences for humans and local 
ecosystems for years to come. At the inaugural Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
the nations of the world (or most of them) attempted, for the first of many 
unsuccessful times to come, to take responsibility over the ecological crisis and 
to agree on joint collective action to arrest its progression. One year later, at the 
Venice Film Festival, Derek Jarman premiered Blue, a film with which the artist 
attempted to make sense of himself and of the battlefield that was his own body, 
seized and taken hostage by an unbeatable virus and its army of opportunistic 
diseases. At Maison Martin Margiela’s exhibition in Rotterdam, the audiences 
were forced to confront their own fear of dirt and infection by watching fashion—
that index of the human and of its ‘Culture’—being literally consumed by germs. 
In Steven Cohen’s piece Chandelier, and despite the different readings the 
piece might call for, one was drawn to the movements of an artist struggling with 
his disproportionately high high-heels, with the stones and debris on which he 
tried to walk, and with the incredibly heavy weight of the chandelier he wore.  In 2
volume 415 of the journal Nature, a world-renowned scientist revealed the 
extent to which the future of the planet is being threatened by humans who, 
since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, have been mass-exploiting the 
 For a more in-depth reading of Chandelier as well as some references to its potentially 2
problematic racial politics, see Chapter Five below, pp. 233–236.
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Earth’s resources and releasing huge amounts of life-threatening gases into the 
atmosphere. In Inferno, the prologue to his take on Dante’s Divine Comedy, 
Romeo Castellucci gave away control over what took place on stage by letting 
in a pack of dogs and allowing them to attack him. In Stair Falling, Kira O’Reilly 
shared the authorship of her performance piece with gravity and the cold, hard 
stairs down which she slowly fell. And, finally, the video footage of the rogue 
Fukushima worker forced its viewers to face the ways in which human actions 
and natural phenomena often join forces as the trigger of major ecological 
disasters. "
Approached in that way, all the scenes reveal the distress of a human being 
who is no longer in control, who no longer masters his/her own future or that of 
his/her environment. Be it in the surroundings of a Japanese nuclear power 
plant or in a fictional kaffeehaus built on the stage of a German opera theatre, 
all the human figures depicted above are struggling with a variety of nonhuman 
beings, caught in a more or less dangerous battle with animals, objects, 
architecture, viruses, radioactivity, debris, moulds, bacteria, and the planet itself, 
a battle the victor of which is anything but certain. All the above present humans 
and nonhumans as co-depended, interconnected, enmeshed and involved in 
one another; in none of them can one find an occasion in which the human is 
able to thrive unchallenged. When faced with those scenes, one is caught by 
the feeling of unease that comes with the realisation that the shape of the future 
is anything but certain. Those are scenes that reawaken existential anxieties 
and the fear of falling, of failing, of losing, of dying in the face of a strange and 
uncontrollable nonhuman world."
What, then, are the consequences of having such enmeshment of humans and 
nonhumans highlighted? In particular, in what ways does it affect existing 
theories and practices of performance and that which goes on in the space of 
the theatre? For if theatre is normally seen as an existential mirror, as what Alan 
Read called “the human laboratory” due to its being a privileged space for 
humans to come face-to-face with their own humanity, what happens when one 
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witnesses works in which nonhumans play such important roles as challengers 
of the mastery usually ascribed to the human both on- and off-stage? "3
These are questions guided by ecological concerns. They are also questions 
that have several ontological and epistemological implications. Their guiding 
concerns are ecological because they emerge out of the ways in which different 
kinds of beings, human and nonhuman, have been rediscovered enmeshed in 
one another, not only ‘out there’ on the site of the latest nuclear disaster but 
also ‘in here,’ in the apparently less life-threatening space of the theatre.  Their 4
implications are ontological because, by drawing attention to the co-implication 
of humans and nonhumans, they question the certainty of the divide between 
‘Culture’ and ‘Nature,’ a divide which, as Bruno Latour has argued, grounded 
the ideologies of human autonomy and emancipation at least since the critical 
project of Immanuel Kant and the Industrial Revolution.  And, finally, they have 5
epistemological repercussions because, by troubling the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ 
divide, they call for a rethinking of existing paradigms of knowledge and of the 
structure of academia itself, known as it is to have separated the Humanities 
from the Sciences, with the former researching social, political, and cultural 
phenomena while the latter study the ‘natural,’ nonhuman world. "
They are questions triggered by the realisation that there is a global and 
catastrophic ecological crisis already going on. As it was suggested by the 
 See Alan Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement: The Last Human Venue (Basingstoke and 3
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 2–5; Nicholas Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals, and Other 
Theatrical Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 97–98; and Nicholas 
Ridout, Theatre & Ethics (London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 7–8.
 Ecology is understood in this dissertation as the study of the interactions between all kinds of 4
beings, human and nonhuman, living and nonliving. Departing from Ernest Haeckel’s original 
1869 coinage of the term to designate the “scientific study of the interactions between 
organisms and their environment,” ecology will here be adapted to the reality of a world in 
which, as it will be discussed further below (pp. 29–30), ‘Nature’ or ‘the environment’ is no 
longer that which surrounds or environs ‘Culture’ but, rather, exists in a continuum with it. As 
such, ecological thinking is the thinking that addresses the ways in which beings encounter one 
another and create networks of influence without any primacy being given to ‘Nature’ over 
‘Culture’ or vice-versa. In that sense, ecological thinking can address the natural world as much 
as it can address that which happens on the theatrical stage. For more on ecology and 
ecological thinking, see below, pp. 33–36. For Haeckel’s definition of ecology, see Michael 
Begon, Colin R. Townsend, and John L. Harper, Ecology: From Individuals to Ecosystems 
(Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), xi.
 See Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 5
1993); and Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, trans. H. B. 
Nisbet (London: Penguin Books, 2009). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter One.
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debates at the various Earth Summits that have been happening regularly since 
1992, or by Paul Crutzen’s identification of a new geological epoch inaugurated 
by the machine revolution, humans and nonhumans are increasingly tied 
together and dependent on one another.  Therefore, human actions can have 6
substantial nonhuman consequences. In the present ecological age, ontology is 
flat, expansive, horizontal, and deprived of mastering transcendence either in 
the form of the supreme designer of the Abrahamic faiths, or in the shape of the 
human and its exceptionalism.  "7
In the ecological age—the present age—the validity of categories like ‘Nature’ 
and ‘Culture,’ as well as the ontological rift between humans and nonhumans, 
are also being challenged from within the Humanities themselves. Coming from 
a variety of fields and often by blurring the boundaries of their own disciplines, 
scholars have, for over twenty years now, been trying to think the world beyond 
human (and often phallogocentric) privilege and mastery. From the posthuman 
feminisms of Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, and Rosi Braidotti to the 
new materialisms of Manuel DeLanda and Jane Bennett; from the Actor-
Network Theory of Bruno Latour to the “agential realism” of Karen Barad or the 
speculative realist moves of Quentin Meillassoux or Graham Harman, recent 
metaphysical thought has been trying once again to address the real beyond 
the human by daring to think a world—the ecological world—in which humans 
 The new geological epoch identified by Crutzen is the Anthropocene, the definition of which 6
will be given in the next page. 
 For more on ideas of human exceptionalism and their relationship with Western philosophical 7
thought see below, pp. 60–66).
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are either no longer present or, at least, not in full control.  It is fair to say that all 8
those authors, despite their different approaches and often passionate 
disagreements, share a common interest in undoing the categories of ‘Nature’ 
and ‘Culture’ through a troubling of the ontological rift between humans and 
nonhumans. "
That rift between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ has been troubled further and, arguably, 
irreversibly, in 2002 when, writing in the journal Nature, chemist Paul Crutzen 
proposed to assign the term ‘Anthropocene’ to “the present, in many ways 
human-dominated, geological epoch, supplementing the Holocene—the warm 
period of the past 10-12 millenia.”  As he continued:"9
The Anthropocene could be said to have started in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the 
beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and 
methane. This date also happens to coincide with James Watt’s design 
of the steam engine in 1784. "10
According to data quoted by Crutzen, since the dawn of the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain, the human population has increased tenfold to 6 billion, 
being expected to reach 10 billion before the end of the 21st century. Driven by 
 See Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: 8
Routledge, 1991); N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and 
Literary Texts (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); Manuel DeLanda, 
A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2006); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things  (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010); Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: 
how actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them do so,” in Advances in Social 
Theory and Methodology: toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies, eds. Karin 
Knorr-Cetina and Aaron V. Cicourel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); Karen Barad, 
Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007); Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An 
Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London and New York: Continuum, 
2009); Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Winchester and 
Washington: Zero Books, 2010); Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology: or What It’s Like to Be a 
Thing (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); and Levi Bryant, The 
Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011). Although only some of the 
theses put forward by these authors will be discussed and used in building the argument of this 
dissertation, the interest they all seem to share in a thought that is able to overcome human 
exceptionalism is very much in line with the ethos of this project.
 Paul Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature 415 (2002), 23. 9
 Ibid. Worth noting, in the context of the argument to be unfolded in this dissertation, that the 10
latter part of the eighteenth century which, according to Crutzen, coincided with the beginning of 
the Anthropocene, also saw the publication, in 1781, of the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason.
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changes in the human dietary habits made possible by the industrialisation of 
food supply chains, the methane-producing cattle population has risen to 1.4 
billion and the fishing industry has removed more than 25% of the primary fish 
production in upwelling ocean regions and 35% in the temperate continental 
shelf, with 30-50% of the planet’s land surface being exploited by humans. 
While dams and river diversions have been made possible thanks to the 
development of engineering and have become common realities around the 
globe with cities like London having its small rivers now flowing through 
underground systems, tropical forests are disappearing and more than half of all 
accessible fresh water is being used by humans. Energy use has increased 16–
fold during the twentieth century, leading to the emission of 160 million tonnes 
of atmospheric sulphur dioxide per year, more than twice the sum of its natural 
emissions, while more nitrogen fertiliser is applied in agriculture than is able to 
be fixed naturally by all terrestrial ecosystems. Added to that, fossil-fuel burning 
and agriculture have caused substantial increases in the concentration of 
greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide by 30% and methane by more than 100%, 
reaching their highest levels of the past 400 millennia. As a consequence of all 
those effects, caused so far by only 25% of the world population, the Earth’s 
climate is changing dramatically and faster than it has ever done in the previous 
12 millennia of the Holocene, with global warming, climate change, and carbon 
emissions having become a regular feature in party-political debates and on the 
front pages of newspapers and magazines. "11
Crutzen’s thesis confirms what some scholars have been speculating for the 
best part of 20 years, i.e. that the separation between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ is 
anything but clear or even certain. That being the case, how does that affect 
performance theory? Is it possible to speculate on what performance might 
mean, on how differently it might or might not look, on the flattened ontological 
grounds of the Anthropocene? And can current and future understandings of 
what it means to perform respond to the fall of the wall between ‘Nature’ and 
‘Culture’? |f so, what could be the consequences—epistemological, ethical, 
political, etc.—of rethinking, reenacting, reconfiguring, and reshaping 
performance and its theories in light of the challenges of the ecological age?   "
 See ibid for the full breadth of the human impact on the planet’s ecosystems.11
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Theories of theatre and performance have, at least since ancient Greece, been 
predominantly centred in the human as forms of cultural production.  From 12
Plato’s rejection of mimesis to its recovery as a didactic tool at the hands of 
Aristotle; from Brecht’s political writing on theatre to the field-defining works of 
scholars such as Richard Schechner and Peggy Phelan, performance has, until 
fairly recently, been mostly thought as something that depends on the presence 
of human bodies, whether as performers or as audiences. As Marvin Carlson 
wrote, “[performance] is always performance for someone, some audience that 
recognises and validates it as performance […].”  Nevertheless, what both the 13
ecological crisis and the recent resurgence of materialist and realist 
metaphysical projects show is that any attempts at isolating the human from the 
nonhuman and making the latter dependent on the former are, at best, wishful 
thinking. In the ecological age, when humans and nonhumans are so 
enmeshed in promiscuous relationships with one another that it no longer 
makes sense to keep them apart in knowledge formations, how can 
performance be said equally of both sides of the old divide between ‘Nature’ 
and ‘Culture’? Is it possible to theorise “performance as such”? "14
"
Transport!
The method chosen to, at least in a provisional manner, try to address the place 
of performance in the ecological age is indebted to the tradition of speculative 
thought found everywhere in continental philosophy from Plato to Deleuze, 
 See Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement, 2; also, Claudia Castellucci et al., The Theatre 12
of Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 15.
 Marvin Carlson, Performance: a Critical Introduction (New York and London: Routledge, 13
2004), 5 (emphasis added).
 I owe the phrase “performance as such” to Alan Read. It has taken me a while to find a term 14
to describe the main object of this dissertation as no term seemed ever able to fully point in a 
concise manner to what I was trying to think. No term, that is, until Alan Read’s book Theatre, 
Intimacy & Engagement was recommended to me towards the end of my doctoral research. At 
one point in the book, Read claimed that human performance is simply a subset of 
“performance ‘as such’” (Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement, 82), where the latter is 
defined simply by the presence of “the two key qualifiers of performance, its liveness and the 
audience/performer act of spectation” (Ibid., 85). Read’s minimal definition of performance ‘as 
such’ will hopefully vibrate in sympathy with the notion of performance that will be put forward in 
this dissertation, despite the fact that I only became acquainted with it after having already 
written much of what you are about to read. 
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Spinoza to Derrida. It does, however, take that speculative tradition further by 
refashioning it after the ecocritical work of authors such as Timothy Morton. "15
“Speculative Philosophy,” Alfred North Whitehead wrote in Process and Reality, 
“is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general 
ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.”  16
By seeking to produce a coherent system of general ideas that is applicable to 
all instances of everyday experience, i.e. to “everything of which we are 
conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought,” the task of speculative 
thought is that of finding the “essence to the universe,” through a method of 
metaphysical generalisation.  Thus, by concerning itself with what Whitehead 17
called the “larger generalities,” speculative philosophy was developed as 
master(ing)-thought, a thought that ought to be coherent and applicable to all 
instances of the real and, as such, also detached from the mundane everyday 
concerns of the scientific disciplines and their particular areas of study.  "18
The problem with such purely speculative approach is that, by definition, it 
exists disconnected from the catastrophic reality which humans and nonhumans 
are increasingly forced to face and that, therefore and as it is, it offers little 
contribution to problems such as the ones arising from the ongoing ecological 
crisis. Because global warming is a particular atmospheric event and not a 
 See Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics 15
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2007); and Timothy Morton, The Ecological 
Thought (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Free 16
Press, 1978), 3.
 Ibid., 3–5.17
 There is an important passage in Process and Reality that illustrates the relationship between 18
speculative philosophy and scientific thought in a very clear and straightforward way. In it, 
Whitehead wrote:"
“The field of a special science is confined to one genus of facts, in the sense that no statements 
are made respecting facts which lie outside that genus. The very circumstance that a science 
has naturally arisen concerning a set of facts secures that facts of that type have definite 
relations among themselves which are very obvious to all mankind. […]"
“The study of philosophy is a voyage towards the larger generalities. For this reason in the 
infancy of science, when the main stress lay in the discovery of the most general ideas usefully 
applicable to the subject-matter in question, philosophy was not sharply distinguished from 
science. To this day, a new science with any substantial novelty in its notions is considered to be 
in some way peculiarly philosophical. In their later stages, apart from occasional disturbances, 
most sciences accept without question the general notions in terms of which they develop. The 
main stress is laid on the adjustment and the direct verification of more special statements. In 
such periods scientists repudiate philosophy […].” (Ibid., 9–10).
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larger metaphysical category, it should remain the concern of scientists and not 
cross their doorstep into the abstract outdoors of speculative thought."
With such disinterest in everyday reality and concerned instead with challenging 
scientific knowledge—what, as this argument progresses, will also be identified 
with the ethos of critique—speculative philosophers eventually found 
themselves doing metaphysics as the world on which they stood progressed 
towards obliteration.  Thus, whilst the present dissertation takes up speculation 19
as its method for tentatively rehearsing an ecological general theory of 
performance, its speculative exercises are grounded on the urgent need of a 
better understanding of the implications the troubling of the divide between 
‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ can have for performance scholarship."
Not merely concerned with the “larger generalities” proposed by Whitehead as 
the main object of speculative philosophy, this dissertation will align itself with 
what Timothy Morton called “the ecological thought,” the thought that “thinks 
big” through increasing one’s awareness of the “mesh,” the vast 
“interconnectedness of all living and non-living things.  However, because it is 20
triggered by the discovery of what Morton called “hyperobjects,” i.e. realities 
that, like Styrofoam, plutonium, and climate itself, “exist on almost unthinkable 
timescales,” ecological thinking, in being both speculative and realist, is also 
aware of its inability to master the real while nonetheless trying to, somehow, 
think it.  In Morton’s words: "21
When we think big we discover a hole in our psychological universe. 
There is no way of measuring anything anymore, since there is nowhere 
“outside” this universe from which to take an impartial measurement. 
Strangely, thinking big doesn’t mean that we put everything in a big box. 
Thinking big means that the box melts into nothing in our hands.  "22
Or, in an even more poetic passage that illustrates the anxiety of someone who, 
faced with an enormous danger, has nowhere to run to: "
 For details on the problems associated with methodologies of critique, see below, pp. 60–66.19
 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 20, 28.20
 For more on Morton’s concept of “hyperobject,” see Ibid., 19.21
 Ibid., 31.22
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The ecological disaster is like being in a cinema when suddenly the 
movie itself melts. Then the screen melts. Then the cinema itself melts. 
Or you realize your chair is crawling with maggots. "23
As such, although concerned with thinking larger generalities like any other 
ontological project, this dissertation is also very much aware of its own limits 
when forced to face the hyperreality of the ongoing ecological disaster. In other 
words, it is because it departs from a realisation that the ecological crisis calls 
into question human dreams of mastery over the real and the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ 
divide, that this dissertation will pursue its speculative enquiry on performance 
with the knowledge that there will always be a part of its object of study that it 
won’t be able to grasp or anticipate. As a result, it will highlight the real as 
ultimately strange rather than positing it as a fully graspable and certain world. 
In doing so, this project will make a claim for the performative nature of all 
encounters between all kinds of bodies, whilst never losing sight of its own 
reality as performance, a reality enacted in the encounter between the body of 
this text and you as its reader. "
In a flat world where beings are enmeshed in one another, method should not 
come before that which it will eventually lead to. Instead, method, form and their 
outcomes or contents are fully intertwined like the threads in a piece of fabric. 
Therefore, as a text guided by ecological concerns, this thesis will embrace its 
own ecology by becoming aware of its reality as a system of relations and 
connections, clusters and collisions. It will also attempt to become something 
close to a geological formation by making use of pressure, movement, and 
flows in order to fuse and fission concepts and ideas. It will, ultimately, try to 
become an example of that which it has set itself to think; it will explore its own 
poietic existence. If, as it will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three, poiēsis 
is the name of the performative power of all bodies, a thesis that aims to remain 
faithful to the performative character of its encounter with a reader will have to 
embrace its poietic weapons openly. Furthermore, if the aim is to think while 
nonetheless remaining unable to master, the text must simultaneously explore 
new strategies to convey meaning whilst never losing sight of the ultimate 
strangeness of that which it tries to think."
 Ibid., 32.23
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As a consequence, this thesis aims to reflect, in both its content and poietic 
style, a certain feeling of being late: too late to write, too late to think, too late to 
act in the hope of avoiding the ecological catastrophe that, for what it’s worth, 
has already started. As late writing and late thought, this thesis is written from a 
position of anxiety, of feeling powerless in the face of imminent danger. It is 
writing written when it is already too late to write; it is writing that precludes the 
possibility of its own cathartic finale. It is, as it was already mentioned, writing 
that is aware of itself as failure, unable to master the real and determine its 
unfolding. In such circumstances, the only thing this writing sets itself to do is to 
tentatively point in the direction of that which it knows it can’t fully grasp: that 
which will remain strange in all encounters. For, as Timothy Morton wrote: "
Heidegger poetically said that you never hear the wind in itself, only the 
storm whistling in the chimney, the wind in the trees. The same is true of 
the mesh itself. You never perceive it directly. But you can detect it in the 
snails, the sea thrift, and the smell of the garbage can. "24
Although unable to master the real, as writing that comes too late to avoid the 
ecological crisis, this will be guided by two aims: 1) it will try to highlight the 
uncomfortable strangeness of the real that it, itself, will remain unable to grasp, 
and 2) it will to avoid existing styles of writing which have historically tried to 
safely master the real within the confines of their pages. "
Taking mainstream environmental rhetoric as an example of the kind of 
mastering discourse this dissertation will try to avoid, Morton, again, provided a 
useful description of it:"
Environmental rhetoric is too often strongly affirmative, extraverted, and 
masculine; it privileges speech over writing; and it simulates immediacy 
(feigning one-to-one correspondences between language and reality). It’s 
sunny, straightforward, ableist, holistic, hearty, and “healthy.” Where does 
this leave negativity, introversion, femininity, writing, mediation, 
ambiguity, darkness, irony, fragmentation, and sickness? Are these 
simply nonecological categories? "25
 Ibid., 57.24
 Ibid., 16.25
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As it was shown by the scenes included in the Prelude, human mastery of the 
nonhuman is an impossible task. Its pursuit has led to the revelation of its own 
impossibility. Writing after the ecological crisis has already began—writing late
—is thus a dark, uncertain, literally near-death (perhaps even post-death) 
experience; it holds no place for mastering discourses and masculinist 
certainties. And even less does it allow humanist ideologies or any other 
attempts to reinstate ontological divides between ‘Culture’ and ‘Nature.’ "
With a style that is close to Edward Said’s understanding of “late style,” writing 
after (and because of) the ecological crisis is writing that “[stirs] up more 
anxiety, [that tampers] irrevocably with the possibility of closure, and [that 
leaves] the audience more perplexed and unsettled than before”.  It is, 26
following Adorno, a writing that is closer to the essay form than to the certainties 
of the established style of academic writing. Considering the latter to be a kind 
of writing marked by “comprehensive general views” and “continuity of 
presentation,” the essayistic style of ecological writing pursued by this thesis is, 
instead, characterised by discontinuity and experimentation.  If dominant styles 27
of scholarly writing seek legitimacy through the adoption of recognisable 
methods of enquiry, ecological writing—writing that comes late—is closer to 
creative than to critical writing. Because there is no outside mastering position it 
can safely occupy in order to look at the world, because it is always already 
implicated in whatever it writes about, ecological writing of the kind that will be 
pursued here is a kind of “veering” in the sense Nicholas Royle has given to the 
term: a veering away from anthropocentric, logocentric, egocentric, and subject-
 Edward Said, On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain (London: Bloomsbury, 26
2007), 7. In that book, Said investigated the late works of several artists and authors that, 
against what one usually believes late works to be, don’t exhibit any serene “ripeness of 
style” (ibid.) but are, instead, “a kind of self-imposed exile from what is generally acceptable, 
coming after it, and surviving beyond it” (ibid.,16). Being felt as uncanny in their representations 
of catastrophe, late works of authors such as Beethoven, Ibsen, Adorno, Genet, etc., manifest a 
“sustained tension, unaccommodated stubbornness, lateness, and newness next to each other 
by virtue of an ‘inexorable clamp that holds together what no less powerfully strives to break 
apart’” (ibid., 17). Although it is not the aim of this dissertation to place itself alongside the late 
works discussed in On Late Style—that would have been ridiculous at best—Said’s study of the 
ways in which lateness manifests itself in musical and literary works is rather useful for thinking 
the style writing might have to adopt in order to cope with its own being late vis-à-vis the 
ecological crisis. Although Said’s book deals with the final works of writers and artists that are, 
individually, approaching death and the end of their careers, it is fair to say that, if writing is 
depersonalised and thought of as a product of the human, it could in principle manifest the 
same kind of troubling qualities after humans as a species realise the failure of their project of 
emancipation and the imminence of their own disappearance. 
 Theodor Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” New German Critique 32 (1984): 10–11.27
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centred paradigms of knowing.  Ecological writing is, therefore, writing that is 28
attuned to the strangeness of words understood as part and parcel of an 
equally strange and ultimately ungraspable universe. It is writing that allows for 
an intimate encounter with the strangeness of the real or, as Royle wrote of 
Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura:  "
[It is] an experience of uncertainty of time and place, a universe of 
swerving atoms, from the swirling movements of what passes through 
water and air and goes rippling through our limbs to the sways of fear 
and pleasure in the mind: sheer veering. "29
"
Landscape!
When writing a PhD thesis, it is customary to position one’s contribution to 
knowledge within an existing academic field. Such a move, close to being a 
disclaimer, allows the reader—that is, you—to fine tune his or her critical 
parameters to the standards that come with concrete expectations before the 
task of reading even begins: What are the defining texts in the field? Does the 
student start by acknowledging them? Does the already existing literature 
address questions or problems that might be similar or closely related to the 
ones the student is setting him- or herself to tackle? If so, to what extent is the 
student aware of that fact, and how does he or she depart from or add to what 
has been written before? "
By claiming a field, by outing oneself as citizen of an academic territory, as the 
newest cog in a preexisting epistemological machine, the future doctor—may 
the gods help him or her—aims to thread safely on a recognisable landscape, 
even if the particular road he or she chooses to open from here to there is not 
normally mapped out in advance. Voicing one’s academic field is, like stating 
one’s citizenship, identity, or belonging, something one generally does for 
increasing the chances of survival: in our being together, we are usually 
stronger. "
 Nicholas Royle, Veering: A Theory of Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 28
2011), 69. 
 Ibid., 84.29
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The problem with the above is that we often find ourselves building homes—
that is to say, drawing boundaries, erecting walls, creating divides—in order to 
feel together. When we claim to belong here or there, we are necessarily 
denying ourselves the advantages that might come with belonging elsewhere, 
belonging only temporarily (as a tourist, a visitor, an observer, an asylum 
seeker), or even not belonging at all (being nomad). We are also, more often 
than not, deciding who or what will be allowed in with us, in our homes, in our  
nations, in our property. And that, I believe, is something we can no longer 
afford to do in the ecological age. The ecological age, as it was seen above 
when discussing methodology, demands “thinking big”—when the end is nigh, it 
comes for us all, regardless of where we live, of what we look like, or of the 
thickness of the walls we surround ourselves with. “Thinking big” means there is 
no time to build fences or dig trenches—the sooner we leave the safety of our 
houses, the sooner we will be forced to face the full extent of the damage. 
Boundaries—between identities, species, nations, genders, modes of being, 
and even academic disciplines—serve, I believe, only to prevent action, as it will 
become clearer as this thesis progresses. They might make us feel safer, but 
feeling safe is worth nothing when the only thing left to breathe in is thick fire. 
Or, provided you need another image, building walls won’t prevent the ground 
underneath our feet from cracking open.   "
Few people have got the full ecological implications of that refusal of 
boundaries better than Deleuze and Guattari in their “Treatise on Nomadology,” 
part of A Thousand Plateaus. In it, and in their usual poetic style, the pair 
identified two kinds of science, one that “reproduces” and one that “follows,” the 
difference being that,"
[reproducing] implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is 
external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the bank. But 
following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, 
just different. One is obliged to follow when one is in search of the 
“singularities” of a matter, or rather of a material, and not out to discover 
a form; when one escapes the force of gravity to enter a field of celerity; 
when one ceases to contemplate the course of a laminar flow in a 
determinate direction, to be carried away by a vortical flow; when one 
engages in a continuous variation of variables, instead of extracting 
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constants from them, etc. And the meaning of Earth completely changes 
[…]. "30
What could be more ecological than having “the meaning of Earth” change as a 
result of our choosing to jump on a river and follow its flow rather than to stand 
on the safety of its banks and watch it go by in the hope we won’t be carried 
away with it? What could make thought bigger—that is, more ecological—other 
than insistently denying oneself the comfort that comes with the sight of a 
clearly demarcated border-horizon?"
Because I believe that only through denying oneself comforting viewing 
platforms can one sketch new knowledges that match this ecological ambition, 
this dissertation will refuse being contained within the boundaries of a single 
academic discipline. Therefore, it should not be seen as making its way along a 
homogenous and clearly delimited scholarly field. If boundaries are seen to be 
drawn at times for the sake of—say—clarity, they should always be thought of 
as both porous and contingent. Nevertheless, in the end, the text you hold in 
your hands aims at being a doctoral thesis and, as such, it is expected to abide 
by certain rules and to conform with certain expectations—this, it is hoped, will 
grant it scholarly recognition. And as scholarly recognition is its more practical 
aim, I cannot but attempt, even if only provisionally, to briefly sketch the territory 
through which this work will be moving (even if said territory will remain a 
swamp or, at best, a rather muddy and slippery field).  "
The research project which has resulted in this dissertation departed, as it was 
already seen, from asking an old question in a new context. The question “what 
is performance?”—an ontological one—is a question to which many scholars 
working in the field of Performance Studies have already devoted themselves 
on several occasions. From Richard Schechner to Jon McKenzie, from Peggy 
Phelan to Alan Read, their work has been crucial for thinking what we think 
when we think performance. "
As it will be developed in detail in Chapter Two, Schechner’s inaugural works on 
performance presented it as a kind of social, repeated, and/or ritualised type of 
behaviour that is often responsible for (re-)shaping the structural organisation of 
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 30
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 372.
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societies.  Due to its indebtedness to Anthropology, especially to Victor 31
Turner’s ritual studies, Schechner’s work has been primarily concerned with 
performance as a certain type of human behaviour responsible for enacting the 
social.  "32
Phelan, on the other hand, drew from a different source, psychoanalysis, in 
order to build her ontology of performance, in what might be one of the most 
quoted works of Performance Studies, Unmarked.  If, for Schechner, 33
performance is responsible for making and structuring worlds, for Phelan, in her 
privileging of the liveness of the encounter, performance is, instead, responsible 
for undoing worlds and refusing their structures. In its inability to be reproduced 
or fixed, that is, in its absolute ephemerality, performance is, for Phelan, always 
already disappearing and, therefore, impossible to be arrested. As Alan Read 
put it recently, “Schechner’s position could be identified as a binding to the 
social, while Phelan’s was recognised as a tactical withdrawal from [it].” "34
Nevertheless, despite the differences between the two positions, what both 
authors have in common is a clear focus on the human in performance: 
Schechner, due to his anthropological concerns with the social, and Phelan, 
due to her psychoanalytical focus on performance’s troubling of human 
subjectivity.  As such, both authors are primarily focused on ‘Culture,’ the realm 35
that appears in opposition to ‘Nature’ and one of the sides of the ontological 
divide this dissertation will try to trouble in response to the demands of the 
ecological age."
 See, for instance, Richard Schechner, Performance Theory (London and New York: 31
Routledge, 2003). 
 This is somehow a generalisation for Richard Schechner has indeed more than once 32
reflected on instances of performative behaviour in animals, something that will also be 
discussed in Chapter Two below. However, as it will be further argued later, his work is mostly 
concerned with making claims about performance in relation to the human sphere, even when 
writing about instances of nonhuman performance (see below, pp. 93–94). 
 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 33
1993). 
 Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement, 55.34
 As Phelan wrote:"35
“In performance, the body is metonymic of self, of character, of voice, of ‘presence.’ But in the 
plenitude of its apparent visibility and availability, the performer actually disappears and 
represents something else—dance, movement, sound, character, ‘art.’ […] Performance uses 
the performer’s body to pose a question about the inability to secure the relation between 
subjectivity and the body per se […]” (Phelan, Unmarked, 150–151). 
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Still, various performance scholars have already tried to take Performance 
Studies beyond the human and its social and cultural apparatuses. Examples of 
those are Jon McKenzie and, more rencently, Alan Read who, in very different 
ways, have questioned the discipline’s privileging of human performances 
aimed at structuring an all-too-human social system.  Similarly, the necessity of 36
liveness for the performance encounter, a thesis that is central in Phelan’s work, 
has also been questioned by scholars such as Philip Auslander and Amelia 
Jones.  Still, none of those authors has really been able to sufficiently push 37
performance beyond the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide. That is because, in my view, 
although they have opened the way for nonhuman and even nonliving bodies to 
be seen as performers in their own right—e.g. performing documents or 
technological apparatuses—they have nonetheless kept the human as the 
ultimate spectator for whom those performances take place.   As such, this 38
thesis will be both inspired and challenged by their work, and try to depart from 
it in order to, even if only tentatively, rephrase older questions and open up new 
ones on the nature, place, and role of performance in the ecological age. "
However, if Performance Studies is the primary field on which this thesis will 
move in its rethinking of performance, there are other branches of knowledge 
which, due to their being concerned with the broad ecological question, will 
have to also be acknowledged as parallel landscapes this research project has 
had to venture across. Amongst those fields, it is important to note my 
indebtedness to continental philosophy (especially the broad umbrella of so-
called speculative realism and object-oriented ontology), and ecocriticism."
Continental philosophy has been invaluable in helping me understand the full 
breadth of the consequences the ecological crisis is having on ideologies of 
progress, emancipation, and (human) autonomy. From the thinkers to whom I 
am indebted, I would highlight Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, Bruno 
 See, Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: from Discipline to Performance (London and New York: 36
Routledge, 2001), 29–53; and Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement, 81–101.
 See, for instance, Philip Auslander, “The Performativity of Performance Documentation,” PAJ: 37
A Journal of Performance and Art 28, no. 3 (2006): 1–10; and Amelia Jones, “‘Presence’ in 
Absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation,” Art Journal 56, no. 4 (1997):11–18.
 This argument will be developed in Chapter Two (see below, pp. 95–97). 38
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Latour, and Jane Bennett.  All of them, despite their recurrent disagreements 39
which I won’t be addressing, have convinced me of the urgency of rethinking 
the human-nonhuman divide as part of a broader response to the unfolding of 
the ecological age.  That has provided the launching platform for the central 40
question of this dissertation: what does performance look like in the absence of 
humans? However, despite my indebtedness to their work, I also hope to give 
something back by highlighting the rather crucial role performance plays in—
say—Harman’s theory of causation.  "41
There is another field or class of scholarly discourse that, at the intersection of 
continental philosophy, literary criticism, and queer and feminist theories, also 
shares similar concerns with this research project, the field of posthumanism. 
Normally associated with the likes of Donna Haraway, Katherine Hayles, or Rosi 
Braidotti, posthumanism also intends to think the world under the very real 
effacing of the boundaries between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture.’ In that sense, it can 
be said that posthumanism is also a core landmark in the theoretical landscape 
through which this thesis will be moving. For, as Braidotti noted, what all 
posthumanist theorists seem to share is a belief in the continuum 
‘Nature’–‘Culture’ instead of a defence of the divide ‘Nature’/‘Culture.’  Still, the 42
ground shared by posthuman theorists appears to be just that, certainly due to 
 This is by no means an exclusive list. As it will become clear as this dissertation progresses, 39
other thinkers have played a role no smaller than the one played by the ones I have just named. 
 I have spent quite a lot of time trying to decide whether or not to address, as part of this 40
thesis, the philosophical disagreements between thinkers like Harman and Latour, or Harman 
and Meillassoux, or Harman and Bennett, or even between all the latter and others such as Ray 
Brassier, François Laruelle, or other thinkers who share similar realist or materialist concerns 
but who do often passionately disagree with the likes of Harman, Latour, and Bennett to whom 
this thesis, at times, owes a lot. Nonetheless, at least a footnote would have to be written as a 
kind of disclaimer: whereas I share some of the concerns and am convinced by some of the 
thesis of Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, by no means I 
intend, here, to align myself with a particular philosophical discourse, to become a disciple of a 
‘movement,’ whether Harman’s or someone else’s. My primary concern is with opening up a set 
of questions concerning that thing we call performance, its present state and its possible 
ecological future. Therefore, for addressing that concern of mine, I am happy to use and 
sometimes abuse various claims of otherwise contradictory philosophical positions. That, 
however, is one of the advantages of not restricting one’s dwelling to the established confines of 
one discipline: philosophy, as a unified field has, like all other disciplines, adopted certain codes 
and modes of working that provide philosophers with the legitimacy and comfort that being 
recognised by one’s peers brings. I, on the other hand and as this introduction has hopefully 
already shown, take much more pleasure and pride from nomadism and promiscuity. 
Sometimes love is a problem for which polygamy is the only foreseeable solution. 
 This is something that will be discussed in further detail from Chapter Two onwards.41
 See Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2013), 2.42
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the fact that several scholars of the posthuman appear to have arrived at the 
‘Nature’–‘Culture’ continuum via different roads and with different 
methodologies: some, such as Hayles, arrived at it through cybernetics and the 
work done at the quasi-mythical Macy Conferences of 1946–1953, whilst others 
like Judith Butler got into it via Foucault’s work on biopolitics and technologies 
of Self. Some, like Haraway, departed from the ideas of hybridity and perversity 
embodied in the (feminised) figure of the cyborg, whilst others such as Braidotti 
aligned themselves with the thinking of flows and multiplicities that can be found 
in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.  Further to all the differences 43
that emerge out of such diverse avenues of enquiry, the term ‘posthuman’ is 
also in itself quite controversial. As Haraway noted when reflecting on her 
abandonment of the term ‘posthuman’ which she had used in her early work: "44
I never wanted to be posthuman, or posthumanist, any more than I 
wanted to be postfeminist. For one thing, urgent work still remains to be 
done in reference to those who must inhabit the troubled categories of 
woman and human, properly pluralized, reformulated, and brought into 
constitutive intersection with other asymmetrical differences.    "45
A totally opposite take on the term can be found in Braidotti who, nonetheless, 
shares with Haraway an interest in reflecting on what makes humans human:"
The posthumanist perspective rests on the assumption of the historical 
decline of Humanism but goes further in exploring alternatives, without 
sinking into the rhetoric of the crisis of Man. It works instead towards 
elaborating alternative ways of conceptualizing the human subject. "46
Hayles’ work, too, is primarily focused on a reconceptualisation of the human, 
albeit this time under the light of an increasingly networked informational world. 
As she argued: "
 See Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 43
Press, 2010), xi–xvi; and Braidotti, The Posthuman, 38–54.
 For Haraway’s early use of the term ‘posthuman,’ see, for instance, Donna Haraway, “Ecce 44
Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and Innappropriate/d Others: The Human in a Post-Humanist 
Landscape,” in The Haraway Reader (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 47–61. 
 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 17.45
 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 37.46
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Whereas the ‘human’ has since the Enlightenment been associated with 
rationality, free will, autonomy, and a celebration of consciousness as the 
seat of identity, the posthuman in its more nefarious forms is construed 
as an informational pattern that happens to be instantiated in a biological 
substrate. "47
What the three passages above show is how unstable the term ‘posthuman’ is 
and the different, often contradictory, ways in which it has been thought, used, 
and valued by theorists who nevertheless appear to be interested in similar 
projects. Further, the concern with rethinking the human under the light of the 
‘Nature’–‘Culture’ continuum that is demonstrated by Haraway, Braidotti and 
Hayles falls out of the scope of this thesis even if it does resonate with a big 
part of its premise and line of enquiry. Because the present project is primarily 
interested in thinking what performance might mean when the human is not 
present—either because it became too unstable a taxon, because it became 
extinct as a species, or simply because it did not take part as either performer 
or audience in a particular performance encounter—neither Haraway’s, 
Braidotti’s, nor Hayles’ focus on rethinking the human after the ‘Human’ is 
sufficient to lead this boat to its desired shore. That said, there will be 
references throughout this thesis to all of those theorists, some more explicit 
than others, some agreeing whilst others disagreeing with part of their 
arguments.   "
Finally, ecocriticism has been crucial in thinking the ways in which ideas of 
‘Nature’ have become sedimented in layers upon layers of collective memory 
thanks, in part, to literature. Hard to define as a discipline, ecocriticism is a 
mostly north-american subset of literary criticism that, since the mid-1980s and 
in an avowedly political manner, has attempted to do for ‘Nature’ and ‘the 
environment’ what feminist literary critics, for instance, have done for gender, 
that is, to track down and analyse the ways in which those categories have 
been described and, to a certain extent, constructed through literary 
 N. Katherine Hayles, “Unfinished Work: From Cyborg to Cognisphere,” Theory, Culture & 47
Society 23, no. 7&8 (2006): 160.
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representations.  As Cheryll Glotfelty wrote, rather concisely, in her introduction 48
to the field-defining 1996 book The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary 
Ecology:  "
[Ecocriticism] is the study of the relationship between literature and the 
physical environment. Just as feminist criticism examines language and 
literature from a gender-conscious perspective, and Marxist criticism 
brings an awareness of modes of production and economic class to its 
readings of texts, ecocriticism takes an earth-centered approach to 
literary studies. "49
Despite early ecocriticism having been primarily concerned with the ‘Nature’ 
and ‘wilderness’ writings of Romantic authors such as Henry David Thoreau, 
Aldo Leopold, or William Wordsworth, today it explores the co-dependency of 
the terms ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture,’ ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman,’ as they are 
negotiated in a broader variety of media, from science-fiction novels to 
television shows, from contemporary poetry to visual art practices.  The 50
questions asked are often varied but all depart from the premise that human 
‘Culture’ and ‘Natural’ world, as well as the realities which they attempt to 
circumscribe, are always already entangled in a rather fundamental way. 
According to Glotfelty, some of the contemporary lines of enquiry attempt to 
answer questions such as:"
How is nature represented in this sonnet? What role does the physical 
setting play in the plot of this novel? Are the values expressed in this play 
consistent with ecological wisdom? How do our metaphors of the land 
influence the way we treat it? How can we characterize nature writing as 
a genre? In addition to race, class, and gender, should place become a 
new critical category? […] In what ways has literacy itself affected 
humankind’s relationship to the natural world? How has the concept of 
 See Anne Milne, “Ecocriticism,” in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory & Criticism, 48
eds. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 280–284. 
 Cheryll Glotfelty, “Introduction: Literary Studies in an Age of Environmental Crisis,” in The 49
Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology, eds. Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm 
(Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1996), xviii.
 See Milne, “Ecocriticism,” 281–282; and Greg Garrard, Ecocriticism (London and New York: 50
Routledge, 2012), 5.
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wilderness changed over time? In what ways and to what effect is the 
environmental crisis seeping into contemporary literature and popular 
culture? What view of nature informs U.S. Government reports, corporate 
advertising, and televised nature documentaries, and to what rhetorical 
effects? "51
Therefore, by trying to show how existing representations of ‘Nature,’ as well as 
their meaning, are inseparable from the cultural apparatuses that give rise to 
them and often supported by ideologies of human autonomy, mastery, and 
freedom—the longing for the “great outdoors,” for instance, being nothing more 
than a symptom of one’s mastery over it—ecocritical works by the likes of 
Timothy Morton, Greg Garrard, and Timothy Clark amongst many others have 
allowed me to think ecologically whilst trying to undo or, at least, problematise, 
popular notions of ‘Nature’ and, as a consequence, also of ‘Culture.’"
Notwithstanding what has just been claimed in the above paragraphs, this 
section does not intend to be an exhaustive naming of my fellow travel 
companions nor a full explanation of how I will borrow and possibly depart from 
their work. As I move along this road, many other companions will join me, our 
paths will cross for a while, and then they will take us apart with the same ease 
as they brought us together. As the road is long and the journey rarely a lonely 
one, naming everybody with whom I may walk for a while would be a rather 
lengthy affair. Doing the travel is always better than looking at someone else’s 
photos of it. Therefore, I can only hope that, as I take you on this journey, you 
will forgive me for all the blank spaces I purposefully left open here as you 
become surprised, hopefully in a positive way, by all the strange and 
unexpected bodies, human and nonhuman, we will encounter along the way."
"
Road!
Divided into five Chapters and a Conclusion, and punctuated by an Interlude 
and a Fugue, this thesis will draw from and build upon existing work in 
Performance Studies, Philosophy, and Ecocriticism, in order to sketch, however 
tentatively, a general theory of performance for the ecological age. "
 Glotfelty, “Introduction: Literary Studies in an Age of Environmental Crisis,” xix.51
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With that aim in mind, Chapter One will depart from an analysis of Vito 
Acconci’s 1971 performance for camera Centers, and of its 2011 reenactment 
at the site of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, in order to explore the challenges 
that the current ecological age poses to the pursuit of human autonomy and 
emancipation from ‘Nature.’ By looking at those two performances for camera 
as well as at the genealogy of ideologies of human emancipation since Kant, 
the first chapter will claim that the Western investment in human autonomy has 
laid the ground for the development of a deeply narcissistic human civilisation.  "
In line with the argument of Chapter One, Chapter Two, “Performance on the 
Anthropocenic Stage,” will begin by tracing the history of human exceptionalism 
surrounding the term ‘performance’ from its first utterance on the 
Shakespearean stage through to its contemporary use in relation to a “broad 
spectrum” of events ranging from religious rituals to performance art pieces. 
After looking at the various ways in which the term has been used historically 
and in response to the variable degrees of anthropocentrism that can be found 
underlying many of such uses, the chapter will then draw from the work of 
philosophers Martin Heidegger and Graham Harman in order to open up a new 
framework for thinking performance in such a way that the human is no longer 
its condicio sine qua non. Triggered by the pressing issues arising from the 
ongoing ecological crisis and identified in Chapter One, Chapter Two will try to 
rehearse performance theory beyond human mastery and open the way for 
performance to be understood in a broader than broad spectrum, as the way in 
which all bodies, human and nonhuman, encounter one another whilst 
remaining strangers to each other. In doing so, the chapter will also stress the 
ecological interconnectedness of all kinds of bodies whilst nonetheless 
maintaining that, despite their tight enmeshment in one another, bodies will 
always remain separated by a distance that is better described as theatrical."
Chapter Two will be followed by an Interlude in which Art Orienté Objet’s work 
Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi and Pina Bausch’s landmark piece Café Müller will 
be used as case studies for presenting the ways in which the ecological theory 
of performance just sketched has also been enacted in two very different 
performance artworks. The reason behind the choice of pieces has to do with 
the fact that both the French bioart duo Art Orienté Objet and choreographer 
Pina Bausch have, despite the apparent divergency of their interests, always 
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made works that, in one way or another, troubled the certainty of the divide 
‘Nature’/‘Culture.’ As such, the Interlude will claim that both Che Le Cheval Vive 
en Moi and Caffé Müller present human and nonhuman bodies as well as their 
encounter in a way that resonates with and strengthens the argument put 
forward in the two previous chapters."
Following on from that, and if, as Chapter Two claimed, all relations can be 
thought of in terms of performance, Chapter Three, “Silent Shouts,” will take up 
some of the questions already explored in this Introduction whilst thinking about 
method, and engage with the strategies that might be adopted in order to 
somehow highlight the other side of the theatrical space that separates a 
performance from the always already strange presence of the body performing 
it. In order to do so, the chapter will reflect on the work that performance 
scholars have been doing since the 1990s trying to address the problems one 
faces when writing about performance, that is, about events that, due to their 
very nature, can never be fully translated into photography, video, or critical 
writing. Owing to Peggy Phelan’s and Della Pollock’s work on performative 
writing as a kind of writing that is able to capture and communicate something 
about a performance whilst not attempting to mask with certainty the ultimate 
elusiveness of its nature, Chapter Three will place performative writing in a 
lineage of ekphrastic writing that can be traced all the way to Homer’s Iliad and 
claim its use of metaphor to be particularly successful in allowing the 
strangeness of bodies to be foregrounded. As such, metaphor will be posited as 
a rhetoric device that highlights the unavoidable theatrical distance separating 
two bodies whilst simultaneously, and because of that, making that distance the 
shortest it can ever be. In terms of academic practice, then, that process entails 
the adoption of non-traditional forms of critical writing or, better, of writing that 
happens half-way between critical reflection and creative practice. However, 
unlike earlier forms of that practice and due to the ecological premise of this 
thesis, performative writing as explored here will not be reenacting and 
strengthening the anthropocentric legacies of postmodernism or post-
structuralism as it did in the 1990s, but it will instead emerge as a valid 
epistemological tool for the ecological age.  "
In line with that argument, Chapter Four will reflect on an instance in which the 
metaphoric strategies that mark performative writing have been successfully 
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used as epistemological tools by an artist attempting to convey the absolute 
strangeness of a body he knew himself unable to master. In the style of another 
case study, the example of performative writing that will be analysed in this 
chapter is Derek Jarman’s Blue. In “Blue, or Performing Metaphor,” Jarman’s 
film will be used to explore the efficacy of performative metaphors as catalysts 
of strange visions in a world marked by blindness. The argument will be built 
around an analysis of the poetic strategies Jarman used to represent AIDS, a 
goal the artist himself, as it will be seen, had always known to be unattainable.  
As a direct result of Jarman’s awareness of that fact, Blue emerged as a grand 
metaphorical gesture, one that, instead of trying and failing to portray a reality, 
did instead embrace the impossibility of such task and, through that, pointed to 
the theatrical cleavage separating the artist-spectator from that which he tried, 
unsuccessfully, to picture. Through his systematic use of metaphors voiced 
against the blinding light of a flickering International Klein Blue projection, Derek 
Jarman was able to allude to the strangeness of AIDS and to the space found 
between the concrete private reality of a body struggling (and slowly dying) with 
the syndrome and the abstract phenomenon of an epidemic being constructed 
and construed through public discourse and mass-circulated images of pain and 
suffering. By persistently making different bodies—colours, images, sounds, 
ideas—collide with and rub against one another, Jarman did, in Blue, 
hyperbolise metaphor and, through that, was able to turn blindness into the 
most successful form of sight. In doing so, the artist revealed how one’s 
perception of another body—in this case a body suffering from AIDS or AIDS-in-
itself—is always already metaphoric. Therefore, only a conscientious embrace 
and hyperbolising of metaphor can make metaphor itself visible and, as a result, 
foreground the theatricality of bodies as they are encountered. "
While the sudden awareness of the ultimate strangeness of bodies, triggered by 
the foregrounding of the theatrical space between them, could be seen to lead 
to a reinstatement of the split between ‘Culture’ and ‘Nature,’ a crucial difference 
between the pursuit of human autonomy discussed in Chapter One and that of 
the thesis put forward here will, by the end of Chapter Four, have hopefully 
emerged: whereas the pursuit of human autonomy culminated in the tautology 
of a human surrounding itself with its own humanity, the present thesis aims to 
interrupt that mise-en-abyme by pointing to the distance that separates not only 
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human ‘Culture’ from nonhuman ‘Nature,’ but ultimately every single body, 
human and nonhuman, from all other bodies at the time of their encounter. If, 
for much of post-Kantian philosophy, the only knowledge that was available to 
humans was knowledge of themselves and their own mental structures, through 
this thesis’ extension of the notion of performance to all encounters, all bodies, 
human and nonhuman, will emerge as absolute strangers to both each other 
and themselves. "
After the absolute strangeness of bodies and consequent unpredictability of 
their encounter is claimed, Chapter Five, “Blind Dates,” will address the 
ecopolitical implications of the argument unfolded theretofore. If the 
Anthropocene and the ecological crisis have highlighted the entanglement of 
humans and nonhumans as well as their own strangeness to both themselves 
and one another, and if that entanglement and strangeness are such that 
neither a human mastery of humans nor a human mastery of ‘Nature’ are able 
to be safely pursued, how could one reconfigure politics? If the project of 
human autonomy aimed to achieve a community of equals grounded on the 
right of every single human to reason freely, what kind of community lies ahead 
after the realisation that the only thing humans have in common with 
themselves and with nonhumans is their absolute strangeness to one another? 
Grounded in Jacques Rancière’s reconceptualisation of ‘policing’ and ‘politics,’ 
and aided by Deleuze and Guattari, Martin Heidegger, Peggy Phelan, Victor 
Turner, Roberto Esposito, and Emmanuel Lévinas, the final chapter of this 
thesis will open itself to a more ecological politics sustained by the absolute 
strangeness of all bodies, so that all humans and nonhumans can encounter 
one another in a more ethical fashion by never losing sight of the only thing they 
can be sure to have in common: their estrangement to one another."
Finally, the Conclusion will synthesise my contribution to knowledge by 
connecting the argument built in each chapter to the philosophical and political 
challenges posed by the Anthropocene.  The conclusion will also reflect on the 52
ways this dissertation can add, even if only provisionally, to work already being 
done in Performance Studies and further the discipline’s already existing 
 The challenges posed by the Anthropocene will be presented and discussed in more detail in 52
Chapter One below (pp. 66–68).
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potential and willingness to engage with other fields of knowledge in an 
ecological fashion."
After the Conclusion, a small, performative section will be added as this thesis’ 
Fugue: its an alternative ending. In it, the whole argument of this work will be 
summed up in a more poietic fashion, in line with the claims made on 
performative writing and metaphor in Chapter Three. Its aim will be that of 
capturing, even if only temporarily, even if only tangentially, the strangeness of 
the object of this study, a strangeness which the more academic sections of this 
dissertation will necessarily have failed to fully convey."
"
Arrival!
Situated at the intersection of Performance Studies, Philosophy, and 
Ecocriticism, this thesis will add to the work already done by scholars such as 
Jon McKenzie and Alan Read and propose a further opening up of performance 
to the nonhuman sphere as a response to the pressing ontological questions 
posed by the unfolding of the ecological crisis. With its claim that all encounters 
amongst all bodies, human and nonhuman, could be thought as performance, 
the thesis you hold in your hands will support a broader than broad spectrum of 
performance for an ecological world that will thereby once again emerge as 
theatrum mundi, albeit one where there will no longer be space for ontological 
exceptionalism of any kind, human or otherwise. In that way, this thesis will 
align itself with the strong history of Performance Studies scholarship 
concerning itself with the ethics of the encounter, as well as trying to expand on 
and adapt that work in light of the blurring of the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide and the 
‘nonhuman turn’ of recent philosophical debates. 
 52
—ONE— !
Correlationism and the Shock of the Anthropocene !
"
"
I see trees of green, red roses too"
I see them bloom, for me and you"
—Louis Armstrong "1"
(After the heathwaves: Heath Death, Entropy, "
Absolute Zero...)"
—Peter Reading "2"
"
"
"
Setting the Scene!
On the 11th of March 2011, at exactly 14:46 JST, the Pacific Coast of Tōhoku in 
the Northeast of Honshu, Japan, was hit by the 9.0 magnitude-strong Great 
East Japan Earthquake. Immediately after the beginning of the seismic activity, 
the SCRAM or emergency shutdown system of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant, located in the most affected coastal area, went into operation in 
Units 1, 2, and 3, which were active at the time.  However, due to the severity of 3
the tremors, the electricity transmission between the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company Shinfukushima Transformer Substations and the Fukushima Plant 
was also damaged, resulting in a total loss of electricity and, as a consequence, 
in the automatic activation of the emergency diesel generators, which were 
responsible for powering the core cooling down process in the three active 
reactors.  Soon after, and as it is often the case, the disturbances in the oceanic 4
crust led to the formation of a major tsunami which reached its peak at 15:37 
JST. As if the damage caused by the earthquake hadn’t already been enough, 
 Louis Armstrong, “What a Wonderful World,” writ. Bob Thiele and George David Weiss, MP3 1
download (Universal-Island Records Ltd, 1999).
 Peter Reading, −273.15 (Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2005), 1.2
 See Japan, NAIIC, The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 3
Investigation Commission (Tokyo: The National Diet of Japan, 2012), 23–24. 
 Ibid.4
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the tsunami flooded and destroyed the emergency diesel generators of the 
nuclear power plant, along with its seawater cooling pumps, the electric wiring 
system, and the DC power supply for Units 1, 2, and 4. By the time the water 
had retreated, the site was powerless and covered in debris, and its monitoring 
equipment was left irresponsive.  Ultimately, the lack of electricity made it 5
extremely difficult to cool down the reactors and the lack of access made it 
harder to bring in cooling alternatives such as fire trucks. As a result, a series of 
reactor core exposures and damages started at approximately 18:10 JST in 
Unit 1, followed by Unit 2 at 9:10 on the 13th of March, and Unit 3 at 
approximately 17:00 on the 14th. Those events led to hydrogen explosions at 
the Unit 1 building on the 12th of March, at Unit 3 on the 14th, and at Unit 4 on 
the 15th, followed by an explosion and mass discharge of radioactive material 
from Unit 2 also on the 15th.  It is estimated that a total of 900 PBq of 6
radioactive substances was released, 1/6 of the emissions of the Chernobyl 
accident, leading the Japanese government to evacuate 146,520 people living 
within a 20 Km radius of the power plant, several foreign embassies to advise 
their citizens to evacuate areas extending as far as Tokyo, and the disaster to 
be rated 7—“Major Accident”—on the International Nuclear and Radiological 
Event Scale.  "7
According to the World Nuclear Association, most radioactivity accumulated in 
the soil was due to the release of Caesium-137, an easily dispersible 
radionuclide with a 30-year half-life, which can contaminate land for some time 
and, due to its solubility, end up being consumed by humans.  In July 2011, 8
data collected by the Japanese Government identified the presence of 
accumulated Caesium-137 at radioactivity levels ranging between 10 KBq and 
3000 KBq/m2 within a radius of 80 Km from the nuclear power plant.  Although 9
 Ibid.5
 Ibid.6
 See Ibid., 34; Rama C. Hoetzlein, “Visual Communication in Times of Crisis: The Fukushima 7
Nuclear Accident,” Leonardo 45, no. 2 (2012): 113; and “Fukushima Accident 2011,” World 
Nuclear Association, accessed April 3, 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-
Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident-2011/.
 “Fukushima Accident 2011,” World Nuclear Association, accessed April 3, 2013, http://8
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident-2011/.
 NAIIC, The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 9
Commission, 40.
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the levels of radioactivity were much lower than those released during the 
archetypical nuclear accident that was Chernobyl, and even if there is no 
consensus amongst experts on the long-term health effects of exposure to low 
radiation levels, Chernobyl has taught the world that the levels of radioactivity 
accumulated in mountain and forest areas do not naturally diminish for many 
decades, and that wildfires, floods, and other events, whether natural or not, 
can cause the contamination to spread even further.  Still, one cannot as yet 10
know what long-term consequences will the radioactivity released during the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster have both on the humans that were 
exposed to it and on future human generations. And neither can one predict 
with absolute certainty how far will the it reach and for how long. Nevertheless, 
one thing is already certain amidst all that uncertainty: in June 2013, a paper 
was published by researchers at the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa, 
presenting the outcomes of a series of physiological and genetic tests done to 
the Zizeeria maha, a pale grass blue species of butterfly common in Japan 
which, like all butterflies more generally, is used as an indicator species in the 
evaluation of environmental conditions. The results were clear: not only were 
mild morphological abnormalities found in 12.4% of the individuals caught in 7 
localities near Fukushima in May 2011, but, perhaps most importantly, those 
abnormalities were then inherited by their second generation, which also 
presented a much higher overall rate of abnormalities at 33.5%.  What those 11
results show is that, only two months after the Fukushima accident, the local 
ecosystems had already been forever changed as a result of the spread of 
artificial radionuclides. "
"
Exterior. Nuclear Site."
In August 2011, soon after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, a video appeared on 
YouTube and quickly went viral. In it, a worker wearing full protection clothing 
was seen walking towards one of CCTV cameras of the power plant in the 
aftermath of the explosions and radioactive discharge. Carrying in his hand 
 See Ibid.10
 See Atsuki Hiyama et al., “The biological impacts of the Fukushima nuclear accident on the 11
pale grass blue butterfly.” Scientific Reports 2, no. 570 (2012).
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what appeared to be a smartphone streaming live the images captured by that 
particular CCTV camera, the worker used the live stream on his mobile device 
as a guide to position himself at the centre of the frame in the foreground of the 
image. Behind and besides him, the otherwise vegetal landscape was 
punctuated by metal pipes and vertical steel structures. As soon as the worker 
placed himself at the centre of the screen, he opened his right arm to the side 
and paused there, pointing to the site on which he stood. A few seconds later, 
he raised his arm up to the sky and then down again towards the front until his 
index finger was pointing towards the centre of the camera (Fig. 11).  As he 12
stood there, his right index finger pointing at the camera, his left hand held his 
phone close to his face so he’d continue watching the live streaming. 20 
minutes later, he left."
  "
After the video went viral and started attracting the attention of internet users 
worldwide, of the media, and even of TEPCO—the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company—and the Japanese government, the mysterious worker reemerged in 
late 2011, this time with a a blog on which he published documentation and 
texts related to the now infamous video event. On the English version of that 
website, it is possible to find a diagram of the network through which the images 
captured on CCTV circulated (Fig. 12) alongside a series of photographs taken 
Fig. 11: Anonymous worker points a finger at a monitoring live 
camera, Fukushima 1 nuclear plant, 2011. Video still."
 See “[検証動画] 作業員がカメラに指差し(ほぼ等倍：前半) 1/2,” YouTube video, 14:49, 12
posted by “fuku1live,” August 28, 2011. http://youtu.be/t3g8L_7cTkM.
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at the power plant, a text justifying the action, and what looks like a manifesto 
written in the form of a poem.  13
 
According to that online source, the still anonymous worker decided to make the 
video in order to draw attention to the precarious labour conditions at TEPCO, 
where workers allegedly had to work long hours in exchange for very low wages 
and had no insurance or proper contract documents, often being subcontracted 
through a vast network of agencies.  Simultaneously, his intention was to also 14
draw attention to the position of the spectator who watched the disaster 
happening through television news reports, as well as to his own position as 
someone who had also followed the accident through the media.  15
Nevertheless, what is most relevant for the present argument, is the worker’s 
acknowledgement that the video was a reenactment of Vito Acconci’s 1971 
work Centers, which he adapted to the site of the Fukushima nuclear crisis and 
the present global time of the Internet and closed-circuit surveillance systems.  "16
The worker’s reference to Acconci became less of a surprise after March 2012, 
when Tokyo-based artist Kota Takeuchi announced his intention of including the 
Fig. 12: Anon., diagram of the Fukushima CCTV network.
 See Anon., “About the Pointing a Finger Toward Fukushima live cam,” accessed April 3, 2013, 13
http://pointatfuku1cam.nobody.jp/e.html.
 Ibid.14
 Ibid.15
 Ibid.16
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Fukushima CCTV video in a solo exhibition he held in Japan’s capital city.  17
Soon, all the speculation on the identity of the worker seemed to have turned 
into a safe degree of certainty. Although Takeuchi still refused to confirm he was 
the man pointing at the CCTV camera even after having announced the 
inclusion of the video in his solo show, the news stories ran by media titles such 
as The Japan Times seemed to leave little room for doubt: according to the 
newspaper not only was 29-year-old Takeuchi about the same hight and build 
as the rogue Fukushima worker, but he had also admitted to having been 
working at the power plant at the time the video was shot.  Little room for 18
doubt, then—the Fukushima CCTV YouTube video had now been officially 
recognised as a work of art."
With such qualifier grounding the visioning of the video and with its reassuring 
passage from the anonymity of the internet to the signed white walls of a Tokyo 
art space, a few questions arise: to what extent does the radioactive 
spatiotemporal context of Takeuchi’s video add to, expand, or problematise the 
original gesture of Vito Acconci? In what way or ways does the viewing of a man 
pointing at himself pointing at the centre of a screen acquire a new set of 
possible readings when it is framed by the anxious clicks of a Geiger counter? 
What happens to Acconci’s video when the man who reenacts it stands on the 
contaminated grounds of a nuclear disaster? Or, ultimately, if Acconci’s Centers 
is agreed upon as symptomatic of twentieth-century narcissism, what can 
Takeuchi’s video tell us about the conditions of our own ecological time?  "
"
Interior. White Cube."
In 1971, Vito Acconci decided to sit for 20 minutes in front of a television 
connected to a video camera and film himself pointing at the centre of the 
screen that, in turn, fed back his own mirror-image, live, pointing at himself (Fig. 
13)."
"
 See Edan Corkill, “Are we pointing at the right guy?,” The Japan Times, March 8, 2012.17
 Ibid.18
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"
  "
According to Rosalind Krauss, writing five years later in 1976, Acconci’s work, a 
“sustained tautology: a line of sight that begins at Acconci’s plane of vision and 
ends at the eyes of his projected double” is a paradigmatic example of the 
“narcissism so endemic to works of video.”  It was because Centers revealed 19
the human body bracketed from its environment by being caught within the 
feedback loop of a visual apparatus that was able to simultaneously record and 
transmit images, that Krauss used it as the ultimate example of video’s 
underlying narcissism. "
Whereas, in a nod to Clement Greenberg’s modernist art criticism, Krauss saw 
established art forms such as painting, sculpture, or even film, defining 
themselves through the exploration of the material specificities of their particular 
medium—pigment-bearing surfaces for painting, matter in space for sculpture, 
and light projected through moving celluloid for film—in video work the artist 
was left surrounded only by him or herself, eventually collapsing the present 
through self-encapsulation, spatial closure, and self-reflection (Fig. 14).  "20
"
Fig. 13: Vito Acconci, Centers, 1971. Video still.
 Rosalind Krauss, “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism,” October 1 (1976): 50.19
 See Krauss, “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism,” 53–54.20
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"
  "
Like the lake that reflects Narcissus’ image back to himself, video was, for 
Krauss, revelatory of a self “split and doubled by the mirror-reflection of 
synchronous feedback.”  Through its use of a mirroring apparatus, Acconci’s 21
work executed a movement towards the fusion of the artist with his own artwork. 
In Krauss’ words:"
The self and its reflected image are of course literally separate. But the 
agency of reflection is a mode of appropriation, of illusionistically erasing 
the difference between subject and object. Facing mirrors on opposite 
walls squeeze out the real space between them.  "22
As a consequence, the self-reflective tautology of video represented by Centers 
was a landmark instance of that centripetal collision in which the autonomy of 
an object was compromised by its continuous giving back of nothing other than 
the subject himself, something akin to the staging of the correlationist circle that, 
as it will now be seen, French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux identified as the 
crucial feature of the post-Kantian tradition of critical thought. "
"
Fig. 14: Diagram of the narcissistic loop in Acconci’s Centers.
 Ibid., 55.21
 Ibid., 56–57 (emphasis added).22
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"
Correlationism: From Kant to Critical!
In his 2008 book, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
Quentin Meillassoux used the term “correlationism” to name the core principle 
of continental philosophy since Kant according to which only the correlation 
between thought and world is thinkable and never the world in itself. As he 
wrote:"
[The] central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems to be that of 
correlation. By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and 
never to either term considered apart from the other. […] "
Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to 
consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one 
another. Not only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp 
an object ‘in itself,’ in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also 
becomes necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that 
would not always-already be related to an object. […]"
[…] Thus one could says that up until Kant, one of the principal problems 
of philosophy was to think substance, while ever since Kant, it has 
consisted in trying to think the correlation. […] The questions is no longer 
‘which is the proper substrate?’ but ‘which is the proper correlate?’ "23
Answering the question “Was ist Aufklärung?” in 1784 in the newspaper 
Berlinische Monatschrift, Kant famously started by stating that “[enlightenment] 
is man’s [sic] emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the 
inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another.”  24
Strongly grounded in his own philosophical project, Kant’s answer to the 
question “What is Enlightenment?” saw as the ultimate human tasks the pursuit 
of autonomy and the free public use of reason. For him, it was reason that, from 
the moment when it was woken up in the history of humankind, caused humans 
to overcome their animality and lead civilisation into a freer and more righteous 
 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray 23
Brassier (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), 5–6.
 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, trans. H.B. Nisbet 24
(London: Penguin Books, 2009), 1.
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future, through the realisation that they, themselves, were the “true end of 
nature.”  "25
However, because thought had its own limits, the Kantian project was not only a 
call for the progressive liberation of reason and, consequently, of humankind, 
but it was also, and because of that, a project of critique, of recognising the 
barriers which thought could not cross if it was to produce valid knowledge 
rather than dogmatism and illusion.  "26
It was there that Kant placed his own three Critiques. Widely recognised as 
landmarks of modern philosophy, Kant’s Critiques were written as a field guide 
for what was knowable and what was, instead, ungraspable. In line with that, 
one of their most important conclusions was that, because the mind is only able 
to grasp the world through appearances that are passed onto it by the senses, 
knowledge of ‘Nature’ is only valid as long as it is understood as knowledge of 
things qua objects of experience and not knowledge of things in themselves. In 
other words, because things in themselves are outside the mind and are only 
able to be judged once they have been converted into thoughts, thought is only 
ever able to think thought and never the things outside thought to which thought 
itself refers.  Given that time and space or, in other words, duration and 27
extension, are a priori concepts of understanding that precede empirical reality, 
Kant defined his Transcendental Idealism as: "
 In Kant’s words:"25
“The fourth and last step which reason took, thereby raising man completely above animal 
society, was his (albeit obscure) realization that he is the true end of nature, and that nothing 
which lives on earth can compete with him in this respect. When he first said to the sheep ‘the 
fleece which you ear was given to you by nature not for your own use, but for mine’ and took it 
from the sheep to wear it himself […], he became aware of a prerogative which, by his nature, 
he enjoyed over all the animals; and he now no longer regarded them as fellow creatures, but 
as means and instruments to be used at will for the attainment of whatever ends he pleased.” 
Immanuel Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” in An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?, 94.
 As Michel Foucault put it:"26
“Kant in fact describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own 
reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now it is precisely at this moment that 
the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of 
reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what 
may be hoped. Illegitimate uses of reason are what give rise to dogmatism and heteronomy, 
along with illusion; on the other hand, it is when the legitimate use of reason has ben clearly 
defined in its principles that its autonomy can be assured.” Michel Foucault, “What is 
Enlightenment?”, in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2007), 104.
 See Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 35–63.27
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[The] doctrine that all appearances are regarded as mere 
representations, not as things in themselves, and that space and time, 
therefore, are only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations 
given independently by themselves, or conditions of objects taken as 
things in themselves. "28
As a consequence, it is possible to identify the formation of a double separation 
of humans from ‘Nature’ in Kantian philosophy. According to it, not only are 
humans separated from ‘Nature’ once through the development of their 
exclusive high mental faculties, but those mental faculties themselves, due to 
the conditions that must be in place for their correct operation, have also ended 
up producing a second kind of separation, this time a separation of thought from 
world-in-itself. It is that belief in a twice-enforced divide between humans and 
world that Meillassoux named “correlationism,” a principle that grounds a great 
amount of work falling under the academic banner of critique in the Humanities, 
a dominant methodology of scholarly work that could be illustrated by Michel 
Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge."
However, whilst the Kantian critical project passed through an identification of 
the limits which knowledge could not cross if indeed it was to remain valid, 
Foucault’s work at the turn of the 21st century developed and eventually 
inverted the Kantian thesis of the finitude of knowledge. As Foucault wrote in his 
own answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?:”"
[Criticism] is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal 
structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation 
into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that 
sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of 
making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and 
archaeological in its method. Archaeological—and not transcendental—
in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all 
knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the 
instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so 
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Marcus Weigelt (London: Penguin Books, 28
2007), 342.
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many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the 
sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is 
impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer 
being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.  "29
In other words, unlike Kant whose aim was to use critique in order to map the 
limits of a necessarily finite knowledge, Foucault wanted to put critique at the 
service of a genealogy of the present able to demonstrate the historical 
contingency of all configurations of knowledge in order to then consider the 
possibility of future epistemological transgressions. "
Critique, as it was defined thus far, can then be identified as one of the 
dominant paradigms in contemporary scholarly work. From feminist criticism to 
queer theory, from deconstruction to postcolonial theory, the critical ethos of the 
Humanities, much indebted to Foucault’s work, has taken as its primary role to 
reflect upon the limits of human knowledge in order to understand how what is 
taken for granted is indeed produced at the level of discourse through complex 
articulations of power and knowledge. Foucault’s critical project, as it was seen, 
was one that aimed to reveal how knowledge, rather than describing a stable 
and graspable exterior reality, is indeed responsible for its production. As 
Deleuze put it, in Foucault the “subject is a variable, or rather a set of variables 
of the statement. It is a function derived from the primitive function, or from the 
statement itself.”  "30
By focusing on the performativity of knowledge, the critical project has sought to 
reveal how realities previously assumed to be universal are instead produced 
by knowledge itself. In other words, the aim of critique is that of revealing how, 
to quote Eve Sedgwick, “knowledge does rather than simply is.”  To this 31
primacy of the revelatory, Sedgwick gave the name “paranoid reading” and 
characterised it as a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” a term the U.S. scholar 
 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 113–114.29
 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (London and New York: Continuum, 1999), 47.30
 Eve K. Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You 31
Probably Think This Essay is About You,” in Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 124.
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borrowed from Paul Ricoeur.  By privileging how knowledge performs the world 32
rather than merely reflecting it, suspicion has taken over criticality, ultimately 
becoming an obstacle to its own project of separating the contingent from the 
universal. In other words, contemporary critique, in all its suspicion, ended up 
betraying itself by only allowing as certain the claim upon which critique itself 
depends for its own survival, i.e. the one that posits the historical contingency 
and performative nature of all knowledge. As Sedgwick asked, “Always 
historicize? What could have less to do with historicizing than the commanding, 
atemporal adverb ‘always’?”     "33
Sedgwick’s diagnosis of the state of contemporary critique is also shared by 
Bruno Latour. In the aftermath of 9/11 and as a response to the overwhelming 
proliferation of conspiracy theories pointing to ‘the real’ masterminds behind the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Latour wrote a piece for 
Critical Inquiry in which he examined the role critique had played in his own 
work and the ways in which uncritical suspicion had become the dominant 
feature of criticality. Giving as an example Jean Baudrillard’s claim that “the 
Twin Towers destroyed themselves under their own weight, […] undermined by 
the utter nihilism inherent in capitalism itself,” Latour argued that critique had 
become synonym with “instant revisionism” and inundated both academia and 
the non-academic public sphere with more or less sophisticated conspiracy 
theories.  The problem is that whereas the critical enterprise had initially been 34
concerned with disputing systems of belief such as those advocated by various 
religious doctrines and replacing them with scientifically validated facts, at the 
 Ibid.32
 Ibid., 125.33
 Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 34
Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004), 228. As the author explained: "
“Let me be mean for a second. What’s the real difference between conspiracists and a 
popularized, that is a teachable version of social critique inspired by a too quick reading of, let’s 
say, a sociologist as eminent as Pierre Bourdieu […]? In both cases, you have to learn to 
become suspicious of everything people say because of course we all know that they live in the 
thralls of a complete illusio of their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an 
explanation is requested for what is really going on, in both cases again it is the same appeal to 
powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly. Of 
course, we in the academy like to use more elevated causes—society, discourse, knowledge-
slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism—while conspiracists like to portray a 
miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I find something troubling similar in the 
structure of the explanation, in the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of 
causal explanations coming out of the deep dark below” (ibid., 228–229).
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start of the 21st century and there being no beliefs left to disprove, critique has 
now started targeting facts themselves, often by negating their existence or by 
turning them into a mere product of their dialectical counterpart, the observing 
human subject and its world-making language.  "35
The unfortunate outcome of that phenomenon is clear: whilst scholars focus on 
the correlate between human thought and nonhuman world, very real 
phenomena are having rather real consequences: global warming is happening, 
the Arctic ice cap is melting, natural resources are diminishing, sea levels are 
rising, and old and new pandemics are killing millions (unless one can pay to 
survive). The most obscene aspect of the unrestrained reign of critique is that, 
as Latour argued, it has gone from being a socially progressive enterprise to 
having become the weapon of choice of conservative rhetorics, one that is used 
to discredit everything from global warming to the causes of the 2008 banking 
crisis.  In short, widespread critique has been associated by scholars such as 36
Latour with humanity’s inability to act upon issues as pressing as persisting 
social inequalities or climate change."
Granted, such ethos of radical and widespread critique has brought undeniable 
benefits to human societies—from highlighting the nature of gender and ethnic 
inequalities to actively challenging the colonialist and Eurocentric structures of 
power that can still be seen in operation today. Nevertheless, it has done so at 
the expense of its being able to make claims about anything other than human 
knowledge itself: through its exclusive focus on relations of (human) power and 
(human) knowledge, critique has been unable to address anything beyond its 
human door step. In other words, because it has restricted itself to reflecting 
 This is how Latour put it: "35
“[…] I want to show that while the Enlightenment profited largely from the disposition of a very 
powerful descriptive tool, that of matters of fact, which were excellent for debunking quite a lot 
of beliefs, powers, and illusions, it found itself totally disarmed once matters of fact, in turn, were 
eaten up by the same debunking impetus” (ibid., 232).
 As an example, in is essay for Critical Inquiry, Latour quoted the following New York Times 36
editorial from the 15 of March, 2003:"
“Most scientists believe that [global] warming is caused largely by man-made pollutants that 
require strict regulation. Mr. Luntz [a Republican strategist] seems to acknowledge as much 
when he says that ‘the scientific debate is closing against us.’ His advice, however, is to 
emphasize that the evidence is not complete. "
“‘Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled,’ he writes, ‘their views 
about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack 
of scientific certainty a primary issue’” (ibid., 226).
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upon the limits of human knowledge as a way of driving human emancipation 
and freedom, critical work has progressively lost contact with the reality of the 
nonhuman ‘outside’ against which humans defined themselves. "
As a result of narratives of progress towards autonomy and of the split between 
‘Nature’ and ‘Culture,’ humankind has become alienated from everything other 
than itself, living in a house of correlates, of mirrors that, as illustrated by 
Acconci’s piece Centers, do nothing other than reflect back the certainty of the 
human. And so, the human pilgrims of emancipation and reason are left unable 
to grasp anything other than themselves: their qualities, their capacities, their 
politics, their beauty. Like Narcissus drowning in the lake, breathing in the water 
of its own reflection and still hoping for happiness ever after, humanity appears 
to keep on going until the day comes when, to paraphrase Peter Reading, after 
all the heat waves and all the heat deaths, it finally reaches absolute zero. "37
"
The shock of the Anthropocene!
Driven by the pursuit of human autonomy grounded on the free use of reason, 
the critical ethos of post-Kantian thought cut off the knot that tied humans to 
nonhumans, eventually opening up the way for the exploitation of the latter by 
the former. The problem, however, was that such reckless exploitation of 
‘Nature’ did not manage to put a stop to the exploitation of humans by humans 
nor to bring about the emancipation that Kant foresaw for all humankind. On the 
contrary, the exploitation of humans by humans has simply been shifted to the 
Global South, to those places that exist on the fringes of the ‘civilised,’ 
‘emancipated’ world, where people live unaccounted for, uncared for, 
nonhumanly. "
Similarly, in recent decades, humankind has been forced to recognise not the 
limits of its own knowledge that the critical project sought to reveal but, instead, 
the reality of its imminent catastrophic extinction, triggered by the 
unsustainability of the ongoing exploitation of the planet’s resources, and driven 
by fantasies of teleological progress and unstoppable growth. As Latour wrote 
in We Have Never Been Modern:"
 See Peter Reading, −273.15, 1.37
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By seeking to reorient man’s exploitation of man toward an exploitation of 
nature by man, capitalism magnified both beyond measure. The 
repressed returns, and with a vengeance: the multitudes that were 
supposed to be saved from death fall back into poverty by the hundreds 
of millions; nature, over which we were supposed to gain absolute 
mastery, dominates us in an equally global fashion, and threatens us all. 
It is a strange dialectic that turns the slave into man’s owner and master, 
and that suddenly informs us that we have invented ecocides as well as 
large-scale famine. "38
That is the shock of the Anthropocene, the time when the edges of the human-
inflicted cut between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ are finally sutured albeit at the 
expense of a large painful scar. The Anthropocene is a mark left in geological 
time, in the space that was once ripped open by the pursuit of human 
exceptionalism. In what could be seen as the planet’s response to the dream of 
human emancipation, the Anthropocene on which humans now stand shows 
that ‘Culture’ and ‘Nature’ are closely entwined, and that every step humans 
take towards freedom and autonomy will eventually trigger feedback 
mechanisms that will only tie humans and nonhumans back together with 
increasingly stronger knots. "
Whilst post-Kantian thought kept feeding dreams of a human existence twice 
split from nonhuman ‘Nature’ thanks to its mastery of reason and ethos of 
permanent critique, the thick layers of the Anthropocene were sedimenting 
under human feet, progressively and silently, to such an extent that, when 
humans became aware of them, their legs were already stuck too deep in the 
ground to allow for a successful escape. The Anthropocene has proved that 
emancipation is an impossible task in a world where everything is always 
already enmeshed in everything else, forming networks of bodies and 
environments from which no single thread can safely be removed without the 
danger of the whole fabric falling apart. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has put it rather 
concisely and beautifully, “[the] mansion of modern freedoms stands on an 
ever-expanding base of fossil-fuel use.” "39
 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 8.38
 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 39
208.
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In that sense, the Anthropocene became the latest in a series of attacks on a 
long tradition of human exceptionalism that, according to Donna Haraway’s 
reading of Freud via Derrida, started with the Copernican ‘removal’ of the Earth 
from the centre of the universe, moved on to Darwin’s identification of the homo 
sapiens as simply one of many species, Freud’s positing of the animalistic 
human unconscious, and Haraway’s own hybridisation of organic matter and 
technology in the figure of the cyborg.  What is perhaps most interesting about 40
all those wounds inflicted in the narcissistic flesh of humankind is that they were 
also products of the same ethos of critique that sustains the human 
exceptionalism against which they, in turn, have set themselves."
"
Walking on Thin Ice!
If one accepts that Acconci’s Centers staged the narcissist loop of self-reflection 
that Kantian thought set up as condition of human emancipation, what can its 
reenactment on the site of a nuclear disaster tell about the human and its 
pursuit of autonomy at the beginning of the 21st Century? Whereas Acconci’s 
use of closed circuit television foregrounded narcissism as the pathology driving 
the pursuit of human emancipation, could the re-staging of that gesture in 2011 
in Fukushima have highlighted a different kind of condition, one that pointed to a 
humanity coming to terms with its responsibility over the ongoing ecological 
crisis? "
Although at first both gestures seemed to trigger similar narcissistic loops, a few 
differences between the two works point to the significant gap between 
Acconci’s original piece and its Fukushima reenactment. In Acconci’s video, the 
frame was occupied exclusively by a close-up of the artist against a white wall, 
his face and pointing finger at the centre of the screen. In the Fukushima video, 
on the other hand, the human figure occupied only a small fraction of the frame 
and was surrounded by a very specific and identifiable environment, the 
Fukushima power plant. Whereas Acconci’s work was filmed in the clinical, 
sanitised white cube of a generic art gallery, its reenactment in 2011 was 
 See Haraway, When Species Meet, 11–12; also Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal 40
Responded?,” in Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 138–139.
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captured by CCTV in the contaminated site of a nuclear disaster. If the image of 
Acconci dominated Centers, the radioactive landscape of Fukushima dominated 
its reenactment, eventually troubling the certainty of the human figure and its 
reassuring presence. Also, whereas Acconci’s body was caught in the closed 
circuit of early video technology, framed by the camera on one side and by the 
television screen on the other, the existence of the Fukushima video was 
expanded in time and space, viralised thanks to the Internet and YouTube, able 
to be played in every single corner of the world at the same time, forever. In 
other words, whereas Acconci’s loop only included the artist, the camera, the 
TV screen, and a very localised group of spectators (the ones watching the 
video in the gallery), the Fukushima reenactment, although also circular, by its 
being almost immediately uploaded onto YouTube, it was able to circulate in a 
much larger network, and thus to implicate individuals and geographies that 
could otherwise appear detached from Fukushima and from the clicks of its 
Geiger counters. Finally, one small but crucial difference separates Acconci’s 
performance from its nuclear reenactment, a difference in the pointing gesture 
itself: as Fig. 15 highlights, whilst Acconci raised his arm upwards and forwards 
until it was pointing at the exact centre of the frame, the Fukushima worker 
initially raised his arm to the side, pointed to the site on which he stood, and 
only afterwards finalised the gesture by rotating his arm upwards along his side 
and then downwards along the front towards the centre of the frame, in a 
folding gesture that stressed the ecological enmeshment of Fukushima, the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company, the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, ‘green’ 
nuclear energy, cesium-127, the worker himself, and all his viewers in the 
Internet age. "
"
"
"
"
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"
"
"
"
Therefore, if Centers revealed the narcissism at the core of the Kantian 
correlate of thought and world, its reenactment in Fukushima replaced self-
assuring human exceptionalism with the anxiety of a time when the project of 
human emancipation is discovered to have failed and an anthropogenic end of 
days suddenly appears unavoidable. Whilst Centers highlighted a humanity in 
love with the ideas of freedom and autonomy promised by the apparent 
certainty of its own mirror-image, the Anthropocene that literally grounded the 
Fukushima pointing gesture reminds humans of their imperfection, lack of 
autonomy, and inability to escape a global ecological disaster that is already 
ongoing. Progressively, all the reassurance of the correlationist circle started 
being replaced with the extinction anxiety of a species that is forced to face the 
prospect of its own self-obliteration.  
Fig. 15: Vito Acconci vs. the Fukushima worker.
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—TWO— !
Performance on the Anthropocenic Stage!
"
"
"
Performance is an inclusive term. !
—Richard Schechner "1"
By their performances shall ye know them.!
—Victor Turner "2"
"
"
"
"
So far, a scene has been set. Staged under the name ‘Anthropocene,’ it was 
broadly defined as the current epoch of deep geological time characterised by 
the affirmation and strengthening of humankind’s bond with the extended 
nonhuman sphere. The Anthropocene has reawakened humans to the 
continuity and interdependence of ‘Culture’ and ‘Nature,’ of humans and 
nonhumans. Having appeared at a time when humans are being forced to 
either address climate change or face extinction, the anthropocenic thesis has 
already started shaking the foundations of the civilisational project which has 
been set up around ideals of freedom and emancipation since Kant. By 
foregrounding the real and often catastrophic ecological consequences of 
reckless human action, the Anthropocene is forcing humankind to reconsider a 
future that must be shared with the wider nonhuman world. Whilst post-Kantian 
thought has been marked by the correlationist circle, thus feeding a civilisational 
project grounded on human exceptionalism, the Anthropocene troubles the 
 Richard Schechner, Performance Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), xvii.1
 Victor Turner’s statement to the planning committee of the 1981–82 World Conference on 2
Ritual and Performance series, quoted in Richard Schechner and Willa Appel, “Introduction,” in 
By Means of Performance: Intercultural Studies of Theatre and Ritual, eds. Richard Schechner 
and Willa Appel (Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1.
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certainty of freedom and autonomy as human teloi and proposes them, instead, 
as permanently unresolvable negotiations."
In line with the above, this chapter will open up some ways in which the 
ecological undoing of human exceptionalism and consequent blurring of the 
‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide can affect existing theories of performance. In a time of 
crisis, how can performance survive the sinking of the grounds that have, for far 
too long, sustained the pursuit of human emancipation? If there is no longer a 
special and safe space for humanity in the world, how can that affect existing 
understandings of the place of humans in the histories of performance? Or, 
most importantly perhaps, at a time of deep ecological crisis, should 
performance theory rethink itself and its own scope in light of the inescapable 
enmeshment of humans and nonhumans both on- and off-stage and, therefore, 
venture beyond the realm of ‘Culture’ with which it has historically been mostly 
concerned? "
Before answering those questions, it is important to start by examining the 
notion of performance from the moment it first was uttered in Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest to its paradigmatic development into a hybrid of technē and 
epistemē in Richard Schechner’s “broad spectrum” approach.  In order to do 3
so, this chapter will now follow the history of the term and of the ways in which it 
has been used by scholars working in a variety of projects with various 
academic and political agendas. As it develops and builds on existing literature, 
the chapter will become increasingly focused on how nonhumans such as 
animals and technological apparatuses have been featured in performance and 
its theorisation, the aim being to explore both existing and new configurations of 
performance and the ways in which that might respond to the blurring of 
nonhuman ‘Nature’ and human ‘Culture.’ As it progresses in its task, the chapter 
will eventually make a case for performance to be understood as the way in 
 Schechner’s approach to performance will be presented in more detail in the following pages. 3
For now it will suffice to say that, in his own words: "
“Performances occur in many different instances and kinds. Performance must be construed as 
a ‘broad spectrum’ or ‘continuum’ of human action ranging from ritual, play, sports, popular 
entertainments, the performing arts (theatre, dance, music), and everyday life performances to 
the enactment of social, professional, gender, race, and class roles, and on to healing (from 
shamanism to surgery), the media, and the internet.” Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: 
An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 2 (emphasis added).
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which all bodies, human and nonhuman, encounter one another whilst, 
nonetheless, remaining strangers to each other. "
"
A Stroll along Performance’s “Broad Spectrum”!
What is performance? How can it contribute—if indeed it can contribute at all—
to theories of knowledge production and dissemination, and present-day 
debates on the value, potentials and limitations—ethical, political, or otherwise
—of the encounter between bodies? What is the relationship between what is 
performed and the material reality of bodies—bodies of performers and bodies 
of audiences? What are the defining features of communication systems—
verbal, gestural, technological—once they are approached as loci of 
performance? How can performance take part, as a set of both theories and 
practices, in contemporary ontological and epistemological debates? How can 
performance be conducive to a better understanding of the relation between 
time and space and a body’s capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies? 
What does it mean to say “by means of performance”?  "4
Those are some of the questions with which Performance Studies has been 
concerned since the creation of the first academic department dedicated to the 
field at New York University in the early 1980s. According to Stephen Bottoms, 
the institutionalisation of the field as a discipline was a consequence of a series 
of field-defining essays written by Richard Schechner that started being 
published as early as 1962 in the Tulane Drama Review, and that were followed 
by the creation of Schechner’s The Performance Group in 1967 and the 
publication, ten years later in 1977, of the first edition of his Performance 
Theory.  However, despite being questions that have had centre-stage in 5
Performance Studies since the 1980s, the above are still, in one way or 
another, the focus of this dissertation. The reasons for that are manifold and 
some have already been discussed in previous chapters. Further to the 
 As in the title of Richard Schechner and Willa Appel, eds., By Means of Performance: 4
Intercultural Studies of Theatre and Ritual.
 See Stephen Bottoms, “The Efficacy/Effeminacy Braid: Unpicking the Performance Studies/5
Theatre Studies Dichotomy,” Theatre Topics 12, no. 2 (2003): 173–187. See also Richard 
Schechner, “TDR Comment,” The Tulane Drama Review 7, no. 2 (1962): 8–9; and Richard 
Schechner, Performance Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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ecological urgency addressed above, the concerns of this dissertation also stem 
from a feeling that Schechner’s “broad spectrum” approach still has a lot more 
to give in terms of the various facets of the world that could benefit from being 
thought through and alongside performance. That, even despite the fact that 
performance has already become an everyday word, heard in every corner of 
the world from the black box of theatres and the white cube of galleries to the 
pages of financial broadsheets; from departments of human resources to 
studios of software development; from the polymer industry to, at an ever 
increasing rate, education policy. As Bonnie Marranca wrote in what could be an 
elegy to a time when performance only concerned the stuff serious actors did 
on stage:"
After a century of hybridization in the arts, the concept of “performance” 
has come to the forefront of contemporary thought on art and culture. 
The word “performance,” whether it describes a live event or personal 
acting out; or the features of a car, a perfume, a sound system; and 
whether it refers to economy or therapy or the act of mourning, 
performance now shapes contemporary thinking about people and 
things. "6
 However, regardless of all the human and nonhuman behaviours increasingly 
understood or even measured as performance—e.g., rituals of animal courtship, 
fluctuations of stock market indexes, dissemination of computer viruses, or 
Artificial Intelligence networks—the majority of work done in Performance 
Studies still appears primarily concerned with instances of cultural performance 
or, at best, with performances, human or otherwise, as long as they have 
humans as their audiences. In short, performance theory seems, at this initial 
stage at least, to have been mostly interested in thinking performance as 
performance ‘for us,’ in an attitude that appears incredibly close to the world’s 
dependence on human thought identified by Quentin Meillassoux’s in 
correlationist post-Kantian thought.  Therefore, a way out of such seemingly 7
human-centred paradigm towards a broader than broad understanding of what 
it means to perform in the ecological age and beyond the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ 
 Bonnie Marranca, “Performance, A Personal History,” PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art 6
28, no. 1 (2006): 3.
 See above, p. 60.7
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divide requires a revisiting of the history of—and possibly a readjustment of the 
existing discourses on—performance. "
"
Performance: Transforming Humans"
According to Bert O. States and Mary Thomas Crane, “to perform,” originally 
meaning “to carry something out to completion,” wasn’t primarily associated 
with stage arts until the 17th century when, in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, 
Prospero asked Ariel “Hast thou, spirit,/Perform’d to point the tempest that I 
bade thee?.”  As Crane noted,"8
Ariel has “performed” the tempest in the sense that he has brought it 
about […]. "
The theatrical sense of “perform” grows out of the sense of the word 
meaning “to do, go through, or execute formally or solemnly (a duty, a 
public function, ceremony, or rite, a piece of music, a play, etc.).” "9
A pioneering moment, Prospero’s question to Ariel already appeared to 
synthesise an understanding of performance that has been dominant to this 
day: performances are human activities that make things happen. The 
understanding that performance brings something into being has been one of 
the key postulates of performance theory since the 1960s, one which has 
guided the attention given by performance scholars to all sorts of productive 
human activities, from the visual and stage arts to ritual, from social and political 
activism to processes of identity formation. As Jon McKenzie wrote, echoing 
Schechner’s “broad spectrum:” "
Performance studies is an interdisciplinary field of research that draws 
from the social sciences, the humanities, and the arts. It focuses on the 
pervasiveness of performance as a central element of social and cultural 
life, including not only theater and performance art, popular 
entertainments, microconstructions of ethnicity, race, class, sex, and 
gender, world fairs and shows and drag performance—potentially any 
 See Bert O. States, “Performance as Metaphor,” Theatre Journal 48, no. 1 (1996): 4; and Mary 8
T. Crane, “What Was Performance?,” Criticism 43, no. 2 (2001): 172.
 Crane, “What Was Performance?,” 173.9
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instance of expressive behavior or cultural enactment. Within this field, 
performance entails the presentation or “reactualization” of symbolic 
systems through both living and mediated bodies.  "10
In order to better understand how performance came to be identified as such 
ubiquitous transformative affair, it is worth examining Schechner’s work in more 
detail for he, in Stephen Bottoms’ words, is one of the “founding fathers” of 
Performance Studies.  "11
"
Schechner: Performance vs. Theatre!
When, in 1962, Richard Schechner took up the role of editor of the Tulane 
Drama Review, his interests were shifting considerably “from theater to 
performance and from aesthetics to the social sciences.”  Such a change in 12
focus was due to a variety of reasons but mostly a disappointment with the 
theatre productions seen at the time in the US in general and in New York in 
particular. As clearly stated in his first TDR editorial, his aim was to introduce “a 
new departure for TDR,” one that would “restore virginity to the theatre”.  In the 13
following issue of the same journal, Schechner started to uncover the reasons 
why, in his view, theatre was in need of such a restoration: through his review of 
Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, Schechner identified “a running 
sore in [American] theatre” and defined it, in a style not far from that of a 
manifesto, as follows: "14
The American theatre, our theatre, is so hungry, so voracious, so corrupt, 
so morally blind, so perverse that Virginia Woolf is a success. I am 
outraged at a theatre and an audience that accepts as a masterpiece an 
 Jon McKenzie, “Performance Studies,” in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory & 10
Criticism, eds. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 726 (emphasis added).
 Bottoms, “The Efficacy/Effeminacy Braid: Unpicking the Performance Studies/Theatre Studies 11
Dichotomy,” 175.
 Schechner, Performance Theory, ix. 12
 Schechner, “TDR Comment,” 8.13
 Richard Schechner, “Who’s Afraid of Edward Albee?,” The Tulane Drama Review 7, no. 3 14
(1963): 7.
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insufferably long play with great pretensions that lacks intellectual size, 
emotional insight, and dramatic electricity. I’m tired of play-long 
“metaphors”—such as the illusory child of Virginia Woolf—which are 
neither philosophically, psychologically, nor poetically valid. I’m tired of 
plays that are badly plotted and turgidly written being excused by such 
palaver as ‘organic unity’ or ‘inner form.’ I’m tired of morbidity and sexual 
perversity which are there only to titillate an impotent and homosexual 
theatre and audience. I’m tired of Albee. "15
One issue later, and against the threat of the “running sore” that was an 
“impotent and homosexual,” i.e. unproductive, American theatre, Schechner 
highlighted the alternative embodied in The Play of Daniel, a work the New York 
Pro Musica had staged at St. George’s Episcopal Church during Christmas. It 
was in his review of that show that, according to Stephen Bottoms, Schechner 
first praised the efficacious enactment of reality that would eventually become a 
defining paradigm of Performance Studies.  Schechner wrote:"16
The Play of Daniel offers its audience […] a theatre that is real in itself 
[…,] a theatre which unblushingly says it is truth; not the intermediary of 
truth, but truth naked and alone. […] Our theatre spins dizzily on the 
notion that all truth is hopelessly beyond our feelings, that art is some 
kind of collective bargaining with existence. [...] The author of The Play of 
Daniel refuses to compromise at the source; [he believes] in the efficacy 
of the theatrical act, in its holy truth.  "17
Schechner’s attack on what he saw as an unproductive “homosexual” theatre, 
and his favouring of a theatre that somehow was able to effectively enact 
worlds, were certainly behind the increasing interest in performance as 
transformative behaviour that had progressively led him away from Theatre 
Studies and towards the Social Sciences. Aiding that move were recent 
developments in Sociology and Anthropology, born out of the work of Erving 
 Ibid., 9.15
 Bottoms, “The Efficacy/Effeminacy Braid: Unpicking the Performance Studies/Theatre Studies 16
Dichotomy,” 177–178.
 Richard Schechner, “Intentions, Problems, Proposals,” The Tulane Drama Review 7, no. 4 17
(1963): 5.
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Goffman and Victor Turner, respectively, both of whom had started treating 
everyday human behaviour as performance.  "18
Such were the early days of what would, almost 20 years later, have become 
known as Performance Studies, a discipline concerned with the ritualised kinds 
of behaviour through which humans enact their social and cultural reality, a 
discipline not merely concerned with entertainment but with effective worldings 
and social transformation. In a way, an understanding very much in line with the 
etymological root of perform, i.e. parfornir, Old French for “to do, carry out, 
finish, accomplish.” "19
Another important ancestor of performance theory was John Langshaw Austin. 
Although Austin’s work was concerned with the particular case of words that, 
when uttered, are able to enact reality—therefore being closer to Philosophy of 
Language rather than Sociology or Anthropology—he did share Schechner’s  
privileging of doing over being and the latter’s distaste for what theatre seemed 
to stand for in the early 1960s. After having defined, in Lecture I of his 1962 
collection of lectures How To Do Things With Words, “performative utterances” 
as utterances that do not describe reality but, rather, enact it—e.g., the “I do” of 
marriage—Austin was quick to clarify that those utterances responsible for 
enacting reality can never be uttered in the theatre: "20
[A] performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow 
or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or 
spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every 
utterance—a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
 Goffman and Turner’s influence is assumed by Schechner in his preface to the 2003 edition 18
of Performance Theory:"
“Taking a cue from Erving Goffman’s 1959 breakthrough book, The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life, I sensed that performances in the broad sense of that word were coexistent with 
the human condition. Goffman did not propose that ‘all the world’s a stage,’ a notion which 
implies a kind of falseness or put on. What Goffman meant was that people were always 
involved in role-playing, in constructing and staging their multiple identities. By means of roles 
people enacted their personal and social realities on a day-to-day basis. [...] What Turner added 
was that these performances often took the form of rituals and social dramas” (Schechner, 
Performance Theory, ix–x).
 Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “perform,” accessed April 22, 2013, http://19
www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=perform.
 For Austin’s definition of “performative utterance,” see John L. Austin, How To Do Things With 20
Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1962), 5–6. 
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circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but in 
ways parasitic upon its normal use—ways which fall under the doctrine of 
the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from 
consideration. "21
The “hollow” language that Austin attributes to theatre—and here one cannot 
but notice the proximity between something that is “hollow,” devoid of core or 
seed, and something that is “infertile,” “impotent” or even “queer” as Eve 
Sedgwick and Andrew Parker have also noted in relation to Austin—resonates 
with Schechner’s characterisation of American theatre in the early 1960s as 
“impotent and homosexual.”  "22
Perhaps it was a mere coincidence that both Austin’s book and Schechner’s 
first TDR editorial came out in the same year, 1962. Or perhaps Schechner had 
had contact with Austin’s work earlier as the British philosopher of language had 
lectured at Harvard in 1955. Or, most probably, they were both independent 
symptoms of a certain anti-theatrical malaise that can be traced back in 
Western culture to Plato’s rejection of poetry and mimesis on the grounds that it 
only provided access to simulacra and never to the truth of pure forms. "23
The similarities between Plato’s argument and the criticism directed at theatre 
by both Schechner and Austin are striking. In all three cases, the authors 
 Ibid., 22. A quick note on usage of terms: It is important to highlight that, “performative” is 21
often used today, and after Austin, in an exclusively linguistic context as the name of those 
utterances that make realities. However, the term will be used throughout this dissertation as an 
adjective rather than a noun. In other words, “performative” will mean, here, a quality of 
anything that performs or enacts phenomena, as even Austin’s use of “performative utterance” 
implies—i.e., in “performative utterance,” “performative” is not a noun but a quality of a 
particular kind of utterances that are opposed, in Austin, to “constative utterances.” Therefore, 
every time the word “performative” appears in this dissertation, it should be understood as a 
qualifier of any body that has the ability to perform, rather than the proper name of a set of 
exclusively linguistic bodies.
 Schechner, “Intentions, Problems, Proposals,” 5. For Parker and Sedgwick’s criticism of 22
Austin, see Andrew Parker and Eve K. Sedgwick, “Introduction: Performativity and 
Performance,” in Performativity and Performance, eds. Andrew Parker and Eve K. Sedgwick 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 5.
 Plato’s distaste for poetry and mimesis is most evident in Book X of Republic, when Socrates 23
refers to the existence of three kinds of beds: the true bed-form made by god, the copies of the 
bed-form made by carpenters, and the copies of the carpenter’s beds made by artists. The bed 
made by the artist would be twice removed from the true bed-form. See Plato, Complete Works, 
ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997),1200–
1203. For a historical account of the criticism that has been directed at theatre more or less 
consistently since Plato, see the reference book on the subject: Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical 
Prejudice (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1985).
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appear to claim that only the presentation of supposedly true actions is able to 
enact some kind of revelatory transformation and, therefore, constitute true 
knowledge. And although Schechner appeared to progressively tone down his 
position between the early 1960s and his 1977 book Performance Theory, his 
interests have generally been on the side of human behaviours that are able to 
enact the world rather than merely representing it, something that is very much 
in accordance with the strong influence Victor Turner’s work on ritual and social 
drama has had on him.  As he noted in his 1985 book Between Theater and 24
Anthropology:"
Either permanently as in initiation rites or temporarily as in aesthetic 
theater and trance dancing, performers—and sometimes spectators too
—are changed by the activity of performing. "25
Also telling of both Schechner’s and Turner’s privileging of human actions that 
do things rather than simply mimicking them is the series of conferences on 
theatre and ritual chaired by both scholars between 1981 and 1982 in Arizona 
and New York, and which was the precursor of what is today known as 
Performance Studies International.  In December 1980, and as part of his 26
address to the planning committee of the conferences that were to follow, 
Turner claimed the following:"
Cultures are most fully expressed in and made conscious of themselves 
in their ritual and theatrical performances. [...] A performance is a 
dialectic of “flow,” that is, spontaneous movement in which action and 
awareness are one, and “reflexivity,” in which the central meanings, 
values and goals of a culture are seen “in action,” as they shape and 
 Schechner’s more moderate later views are evidenced by a passage in Performance Theory 24
concerning the perceived dichotomy between efficacy and entertainment, ritual and theatre, in 
which Schechner wrote the following: "
“[efficacy] and entertainment are not so much opposed to each other; rather they form the poles 
of a continuum […]. The basic polarity is between efficacy and entertainment, not between ritual 
and theater. […] A performance is called theater or ritual because of where it is performed, by 
whom, and under what circumstances. If the performance’s purpose is to effect transformations
—to be efficacious—[…] the performance is a ritual. And vice versa […]. No performance is 
pure efficacy or pure entertainment.” Schechner, Performance Theory, 130.
 Richard Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology (Philadelphia: University of 25
Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 4.
 See Schechner and Appel, By Means of Performance: Intercultural Studies of Theatre and 26
Ritual, 1.
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explain behavior. A performance is declarative of our shared humanity, 
yet it utters the uniqueness of particular cultures. "27
From Turner’s statement, it is possible to extract two ideas that would 
eventually become the most important pillars supporting Performance Studies 
as an independent academic field: 1) the view that performance is a kind of 
behaviour that is able to transform those involved in it, and 2) the belief that, in 
performance, there is no clear separation between action and awareness of 
action, i.e. between performer and audience. "
One of the problems with such privileging of ‘true’ actions that, due to their 
transformative nature, are necessarily future-oriented, is that it is hard to 
separate it from a certain phallogocentrism and from the normative—read, 
heterosexist—paradigms of futurity famously attacked by Lee Edelman.  28
Nevertheless, it must be noted in relation to Austin that his work has since been 
‘queered’ by Judith Butler who has used his theory of performative utterances to 
support her claim that gender identity is performed through iteration and 
imitation, leading her to famously claim that “[all] gender is like drag,” i.e. that 
being a woman is always the result of passing as a woman. "29
With her equation of being with passing, a gap was opened between Butler’s 
thesis of gender performativity and the work of Schechner and Austin: whereas, 
as it was seen, both Schechner and Austin had criticised theatre for its artifice 
and lack of truth, for Butler “‘realness’ is not exactly a category in which one 
competes” but, it is, rather, always a kind of make-believe. "30
Still, what could at first look like a fundamental rift between Schechner and 
Butler on the possibility of ‘realness’ and truth in performance, was in fact 
somewhat bridged by a reorientation in Schecher’s theory of performance. 
 Victor Turner quoted in Schechner and Appel, By Means of Performance, 1 (emphasis 27
added). 
 See Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University 28
Press, 2004).
 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” (New York and London: 29
Routledge, 2011), 85. See also Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in Inside/
Out: Lesbian Theorios, Gay Theories, ed. Diana Fuss (New York and London: Routledge, 
1991), 18–21.
 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 88.30
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Although, in the early 1960s, the author had posited performance, “truth naked 
and alone,” against theatre, “the intermediary of truth,” two decades later he 
appeared to have reconsidered his previous position.  As he wrote in the 31
1980s in what is closer to what would eventually become Butler’s thesis on 
gender and iterative imitation:"
Restored behavior is living behavior treated as a film director treats a 
strip of film. [...] The original ‘truth’ or ‘source’ of the behavior may be lost, 
ignored, or contradicted—even while this truth or source is apparently 
being honored and observed. [...] Restored behavior is used in all kinds 
of performances from shamanism and exorcism to trance, from ritual to 
aesthetic dance and theater, from initiation rites to social dramas, from 
psychoanalysis to psychodrama and transactional analysis. In fact, 
restored behavior is the main characteristic of performance. [...] Because 
the behavior is separate from those who are behaving, the behavior can 
be stored, transmitted, manipulated, transformed. "32
"
Phelan: Performance vs. Reproduction!
Like Schechner, Peggy Phelan has also occupied a prominent position in 
performance theory since the publication of her landmark 1993 book Unmarked: 
The Politics of Performance. In her introduction to the book, Phelan claimed she 
wanted to"
[examine] the implicit assumptions about the connections between 
representational visibility and political power which have been a 
dominant force in cultural theory in the last ten years. [...] Employing 
psychoanalysis and feminist theories of representation, [she was] 
concerned with marking the limit of the image in the political field of the 
sexual and racial other. "33
 For the 1960s comments, see Schechner, Intentions, Problems, Proposals, 5.31
 Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology, 35–36 (emphases added).32
 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 33
1993), 1–2.
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Blaming economies of representation for the “never totalizing” naming and 
‘arresting’ of the other, and for their “[failure] to reproduce the real exactly,” 
Phelan famously claimed performance to be the only art form capable of 
opening up a space of resistance to representation.  As she put it:"34
Rather than living under the ideology of the visible, which is to say the 
phallocentric regime of a reproductive representational economy in which 
the Other is converted into the fetishized Same, the possibilities of the 
unreproductive must be revalued. Performance, the genre of art in which 
disappearance (the failure of the given to be seen to remain fixed in 
arrested projection) is part of the aim of the work, must take a more 
central place than it currently holds in the landscape of contemporary 
representation. "35
In Phelan’s view, performance is ephemeral and unable to be “saved, recorded, 
[or] documented.”  Performance can only exist for a limited period of time after 36
which it has to vanish if it is to stay true to its ontology. “Without a copy,” Phelan 
wrote, “live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present 
—and disappears into memory,” thus refusing the economy of representations 
that characterises other art forms such as painting, photography or even 
theatre, and that is responsible for the ‘arrest’ of the body represented and of its 
meaning.  Hence, due to its unavoidable ephemeral nature, “[p]erformance 37
honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame 
can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterwards” and, 
in doing so, it constitutes itself as a gesture of resistance to the production of 
commodifiable images.  "38
 Ibid., 2.34
 Ibid., 91.35
 Ibid., 146.36
 Ibid., 148. Here it is worth noting that the theatrical connotations of ‘representation’ are much 37
stronger in Romance languages than in English: Whether in Portuguese (representação), 
French (représentation), Italian (rappresentazione), or Spanish (representación), 
‘representation’ does not only mean standing for something or someone in visual art or in a 
court of law. Rather, ‘representation’ is also the name of what actors do on stage: in Romance 
languages, actors don’t ‘play’ roles, they ‘represent’ them.
 Ibid., 149.38
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Due to its stressing of the impossibility of performance ever happening again in 
the same way, Phelan’s ontology could be seen to be diametrically opposed to 
Schechner’s later definition of performance as restored behaviour. In other 
words, whereas Schechner claimed performance to be behaviour that happens 
again, Phelan defined it as that which can never be repeated.  However, after 39
taking into consideration Schechner’s earlier criticism of the artifice of theatre 
and his stressing of the transformative power of performance, one realises that 
Schechner and Phelan are much closer in their views than what would at first 
seem. Even if Schechner has abandoned his early straightforward rejection of 
mimetic representation and replaced that position—reminiscent of Phelan avant 
la lettre—with a view of performance as restored or repeated behaviour, he has 
never ceased to emphasise the transformative power of of the latter.  Likewise, 40
Phelan has also stressed that performance has the power to transform both 
audiences and performers alike, a power that it shares with no other art form. In 
a 2003 interview, for instance, she was quoted saying the following:"
Now we have streaming video, web casts, all sorts of media capable of 
recording and circulating live events. They can give us something that 
closely resembles the live event but they nonetheless remain something 
other than live performance. [...] [In] terms of the ontological question, it’s 
simply not the same thing. For me, live performance remains an 
interesting art form because it contains the possibility of both the actor 
and the spectator becoming transformed during the event’s unfolding.  "41
But what if there was a kind of spectator being overlooked in the case of 
recorded performances? What if Phelan, in her claiming that video recording is 
 The view that Phelan and Schechner are at odd with one another is echoed in Bert O. States’ 39
claim that “[whereas] the aesthetic of presence dominates Phelan’s approach, the aesthetic of 
repetition dominates Schechner’s contention that ‘restored [or twice-behaved] behaviour is the 
main characteristic of performance.’” Bert O. States, “Performance as Metaphor,” Theatre 
Journal 48, no. 1 (1996): 13.
 On Schechner’s stressing of performance as transformative behaviour, see: Schechner, 40
“Intentions, Problems, Proposals,” 6; Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology, 4; 
Richard Schechner, The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance (London and 
New York: Routledge), 233–235; Richard Schechner, “Foreword: Fundamentals of Performance 
Studies,” in Teaching Performance Studies, eds. Nathan Stucky and Cynthia Wimmer 
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), x; and Schechner and 
Appel, “Introduction,” 4. 
 Peggy Phelan, “Performance, Live Culture and Things of the Heart,” Journal of Visual Culture 41
2, no. 3 (2003): 295 (emphasis added). 
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something other than live performance, ended up overlooking a particular 
spectator that witnessed the performance first-hand—and indeed was 
transformed by it—even before human audiences had the opportunity to watch 
it on screen? What if—let’s speculate—the video support, i.e. the film, tape, or 
memory card, was not only an actual spectator, but also one that succeeded, 
very much like the actors themselves, in being transformed by the performance 
encounter? Could one not claim in all seriousness that the memory card inside 
a video camera is as much transformed by a live event as humans are every 
time a performance piece is converted into electrical impulses fired between 
brain synapses? Would it be unreasonable to expand on the field-defining work 
of both Schechner and Phelan and claim, after Phelan, that performance 
plunges into visibility and disappears into flash drive memory? Or vice versa: 
could the liveness of performance be located in the moment human audiences 
witness the performance of the recorded video and its recalling of events past? 
Would it not be possible to assert, after Schechner, that technologically-restored 
behaviour is also an instance of performance? Or could performance not take 
place in the absence of humans, in the space-time of the encounter between an 
empty stage and the transformed memory card inside a camera left recording 
by accident? Or, even, could performance not take place in the space that 
separates the memories engraved on the surface of a DVD and their 
reenactment on a TV screen? Could performance understood as transformative 
behaviour not happen there, besides or even beyond the watching human 
eye/‘I’? After all, if it is possible to think technological performance, why is it 
hard to think machines that perform for one another?"
"
McKenzie: Performance Beyond the Human!
The previous sections have drawn attention to how performance has been 
understood as transformative behaviour and to the ways in which its 
theorisation has primarily departed from instances of human cultural and social 
performance. Perhaps unsurprisingly due to its inheritance from Theatre 
Studies and Anthropology, Performance Studies, as carved by the likes of 
Richard Schechner and Peggy Phelan, has mostly concerned itself with 
ritualised human behaviours and their ability to enact change. As Jon McKenzie 
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wrote in his controversial 2001 book Perform or Else: From Discipline to 
Performance:"
Over the past five decades, the presentational forms associated with 
theatrical performance have been transformed into analytical tools, 
generalized across disciplinary fields, and reinstalled in diverse locations. 
Anthropologists and folklorists have studied the rituals of both indigenous 
and diasporic groups as performance, sociologists and communication 
researchers have analyzed the performance of social interactions and 
nonverbal communication, while cultural theorists have researched the 
everyday workings of race, gender, and sexual politics in terms of 
performance. [...] The concept of performance as the embodied 
enactment of cultural forces has not only informed many disciplines of 
study, it has also given rise to its own paradigm of knowledge, called in 
the United States and other English-speaking countries “Performance 
Studies.”    "42
As McKenzie’s quote sums up, performance has been primarily understood 
within Performance Studies and the Humanities at large as a transformative 
practice that has mostly to do with the realm of ‘Culture’ in its broadest, all-too-
human, sense. The limit of such view, however, is not only that, in doing so, 
Performance Studies necessarily valorises transgressive or subversive social 
practices at the expense of other kinds of behaviours, but it also tends to ignore 
nonhuman performers and audiences.  In other words, Performance Studies 43
appears to have been grounded on a clear ontological hierarchy, one in which 
only certain kinds of beings and certain types of behaviours are worthy of being 
addressed as performance. In other words, performance scholarship can often 
appear to take for granted J. L. Austin’s claim that “[actions] can only be 
performed by persons.”  "44
 Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (London and New York: 42
Routledge, 2001), 8 (emphasis added). 
 McKenzie gave examples of transgressive social events that performance studies tend to 43
privilege, including “the happenings, rock concerts, and political demonstrations of the 1960s 
[and] the drag shows, raves, and Culture Wards of the 1990s” (Ibid., 30).
 Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 60.44
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However, what Jon McKenzie realised was that, as Performance Studies began 
its institutionalisation as an academic discipline and a paradigm for the study of 
‘Culture,’ two other performance paradigms were being developed more or less 
simultaneously in post-war America and without any apparent contact with one 
another: the paradigms of Performance Management and Techno-Performance. 
Whilst scholars were beginning to use performance as a tool to think broader 
social and cultural phenomena, elsewhere performance was also displacing 
Taylorism as the dominant paradigm of organisational management, and 
starting to be used in relation to technology in the context of the military-
industrial-academic complex of Cold War America.  Seeing the appearance of 45
apparently unrelated discourses on cultural, organisational, and technological 
performance as a symptom of a bigger change taking place in post-war 
American society, McKenzie set himself to build a general theory of 
performance that was able to account for all those instantiations of performance 
and for what they might say about contemporary relations of power and 
knowledge. In doing so, he eventually claimed that if discipline, as theorised by 
Michel Foucault and embodied in Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, represented 
the modern historical formation of power and knowledge aimed at producing a 
certain kind of subject through the complex interweaving of the discourses and 
practices of schools, hospitals, prisons, and the military, performance had taken 
over from discipline as the power-knowledge stratum sustaining the twenty-first 
century. In his words:"
Like discipline, performance produces a new subject of knowledge, 
though one quite different from that produced under the regime of 
panoptic surveillance. Hyphenated identities, transgendered bodies, 
digital avatars, the Human Genome Project—these suggest that the 
performative subject is constructed as fragmented rather than unified, 
decentered rather than centered, virtual as well as actual. Similarly, 
performative objects are unstable rather than fixed, simulated rather than 
real. They do not occupy a single, “proper” place in knowledge; there is 
no such thing as the thing-in-itself. Instead, objects are produced and 
maintained through a variety of sociotechnical systems, over coded by 
many discourses, and situated in numerous sites of practice. While 
 McKenzie, Perform or Else, 5–12. 45
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disciplinary institutions and mechanisms forged Western Europe’s 
industrial revolution and its system of colonial empires, those of 
performance are programming the circuits of out post-industrial, 
postcolonial world. "46
The way that is done, according to McKenzie, is through the articulation of three 
challenges which are then addressed by the three different contemporary 
paradigms of performance: the challenge of efficacy in Performance Studies, 
the challenge of efficiency in Performance Management, and the challenge of 
effectiveness in Techno-Performance. "
As it was already seen, thanks to the liminal model it borrowed from Victor 
Turner’s work on ritual structures and then attached to quintessentially liminal 
genres like performance art, Performance Studies has dedicated itself to 
studying human behaviours and their efficacy in upholding or challenging 
societal arrangements.  More or less concurrently with the development of 47
Performance Studies, and as a response to the inadequacy of the monolithic 
industrial machine of Taylorism in an increasingly informational economy, new 
models for managing workers started being developed. Those were supported 
by the emergence of Performance Management, a new set of practices and 
discourses aimed at measuring and maximising the ability of organisations to 
respond to the challenge of efficiency, i.e. of producing more whilst expending 
less, through fostering the creativity and initiative of their empowered and self-
managed workforce.  Finally, in the context of the U.S. Space Programme and 48
the Cold War, Techno-Performance emerged as a new paradigm of research 
aimed at maximising the effectiveness of technology developed by the military-
industrial-academic complex; in other words, Techno-Performance became the 
set of practices and discourses aimed at measuring and maximising the ability 
of a technological apparatus to carry-out designated tasks to a given 
standard.  In McKenzie’s words:"49
 Ibid., 18.46
 See ibid., 29–53.47
 See ibid., 55–94. See also Sami Siegelbaum, “Business Casual: Flexibility in Contemporary 48
Performance Art,” Art Journal 72, no. 3 (2013): 49–63.
 See McKenzie, Perform or Else, 95–126.49
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Cultural performance, as produced and studied by Performance Studies 
researchers, entails the embodiment of symbolic structures in living 
behavior and, crucially, the transformation of these structures through 
discourses and practices of transgression, resistance, and mutation. The 
challenge is thus one of social efficacy. Organizational performance, as 
designated and reviewed by Performance Management researchers, 
consists of tasks and strategies for maximizing an organization’s output 
and minimising its input; these tasks and strategies are both human and 
technological. The challenge here is one of organizational efficiency. 
Technological performance, as engineered and evaluated by Techno-
Performance researchers, refers to the behaviors and properties that 
technologies exhibit while executing specific tasks in specific contexts. 
Here the challenge is defined in terms of technical effectiveness. "50
What McKenzie’s study highlights, then, is 1) that all three performance 
paradigms appeared in the U.S. more or less simultaneously in the aftermath of 
the Second World War and proceeded to be taken up across the world; and 2) 
that all three of them, regardless of their particular contexts and histories, 
privilege process over product, structuration over structure, event over entity, 
and the testing and contesting of existing norms. In other words performance is 
defined across all three paradigms as a creative and dynamic event whether in 
Performance Studies’ focus on liminality, Performance Management’s call for 
“thinking outside the box” to maximise productivity, or Techno-Performance’s 
investment in “risk-taking” and the “cutting-edge.”  "51
In foregrounding the similarities between cultural, organisational, and 
technological notions of performance whilst nonetheless remaining aware of 
their differences, McKenzie brought human and nonhuman instances of 
performance together, therefore opening up performance theory to processes 
that may or may not take place within the confines of black boxes and white 
cubes. In doing so, he was able to foreground the importance of practices and 
discourses of performance for a more ecological understanding of an 
increasingly enmeshed world, where the actions of a body can often affect other 
 Ibid., 130.50
 Ibid., 131–132.51
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bodies, be it humans troubling the configurations of the social, organisations 
affecting the behaviour of economies and the future of the Amazonian 
rainforest, or drones changing the ways in which friends are delivered their 
shopping and enemies are delivered their death. Nonetheless, by presenting 
efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness as the challenges of cultural, 
organisational, and technological performance respectively, McKenzie left 
untouched the perceived necessity of having humans as the ultimate arbiters of 
performance. Despite having brought human and nonhuman performers closer 
together, McKenzie kept humans as judges of the efficacy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of performance in line with the established view whereby 
performance only becomes performance through the human observer that 
legitimises it as such. Or, as Marvin Carlson put it:"
Perhaps even more significantly, the task of judging the success of the 
performance (or even judging whether it is a performance) is […] not the 
responsibility of the performer but of the observer. […] This is why 
performance […] can be and is applied frequently to non-human activity
—TV adds speak interminably of the performance of various brands of 
automobiles, scientists of the performance of chemicals or metals under 
certain conditions. […] Performance is always performance for someone, 
some audience that recognizes and validates it as performance even 
when, as is occasionally the case, that audience is the self. "52
"
Nonhumans in Performance Studies!
Even if, as Jon McKenzie has shown, Performance Studies researchers have 
mostly privileged the study of human behaviours that, through their liminality, 
are able to challenge and renegotiate the social order, nonhumans have always 
been active presences in cultural performance. As a result, there have been 
occasions in which, notwithstanding McKenzie’s argument, scholars of cultural 
performance have had to look beyond the human in order to reflect on the 
nature of the theatre or to investigate the limits of the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide as 
it is either reinforced or troubled on stage. The aim of this section is to provide 
 Marvin Carlson, Performance: a Critical Introduction (New York and London: Routledge, 52
2004), 4–5 (emphasis added).
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an account of those occasions, to highlight the long history of nonhumans in 
human performance, and to foreground some of the main questions 
surrounding the performances of animals and technology on human stages. "
"
Performing Animals"
Animals have been present on human stages for millennia. From ancient Greek 
festivals to the Roman circus, animals have always been a regular feature of 
human entertainment. Writing in the late 1950s, for instance, P. D. Arnott noted 
that:"
Animals on the stage are usually more trouble than they are worth, and 
producers are notoriously chary of using them. There are several 
instances in ancient drama, however, where they seem to be essential to 
the plot. "53
From the horses that pulled the chariot from which Aeschylus made 
Agamemnon address the Chorus and Clytemnestra, to the donkey that carried 
Xanthias in Aristophanes’ Frogs, animals were used in both tragedy and 
comedy either in the name of spectacle or amusement.  In parallel with those, 54
and according to Lourdes Orozco, the Egyptian and Minoan traditions of 
bullfights and staged hunts were also continued by the Greeks and became 
highly successful forms of popular entertainment in the Roman Empire.  "55
What is crucial, in the context of the argument that has unfolded so far, is that in 
pre-modern Western societies humans and animals were not so much seen 
detached from one another as they were presented in a relationship of co-
defining proximity that had an effect in human cultural production. As John 
Berger noted in his essay “Why Look at Animals?,” drawing on Homer’s Iliad as 
an example:"
 P. D. Arnott, “Animals in the Greek Theatre,” Greece & Rome 6, no. 2 (1959), 177.53
 Ibid., 177–178.54
 See Lourdes Orozco, Theatre & Animals (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 55
2013), 12.
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The Iliad is one of the earliest texts available to us, and in it the use of 
metaphor still reveals the proximity of man and animal, the proximity from 
which metaphor itself arose. Homer describes the death of a soldier on 
the battlefield and then the death of a horse. Both deaths are equally 
transparent to Homer’s eyes, there is no more refraction in one case 
than the other. "56
Similarly, in the Middle Ages, that proximity was still very much a feature of 
everyday life. As Lourdes Orozco highlighted:"
“[Animal-related] spectacles during [the Middle Ages] were at the 
intersection of performance events and daily life. Public executions, acts 
of shaming and punishment, animal baiting (carried out to soften the 
meat before its consumption) and staged hunts were all performed for 
both functional and entertainment purposes. Present in all of them, the 
animal enabled the crossing of boundaries, as these rituals fulfilled the 
practical and spiritual needs of the community. "57
It was not until the scientific revolution and the Age of Enlightenment brought 
about the dawn of the modern world that the proximity between humans and 
animals gave way to an insurmountable divide that was also reflected in the 
theatre, where increasingly professionalisation and elevation of the form to new 
heights of human reflection on its exceptional condition, led the animal 
progressively off stage.  "58
One of the arguments surrounding the problem of having animals on the 
modern stage seems to have been that animals don’t really belong there; 
animals cannot behave in a way capable of triggering the kind of existential 
reflection and cathartic experience humans expect from the ‘high’ thespian arts. 
As Nicholas Ridout wrote:"
The theatre [...] is all about humans coming face to face with other 
humans [...]. The animal clearly has no place in such a communication. 
Thus when it does appear on stage, untethered from framings as a pet 
 John Berger, About Looking (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 7.56
 Orozco, Theatre & Animals, 15.57
 See ibid., 15; also Berger, About Looking, 9–12.58
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within the dramatic fiction, the animal seems doubly out of place. Not 
only shouldn’t it be there, because it can’t be in its own interests to be, 
but also it shouldn’t be there because this particular kind of being there 
when it shouldn’t is what we expect to find in the circus [...]. There is also 
a third sense in which it shouldn’t be there, closely related to these two: it 
shouldn’t be there because it doesn’t know what to do there, is not 
capable of performing theatrically by engaging a human audience in 
experimental thinking about the conditions of their own humanity. "59
Or, in the words of Nick Kaye:"
[The] animal offers a presence that is disruptive of the representational 
apparatus of the theatre precisely because of its performative alertness 
yet inability to answer for its own symbolic significance.  "60
Away from the stage but still within the realm of Performance Studies, Richard 
Schechner has dedicated one chapter of his Performance Theory to ethology 
and opened his discussion of animal performance with a reference to Darwin’s 
identification of a “continuity of behavior from animals to people.”  Departing 61
from an analysis of ritualistic behaviour in primates, Schechner eventually 
concluded that “[on] several levels human and animal performances converge 
and/or exist along a continuum” that manifests itself at different levels: 
structural, processual, technical, cultural, mimetic, and theoretical.  "62
However, rather than being exclusively triggered by an interest in the behaviour 
of primates, Schechner’s reflections on animal performance were a means to a 
better understanding of its most evolved relative, human performance. As the 
author claimed from the viewpoint of a linear evolutionary paradigm, “[those] 
similarities and convergences offer a basis for re-examining human theater from 
 Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals, and Other Theatrical Problems, 97–98. See also Lourdes 59
Orozco, “‘Never Work with Children and Animals’: Risk, mistake and the real in performance,” 
Performance Research 15, no. 2 (2010): 80–85.
 Nick Kaye, “Video Presence: Tony Oursler’s Media Entities,” PAJ: A Journal of Performance 60
and Art 30, no. 1 (2008): 24–25.
 Schechner, Performance Theory, 235.61
 Ibid., 287.62
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the perspective of animal performances.”  For Schechner, therefore, animal 63
performance seemed only worth of study for its contribution to unveiling 
something about humans and their higher forms of ritualised behaviour.  As he 64
has claimed elsewhere:"
A great difference between human and non-human performers is the 
ability of humans to lie and pretend… Although a few species specialize 
in ‘deceit’, most animal performances are automatically released, fixed 
and stereotyped. There is no irony, no pliable back-and-forth play 
between the role and the performer, no trilogical interaction linking 
performer to performer to spectator. "65
Still, despite being either absent from most modern theatre or subjected to 
humans in many canonical works of Performance Studies, animals and 
animality have been embraced by avant-garde movements and contemporary 
performance artists as a political and aesthetic gesture aimed at disrupting the 
established conventions of theatre. From the slaughtered pigs in Herman 
Nitsch’s Orgien Mysterien Theater to the performing horses of French troupe 
Zingaro or the German shepherds used by Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio in Inferno, 
animals have been been present in the works of twentieth- and twenty-first-
century artists to stimulate a reflection on the co-dependence of human and 
animal subjectivities and to investigate and trouble the limits of theatre 
understood as human laboratory.  Similarly, in that same line, contemporary 66
performance scholars such as Lourdes Orozco, Alan Read, or Una Chaudhuri 
have tried to think the role of animals in theatre and performance through a 
study of its history and of the ways in which animals can disrupt the kind of 
recognition expected from the theatre since Aristotle and contribute to excavate 
 Ibid.63
 Even almost twenty years later, Schechner’s take on animal performance changed little. 64
Writing in 1993, he claimed that:"
“Nonhuman primates such as chimpanzees and gorillas behave in some respect very much like 
humans. Even if nonhuman primates cannot speak as humans do […] they can express and 
communicated feelings. Such expressive behavior, communicating and sharing feelings, might 
be closer to human ritual and its associated ‘behavior arts’ (theatre, dance, music, some kinds 
of painting) than anything rational or cognitive the ‘higher apes’ are capable of” (Schechner, The 
Future of Ritual, 229).
 Richard Schechner, quoted in Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement, 107.65
 See Orozco, Theatre and Animals, 25–36; and Martin Puchner, “Performing the Open: Actors, 66
Animals, Philosophers,” TDR 51, no 1 (2007): 21–32; 
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the grounds sustaining established architectures of the animal and the human 
as well as the ethics of their encounter.  "67
"
Performing Technologies"
Very much like animals, technological apparatuses have also been a regular 
presence in cultural performance at least since antiquity. From stage machinery 
to puppets, masks to digital interfaces, technology is as a ubiquitous feature of 
cultural performance as the humans with which it shares the stage. "
In ancient Greek theatres, for instance, historians have identified two main 
types of technological stage apparatuses: the ekkuklema, a mobile platform that 
could be projected out towards the audience and often used to display corpses, 
and the mechane, a crane that was used to lift actors into the air to added 
spectacular effects.  Similarly, stage machinery or ingegni used during the 68
Renaissance in Florentine religious festivals were mentioned in Giorgio Vasari’s 
Celebrated Lives of Architects, Sculptors, and Painters and attributed by the 
early art historian to Filippo Brunelleschi and Francesco d’Angelo.  Similar 69
mechanical apparatuses would then be perfected for seventeenth-century 
Venetian theatres and play an important part in Baroque opera.  "70
Likewise, there is written evidence of puppet and object theatre already taking 
place not only in classical Greece but also in much earlier Chinese, Arabic, 
 See Orozco, Theatre & Animals; Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement; Una Chaudhuri, 67
“Animal Geographies: Zooësis and the Space of Modern Drama,” Modern Drama 46, no. 4 
(2003): 646–662; and Una Chaudhuri, “(De)Facing the Animals: Zooësis and Performance,” 
TDR: The Drama Review 51, no. 1 (2007): 8–20. It should be noted that, despite sharing similar 
concerns and even some theoretical and philosophical starting points with those works, this 
thesis is less concerned with exploring human-animal encounters than it is invested in sketching 
a general theory of performance that takes as its starting point the flatness of the real whose 
rediscovery was a side-effect of the ecological crisis. Rather than investigating the intersections 
of humans and animals in performance, the aim of this thesis is, as it was argued in the 
Introduction, to speculate on performance as such. For that reason, detailed discussions of the 
arguments put forward by scholars such as the ones just mentioned fall outside the scope of 
this work even if running parallel to it. 
 See Graham Ley, A Short Introduction to the Ancient Greek Theater (Chicago and London: 68
The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 20–21.
 See Orville K. Larson, “Vasari’s Descriptions of Stage Machinery,” Educational Theatre 69
Journal 9, no. 4 (1957): 287–299.
 See Orville K. Larson, “Giacomo Torelli, Sir Philip Skippon, and Stage Machinery for the 70
Venetian Opera,” Theatre Journal 32, no. 4 (1980): 448–457.
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Indian, and Javanese cultures, where puppets were used in various contexts 
from secular entertainment to sacred rituals.  However, despite its long history, 71
puppet theatre has often led a marginal, ‘underground’ life. As Kenneth Gross 
wrote,"
Indeed, for much of its history, if it has not been seen as something 
primarily for children, puppet theater has often been taken for a lower 
order of theater, part of a world of unliscensed [sic] street performers, 
mountebanks, charlatans, and circus sideshows, a theater form that is 
debased, unsophisticated, unliterary, ephemeral, though also crudely 
seductive. "72
Yet, for that same reason and very much like animal performance, puppet and 
object theatre has become a prolific arena for reflecting on and troubling the 
conventions of human theatre and performance. For that reason, both theorists 
and artists became increasingly interested in it from the nineteenth century 
onwards. From Kleist’s famous 1810 essay “On the Marionette Theatre” in 
which the author referred to a fictional conversation he had with a dancer in 
which the latter told him about how human dancers could learn a lot from 
marionettes, to Oskar Schlemmer’s 1929 piece Metal Dance, puppets, masks, 
and automata became a regular feature of thought and artistic practices 
invested in pushing boundaries and disrupting the norm.  As puppet historian 73
John Bell wrote:"
In the early decades of the 20th century, avantgarde practitioners such 
as F. T. Marinetti […], Wassily Kandinsky […], Fernand Léger […], André 
Breton […], and Oskar Schlemmer […] valorized the performing object in 
three new ways: as an important link between European and non-
European ritual performance; as a central aspect of traditional popular 
theatre with contemporary experimental possibilities; and, in a 
 See Kenneth Gross, Puppet: An Essay on Uncanny Life (Chicago and London: The University 71
of Chicago Press, 2011), 5.
 Ibid., 6–7.72
 See Heirich von Kleist, “On the Marionette Theatre,” The Drama Review: TDR 16, no. 3 73
(1972): 22–26. For more on Oskar Schlemmer’s use of early technology in the context of the 
Bauhaus, see Steve Dixon, Digital Performance: A History of New Media in Theater, Dance, 
Performance Art, and Installation (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2007), 38–39, 44–
45.
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particularly new manner, as the central focus of what Léger called 
“machine aesthetics” […]. "74
Whilst the use and theorisation of  performing objects in theatre has been going 
on uninterruptedly, new digital technologies opened further possibilities for 
cultural performance.  In the words of Steve Dixon:"75
Digital performance is an extension of a continuing history of the 
adoption and adaptation of technologies to increase performance and 
visual art’s aesthetic effect and sense of spectacle, its emotional and 
sensorial impact, its play of meanings and symbolic associations, and its 
intellectual power.  "76
Still, technological performance should not be restricted to mechanical 
apparatuses such as puppets and stage machinery, digital objects like software 
applications and human-computer interfaces, or even photographic and video 
cameras or lighting systems. Similarly, it should not be reduced to the paradigm 
of what Jon McKenzie called Techno-Performance and its challenge of technical 
effectiveness.  Technology, in its Heideggerian sense, is a mode of 77
occasioning, a way of doing so that what is done is brought-forth out of 
concealment into visibility; it is a mode of displaying, a doing that is also a 
showing and that always carries within it the potential for revelation and 
surprise, akin to that of an epiphanic moment. Therefore, technology cannot be 
exhausted by measures of its effectiveness for effectiveness can only account 
for how a particular apparatus meets preexisting expectations and responds to 
a priori human knowledge. As Heidegger put it:"
Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another 
whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is 
the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth. [...] The word stems from the Greek. 
 John Bell, “Puppets, Masks, and Performing Objects at the End of the Century,” TDR 43, no. 74
3 (1999), 16. 
 For more on the history of the use and theorisation of performing objects see ibid., 15–27. For 75
a genealogy of digital technology in performance, from the Bauhaus to Laurie Anderson, see 
Dixon, Digital Performance, 37–111.
 Dixon, Digital Performance, 40.76
 See above, p. 89.77
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Technikon means that which belongs to technē. [...] techne [sic] is the 
name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for 
the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to 
poiēsis.  "78
Following Heidegger, then, technology implies a movement of actualisation that 
is akin to an instance of performance. Technology, like performance, makes 
something present. By stressing the similarities between both terms one is able 
to rethink the nature of performance and the possibility of its taking place in a 
world increasingly mediated by technology. Understanding performance as 
technē, as a bringing-forth or a giving-rise-to, means not only that performance 
can be seen as a way of making something present—in line with Peggy 
Phelan’s ontological work—but also that the making-present of performance will 
always happen by means of a carrier or a medium, as both Philip Auslander and 
Amelia Jones have claimed.  Performance as technē is, in that sense, a kind of 79
giving-birth: it happens when “a content is articulated through a vehicle.”  As 80
Phelan noted in response to Auslander’s claim that, when writing about 
Angelika Festa in Unmarked, Phelan didn’t seem to notice the presence of 
technology in Festa’s performance work: "81
Of course I notice it, and I spent a long time talking about what’s on 
those monitors because I was not in any way trying to say that live 
performance cannot have video, audio, or technology. [...] Performance 
is a technology. Medieval theatre was a technology. It was not the new 
technology, not, say, electronic technology, but it was a technology: a 
plank and two boards, the definition of theatre. That’s a technology!  "82
 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York and 78
London: Garland Publishing, 1977), 12–13.
 See Phelan, Unmarked, 146; Philip Auslander, “Unmarked: The Politics of Performance by 79
Peggy Phelan,” TDR 84, no. 3 (1994): 186; and Amelia Jones, “‘Presence’ in Absentia: 
Experiencing Performance as Documentation,” Art Journal 56, no. 4 (1997): 12.
 David Davies, Art as Performance (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 80.80
 For Auslander’s criticism of Phelan’s reading of Festa’s work see Philip Auslander, Liveness: 81
Performance in a Mediatized Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 40.
 Phelan, “Performance, Live Culture and Things of the Heart,” 295.82
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Thus, the progression of this dissertation towards a broader than broad 
spectrum of performance—one that will remain valid both within and beyond 
human experience—will depart from the aforementioned Heideggerian definition 
of technē in order to claim performance as the technology that allows all kinds 
of bodies, human and nonhuman, to encounter one another. As it unfolds, the 
political potential of such redefinition will become more evident. For now it will 
suffice to say that if performance, like technē, is a kind of unveiling, and if 
politics is, after Rancière, that which “makes visible what had no business being 
seen,” then performance is full of political potential, regardless of whoever or 
whatever is performing.  However, before delving into the political implications 83
of the thesis being argued here, it is now time to argue how performance can 
account for the increasing ecological entanglement of bodies."
"
Performance as Communication!
In the introduction to his book Story, Performance, and Event, anthropologist 
Richard Bauman wrote the following:"
Briefly stated, I understand performance as a mode of communication, a 
way of speaking, the essence of which resides in the assumption of 
responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative skill, 
highlighting the way in which communication is carried out, above and 
beyond its referential content. From the point of view of the audience, the 
act of expression on the part of the performer is thus laid open to 
evaluation for the way it is done, for the relative skill and effectiveness of 
the performer’s display. It is also offered for the enhancement of 
experience, through the present appreciation of the intrinsic qualities of 
the act of expression itself. […] Viewed in these terms, performance may 
be understood as the enactment of the poetic function, the essence of 
spoken artistry. "84
 See Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: The University 83
of Minnesota Press, 1999), 30.
 Richard Bauman, Story, Performance, and Event: Contextual Studies of Oral Narrative 84
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3 (emphasis added).
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Bauman’s understanding of performance as a particular “mode of 
communication,” one that constitutes an “enactment of the poetic function,” is 
useful due to poiēsis being, in Plato like in Heidegger, a feature of a wide range 
of activities, one that is not exclusive of artistic practices or even of the broader 
human realm. As Diotima of Mantinea tells Socrates in Plato’s Symposium:"
Well, you know, for example, that ‘poetry’ has a very wide range. After all, 
everything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a 
kind of poetry; and so all the creations of every craft and profession are 
themselves a kind of poetry, and everyone who practices a craft is a 
poet. "85
Thus, performance understood as the enactment of poiēsis in its Platonic and 
Heideggerian sense already broadens performance beyond black boxes and 
white cubes and is, therefore, a good first step in the direction of the broad 
ecological definition of performance with which this chapter is concerned. There 
is, however, a problem: even if performance is, indeed, a poietic enactment, and 
if poiēsis can take place beyond the sphere of human ‘Culture,’ most instances 
of performance still don’t appear as such; instead, they take place without being 
noticed. As an example, when using a computer, one does not need to become 
aware of the ways in which the machine performs for it to effectively respond to 
one’s keyboard strokes or mouse clicks. For a computer to bring-forth the image 
of the text one is writing, for instance, it does not need to reveal the ways in 
which it carries out that task; on the contrary, most of the times the user is 
unaware of what goes on in the background. "
However, before delving further into the details about those occasions in which 
performance appears as such, it is important to reflect on the first half of 
Bauman’s definition, i.e. the thesis that performance is a mode of 
communication, and to ask whether communication can take place amongst 
nonhuman bodies."
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to “communicate” means “to make 
[something] known, […] to exchange information,” whereas “communications” 
has a slightly different meaning, standing not for an action but for the series of 
 Plato, Complete Works, 488.85
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apparatuses associated with technology in advanced information societies, from 
traditional roads to information highways such as telephones, radios, and 
computers. "86
Following the General Definition of Information (GDI), information, i.e. that 
which is exchanged in communication, must comply with three conditions in 
order to be classified as such:"
GDI) σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic content, if 
and only if:"
GDI.1) σ consists of n data, for n ≥ 1;"
GDI.2) the data are well formed [i.e., they follow the rules of syntax 
shared by the emitter and the receptor of information];"
GDI.3) the well-formed data are meaningful [i.e., their semantic content is 
able to be deciphered].  "87
From that general definition, it is possible to infer that to communicate, or to 
exchange information, is not a privilege of humans or even of animals. All kinds 
of bodies exchange well-formed information with one another and, in that 
sense, communicate: copies of the HIV virus, for instance, exchange 
information in the form of RNA with their host CD4 cells, information that is then 
transcribed into DNA and transported to the nucleus of the host cells where it is 
added to the cells’ own genetic material, leading to the replication of the virus."
Another quite timely example of communication amongst non-animal bodies is 
the circulation of information in financial systems, networks through which value 
circulates and which, despite having been created by humans, can be said to 
have acquired an agency of their own thanks to the adoption of high-frequency 
algorithmic trading, much to the despair of the people affected by today’s 
 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 5th ed., s.v. “communication.” 86
 Luciano Floridi, Information: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 87
2010), 21. Notwithstanding that definition, the definition of ‘information’ has a long and rather 
complex history, the discussion of which falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Thus, for an 
interesting and accessible explanation of that history, particularly as it unfolded during and in 
parallel with the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics of 1946–53 thanks to the likes of Claude 
Shannon, Norbert Wiener, or Donald MacKay, see, for instance, Hayles, How We Became 
Posthuman, 50–83.
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crumbling economies.  In information systems like contemporary financial 88
markets what is left for humans is the role of analyst, of observer, of audience 
member as it were. Capitalism has become an autonomous machine, a network 
through which flows of information circulate in the form of capital and are 
received and processed not only by finance analysts and high street and online 
shoppers but also, at a time when thousands of financial operations are 
executed automatically every second without the intervention of human agents, 
by other nonhuman nodes of the machine. "
Plants and animals communicate, too. Famous examples of such behaviours 
include the case of the male Scenopoetes dentirostris, a bird known for building 
extremely sophisticated and colourful structures that are then read as 
reproductive value by prospective female partners, an idiosyncratic 
characteristic that made the otherwise forgettable bird take centre stage in the 
philosophical discourse of Deleuze and Guattari, who called it a “complete 
artist.”  Or the case of some species of flowers predominant in Eurasia, South 89
America, and Australia, that mimic female insects in order to be pollinated by 
the males that, fooled by delusion, pseudocopulate with them.  Or even those 90
flowers that, by emitting smells that are read as pleasant by the human olfactory 
system, have encountered a way of striving as a species for humans 
themselves will make sure they won’t die."
All the above situations comply with the General Definition of Information: well-
formed data (GDI.2) is produced as RNA, stock market indexes, colourful 
architectures made of leaves and found materials, or patterns, shapes and 
 As Geoffrey Rogow wrote in the Wall Street Journal blog MarketBeat, “The U.S. stock market 88
has switched to automatic from manual transmission, forcing investors to relearn how to drive.” 
That is because “[the] majority of stock trades now originate with fully automated ‘high 
frequency’ funds […that] employ no traders in the conventional sense. They employ no 
economists or chart trackers. Rather, programmers […] outfit computers with strategies based 
on obscure mathematical correlations. Then the machines trade in and out of stocks at light 
speed without human intervention, a departure from the ‘fundamental’ investing model that 
dominated trading for the last century.” Geoffrey Rogow, “Rise of the (Market) Machines,” 
MarketBeat (blog), The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/
2009/06/19/rise-of-the-market-machines/. See also Christopher Steiner, Automate This: How 
Algorithms Came to Rule the World (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012). 
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh 89
Tomlinson (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 184.
 See Amots Dafni, “Mimicry and Deception in Pollination,” Annual Review of Ecology and 90
Systematics 15 (1984): 259–278.
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smells of flowers. That coherent data is then read and converted into meaning 
(GDI.3) as instructions for producing a certain kind of viral protein, as financial 
tendencies and ‘mood’ of the markets, as indexes of reproductive value, or as 
female insects willing to copulate. Therefore, those examples reveal what 
Luciano Floridi described as the animated world resulting from the 
understanding that information is intrinsic to everything that exists and that its 
constant circulation is indeed the way through which all phenomena take place:"
[In] advanced information societies, what we still experience as the world 
offline is bound to become a fully interactive and more responsive 
environment of wireless, pervasive, distributed, a2a (anything to 
anything) information processes, that works a4a (anywhere for anytime), 
in real time. Such a world will first gently invite us to understand it as 
something ‘a-live’ (artificially live). [...] This leads to a reconceptualization 
of our metaphysics in informational terms. [...] The infosphere will not be 
a virtual environment supported by a genuinely ‘material’ world behind; 
rather, it will be the world itself that will be increasingly interpreted and 
understood informationally, as part of the infosphere.  "91
Now, the question is the following: if the whole world, and not just the human 
world, can be understood in terms of exchanges of information, how do those 
instances of communication become poietic enactments and, therefore, 
performance? Furthermore, how does a communication-centred definition of 
performance relate to the work done in the broader field of performance theory 
by scholars such as Austin, Turner, Schechner, Butler, or Phelan? How can 
performance as exchange of information be reconciled with performance as 
enactment, efficacious transformation, and ephemeral encounter? In short, how 
does performance operate the Heideggerian bringing-forth of poiēsis amongst 
nonhumans while still remaining true or at least close to its existing ontologies?"
Understanding communication as exchange of information is a relatively easy 
affair. There is also little doubt that it can be encountered, as it was already 
seen, in humans, animals, technology, and even in strange entities such as 
viruses, bodies that despite being classified as nonliving, become alive once 
 Floridi, Information: A Very Short Introduction, 17.91
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they infect a host cell.  More difficult, perhaps, is to grasp how those 92
exchanges of information amongst nonhumans can, as performative 
enactments, bring forth something that had not been there before. "
In order to understand the above questions and, as a result, grasp the nature of 
performance beyond its familiar human manifestations, attention will now be 
paid to the work being done under the philosophical banner of Object-Oriented 
Ontology. Such a decision stems from the fact that both Object-Oriented 
Ontology and its umbrella field of Speculative Realism share some of the 
concerns of this dissertation, namely an interest in thinking the nonhuman in 
light of the current ecological crisis. Furthermore, the foundational gesture of 
Object-Oriented Ontology, i.e. Graham Harman’s reading of Heidegger’s tool 
analysis, holds in it the key for understanding not only how all bodies, human 
and nonhuman, encounter and communicate with one another, but also how all 
encounters enact ephemeral and contingent realities that, in that sense, are 
akin to performances. "
"
Translating Bodies!
In the previous sections of this chapter an analogy was drawn between 
performance and communication by focusing on the former’s poietic nature, its 
ability to bring things forth, to make them present. However, it is possible to 
argue that not all instances of communication are performance in a strict, poietic 
sense. As it is was made clear by Austin’s separation of performative from 
constative utterances, not all utterances do things or bring realities forth; some 
merely describe realities that have already been enacted beforehand.  In other 93
words, and in line with Bauman’s definition quoted above, not all communication 
is an “enactment of the poetic function.”  Saying “the sky is blue” is not the 94
same as enacting blue sky in one’s mouth. It seems, then, that for an exchange 
of information to become performance it must function differently and be 
responsible not for describing a priori bodies but for, somehow, enacting or 
 See Marc H. V. van Regenmortel and Brian W. J. Mahy, “Emerging Issues in Virus 92
Taxonomy,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 10, no. 1 (2004): 8–13.
 See Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 5.93
 See above, pp. 99–100.94
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actualising them as phenomena. In short, for performance to take place as 
effective creation or transformation, any body that is given to experience—
regardless of its human or nonhuman, living or nonliving, nature—must be 
understood as movement, as something that is brought-forth every time it is 
encountered. "
Claiming that bodies are always encountered through performance is not 
unheard of within the field of Performance Studies even despite the discipline’s 
primary concern with time-based, (human) body-based art forms and social 
rituals. Schechner, himself, has made a similar claim in his foreword to the book 
Teaching Performance Studies:"
In performance studies, texts, architecture, visual arts, or any other item 
or artifact of art or culture are not studied as such. When texts, 
architecture, visual arts, or anything else are looked at by performance 
studies, they are studied “as” performances. That is, they are regarded 
as practices, events, and behaviors, not as “objects” or “things.” "95
Such a privileging of the eventness and performance-like character of “objects” 
and “things”—i.e. nonhuman, nonliving, bodies—can be more clearly 
understood by looking at the ways in which “object” has been used in 
philosophy. In his book A Hegel Dictionary, Michael Inwood traced the history of 
the concept of object from its origin in the Latin objectum (past participle of 
objicere, “to throw before or over against”) to its use in Hegelian philosophy. 
According to Inwood, Objekt has been given the sense of “something thrown 
before, or over against, the mind” for the first time by German philosopher 
Christian Wolff.  Inwood proceeded to note that there is also a native German 96
word for object, Gegenstand, “what stands over against.” Hegel used both 
terms and gave each a different meaning: while Gegenstand stood, in Hegel, for 
an intentional object, i.e. an object as it is given in experience, Objekt stood for 
an object which is, at least initially, independent from experience.  "97
 Schechner, “Foreword: Fundamentals of Performance Studies,” x.95
 Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 1992), 203 (emphasis 96
added).
 Ibid., 204.97
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It is evident, then, that the etymology of both the Latin and the German words 
for object, objectum and Gegenstand, already implies that performance is that 
which allows for something to be qualified as an object—the performance of 
having it thrown against the mind, of having it presented. Presentation, 
philosopher of science Robert Crease noted, “is that dimension of performance 
which aims at achieving the presence of a phenomenon under one of its 
profiles.”  It is thus that, through presentation, performance creates a theatron  98
understood as the theatrical space that both separates and co-implies bodies 
that spectate and bodies that are spectated.  In such a space, what is 99
spectated, what is perceived by the mind are phenomena, i.e. informational 
translations of the spectated bodies. "
A useful way of understanding such a theatron that performance opens up can 
be found in the recent metaphysical work of philosophers associated with 
Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)."
OOO is a philosophical project initially developed by Graham Harman, first 
named as such in the title of a lecture given by him in September 1999 at 
Brunel University, and later expanded by Harman and several other thinkers, 
most notably Levi Bryant, Timothy Morton, and Ian Bogost.  "100
As a branch of what is broadly called Speculative Realism (SR), OOO shares 
with other philosophical projects a rejection of the thought-world correlate that 
Meillassoux identified in Post-Kantian philosophy. As a result, it tries to 
 Robert P. Crease, The Play of Nature: Experimentation as Performance (Bloomington and 98
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 103.
 In an attempt to bring together the various and often conflicting ways in which the term is 99
used, Josette Féral claimed ‘theatricality’ to be the result of a spectator’s recognition of three 
important cleavages. First, the cleavage between everyday space and representational space 
or between ‘art’ and ‘life.’ Second, the cleavage between reality and fiction that takes place 
within the representational space and which can be defined as the separation between real 
actions happening on stage and that for which they stand in the theatrical fiction. Finally, the 
cleavage within the actor himself or, in other words, the separation between actor and role being 
played. See Josette Féral, “Foreword,” SubStance 31, no. 2&3 (2002): 3. Owing to Féral’s 
definition, ‘theatron’ will be used in this dissertation to name the space that is highlighted by 
each of those three cleavages, the space of the encounter.
 For the Brunel lecture, see Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and 100
Lectures (Ropley: Zero Books, 2010), 93. See also Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects 
(Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011); Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology: or What It’s Like 
to Be a Thing (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Timothy Morton, 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013); and Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, 
Causality (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2013). 
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reengage with the real in itself. As Levy Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman noted in the preface to their edited volume The Speculative Turn:"
The works collected here are a speculative wager on the possible returns 
from a renewed attention to reality itself. In the face of the ecological 
crisis, the forward march of neuroscience, the increasingly splintered 
interpretations of basic physics, and the ongoing breach of the divide 
between human and machine, there is a growing sense that previous 
philosophies are incapable of confronting these events. "101
It was as a response to the state of affairs which, as Bruno Latour noted, has 
artificially split reality into three separate and impermeable sets—facts, 
discourse, and power—which, in turn, became the independent domains of 
study of Science, Philosophy, and Politics, that Speculative Realism constituted 
itself. "102
However, despite sharing SR’s concerns with the real and rejection of 
correlationism, OOO has its own particular set of premises and postulates, 
which have, in recent years, become extremely popular not only amongst a 
younger generation of philosophers and theorists, but also amongst artists and 
scientists.  "103
In line with new techno-scientific developments, Harman inaugurated OOO by 
departing from Heidegger’s tool-analysis and Husserl’s work on intentionality in 
order to bring the nonhuman world once again to the centre of philosophical 
debates. As he wrote:"
Philosophy has gradually renounced its claim to have anything to do with 
the world itself. Fixated on the perilous leap between subject and object, 
it tells us nothing about the chasm that separates tree from root or 
ligament from bone. Forfeiting all comment on the realm of objects, it 
sets itself up as master of a single gap between self and world, where it 
 Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, The Speculative Turn: Continental 101
Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 3.
 See Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 6.102
 References to Graham Harman’s work can, for instance, be found in Carolyn Christov-103
Bakargiev, ed., dOCUMENTA (13): The Book of Books (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2012); 
and Nigel Clark, Inhuman Nature: Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet (London: Sage, 2011).
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holds court with a never-ending sequence of paradoxes, accusations, 
counter-charges, partisan gangs, excommunications, and alleged 
renaissances.  "104
Against philosophical fixations on the “leap between subject and object,” 
Harman went back to works by Heidegger and Husserl and expanded them with 
the help of ideas borrowed from thinkers as diverse as French and Islamic 
occasionalist philosophers (Malebranche, al-Ash’ari, and al-Ghazali), Ortega y 
Gasset, Xavier Zubiri, Manuel DeLanda, and Bruno Latour. "105
The basic claim of OOO is a rather simple one: everything that there is is an 
“object;” humans, trees, dreams, unicorns, light, stock markets, viruses or 
capital, they all are equally “objects.” By “object,” Harman means any reality that 
is irreducible to its parts and that, because it always exceeds its givenness in 
experience, can’t be exhausted by its relations with other entities, therefore 
possessing autonomy and interiority.  In short, “object” means “a real thing 106
apart from all foreign relations with the world, and apart from all domestic 
relations with its own pieces.”  "107
“Objects” are irreducible to relations because,  like the tools in Heidegger’s tool-
analysis, the primarily relationship one establishes with them lies not in knowing 
but in using them. In other words, what characterises Harman’s “objects” is that 
they are first and foremost ready-to-hand (zuhanden in Heidegger) rather than 
present-at-hand (vorhanden).  By that, Harman means that, after Heidegger, 108
for tools to perform as expected their presence must somehow be concealed 
from view; their reality must, as it were, become invisible, unnoticed, 
independent from one’s access to it. It is only when tools break down that they 
are able to reveal themselves or, as Harman wrote, “[for] Heidegger, it is 
generally when equipment is lacking in some way that it emerges from its 
 Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Winchester and 104
Washington: Zero Books, 2010), 94.
 For more on Harman’s use of the work of those authors, see, for instance, Graham Harman, 105
Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 35, 160–163, 
201, 204–206.
 Ibid., 187–188.106
 Ibid., 188.107
 See Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures, 96.108
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shadowy underground of pure competence and reveals its contours to view.”  109
A computer is a great example of this: when it performs at its best, when it 
performs as expected, the computer itself disappears behind its smooth 
performance; one does not notice the screen but is, instead, able to direct one’s 
gaze beyond it, to whatever is projected there. It is only when the computer 
crashes down and freezes that it reappears as itself and no longer as an 
invisible window into a particular informational landscape. "
Still, Harman’s most crucial gesture is not one of reinforcing Heidegger’s tool-
analysis but, rather, one of extending its logic beyond the human uses of 
nonhuman tools. With Harman, the zuhandenheit character of the Heideggerian 
tool-being was extended to all kinds of bodies, human and nonhuman, living 
and nonliving so that zuhandenheit or, as he put it, withdrawnness from 
relations, became the first general postulate of his flat ontology. As he wrote:"
[What] is of most interest is not the content of Heidegger’s self-
understanding, but the unforeseen direction in which contemporary 
ontology is forced to travel as a result of his tool-analysis. […] His insight 
into tool-being is a discovery that belongs to the ages, and is arguably 
the pivot point of twentieth century philosophy. […] Heidegger’s tool-
analysis should not be read as a limited account of human productive or 
technical activity. Instead, it turns out that with the theory of equipment 
Heidegger gives us an insight of overwhelming scope, one that cannot 
be restricted to “tools” in the narrow sense of the term, and ultimately 
cannot even be restricted to the sphere of human life. The discussion of 
tool-being provides us with nothing less than a metaphysics of reality 
[…]. "110
What Harman meant in this passage was that, through expanding Heidegger’s 
tool-analysis to all bodies or, as he called them, to all “objects,” one reaches the 
first principle of his Object-Oriented Ontology, i.e. that the being of all “objects” 
lies somewhere outside the relations they establish with other “objects.” In other 
 Ibid., 97.109
 Ibid., 46.110
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words, that all “objects withdraw from relations” whether or not such relations 
involve humans or their nonhuman tools.  "111
In doing so, i.e. by claiming that 1) all bodies exist on the same ontological 
footing, that everything—from dreams to furniture, unicorns to supernovas—is 
equally an “object” and has reality to it, Harman was able to overcome the 
Kantian thought-world correlate by positing the real as a priori to thought. 
Nevertheless, by then claiming that “objects” cannot enter into relations, i.e. that 
they never make direct contact with one another, Harman still maintained a 
quasi-Kantian notion of epistemological finitude: if “objects” can never 
encounter one another, they can never grasp each another either. Therefore, 
instead of rejecting finitude, what Harman did was to strip it from its human 
exclusivity and extend it to all “objects” as their inability to fully encounter one 
another.  "112
Still, a question arises from such ontological claim: if indeed bodies or “objects” 
are always kept apart, always somehow withdrawn from the encounters in 
which they are supposed to be involved, how is it that they can still manage to 
relate to one another? How is causation still possible? The answer, according to 
Harman, is that “objects” relate to one another by proxy, through the mediating 
role of what he called “sensual objects” after Husserl.  Whereas “real objects” 113
are autonomous from relations, their being or essence never fully exhausted, 
“sensual objects” are given in the phenomenal realm and are contingent on 
each particular encounter. As he put it:"
Phenomenology cannot speak of how one object breaks or burns 
another, since this would deliver the world to the power of scientific 
explanation, which employs nothing but naturalistic theories. For Husserl, 
the only rigorous method is to describe how the world is given to 
consciousness prior to such theories. Philosophy becomes the study of 
 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse II (2007): 193.111
 One of the criticisms that could be aimed at Harman’s position is that, in order to get rid of 112
the anthropocentrism of the thought-world correlate, he is in fact anthropomorphising the world 
by injecting nonhuman-nonhuman relations with traits that are characteristic of human-world 
encounters. To that, Harman has responded by writing that “[rather] than anthropomorphizing 
the inanimate realm, I am morphing the human realm into a variant of the inanimate.” Harman, 
Prince of Networks, 212.
 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 192–197.113
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phenomena, not real objects. But phenomena are objects nonetheless: 
in a new, ideal sense. For what we experience in perception is not 
disembodied qualities, as the empiricists hold; instead, we encounter a 
world broken up into chunks. […] Note already that [Husserl’s] sensual 
objects have a different fate from real ones. Whereas real zebras and 
lighthouses withdraw from direct access, their sensual counterparts do 
not withdraw in the least. "114
In order to illustrate that point, one could take Goldsmiths as an example. When 
one enters Goldsmiths and walks along its corridors or attends lectures and 
seminars or even thinks about it, the reality of Goldsmiths is always more than 
the way it is experienced at any given moment. It is also always more than the 
sum of everybody’s perceptions of it at any given time. That is because 
Goldsmiths, as an example of what Harman calls “real objects,” always 
withdraws from relations. Therefore, what one experiences at any given time 
when crossing its doors, walking along its corridors, attending lectures and 
seminars, or even when thinking about it, is a third entity that acts as the proxy 
in that relation, i.e. the phenomenal or “sensual” translation of the “real object” 
that Goldsmiths is. Consequently, whereas a new “sensual” Goldsmiths is 
created in every encounter only to disappear as soon as that encounter comes 
to an end, the “real” Goldsmiths, on the other hand, remains unperturbed even if 
everybody would suddenly fall asleep, enter a coma, or if the whole world but 
Goldsmiths itself would collapse and relations of any kind would become, 
therefore, impossible."
As a result, what is important to stress and retain throughout this dissertation is 
that relationality, as it was conceived by Harman, opens up a theatron where, 
for the duration of the encounter, bodies meet to witness each other, even if 
what they witness is never the fullness of each other’s being, i.e. Harman’s “real 
 Ibid., 194.114
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object,” but only the contingent mediating roles they perform to one another, 
roles into which they have been translated in order to be read or to pass as.  "115
The notion of translation is of great importance here. Not only is translation a 
particular kind of mediated communication, but it has also been used by 
Harman himself to describe the transformative process through which his 
“sensual objects” come into being and take up their mediating role.  "116
Translation has also been used by performance theorists who have hinted at a 
similar process when describing the poietic nature of performance encounters. 
At the beginning of Between Theater and Anthropology, for instance, Schechner 
described a performance of the deer dance of the Arizona Yaqui as follows:"
At the moments when the dancer is “not himself” and yet “not not 
himself,” his own identity, and that of the deer, is locatable only in the 
liminal areas of “characterization,” “representation,” “imitation,” 
“transportation,” and “transformation” [...]. All of these words say that 
performers can’t really say who they are. "117
Another reference to processes of translation and their relationship to 
performance practices can be found in the following excerpt from Phelan’s 
Unmarked:"
In performance, the body is metonymic of self, of character, of voice, of 
“presence.” But in the plenitude of its apparent visibility and availability, 
the performer actually disappears and represents something else— 
 A note on terminology: although inspired by Harman’s work for its central thesis, this 115
dissertation favours the use of ‘body’ rather than ‘object’ in order to designate, in line with 
Harman’s work, any entity that is irreducible to its parts and never exhausted by its relations—
any entity that exists as a discrete unit. By using ‘body’ instead of ‘object,’ the aim is, first, to 
remain as much as possible within the established lexicon of Performance Studies, where ‘the 
body’ and its ability to affect and be affected are central concerns. Furthermore, ‘body’ is also 
more commonly associated with activity, agency, and performance than ‘object,’ normally 
associated with passivity and receptivity. At the same time, ‘body’ is broad enough to be used in 
relation to nonhuman or hybrid entities as demonstrated by expressions such as “the body of 
the text,” “the elephant’s body,” “full-bodied wine,” “body of work,” etc.  
 For Harman’s use of ‘translation’ as the name for the mechanism through which “sensual 116
objects” are produced and mediate all encounters between “real objects,” see Harman, Prince 
of Networks, 15, 208, 212; and Graham Harman, “Zero-person and the psyche,” in Mind that 
Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millenium, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2009), 276.
 Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology, 4.117
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dance, movement, sound, character, “art.” [...] Performance uses the 
performer’s body to pose a question about the inability to secure the 
relation between subjectivity and the body per se; performance uses the 
body to frame the lack of Being promised by and through the body—that 
which cannot appear without a supplement. "118
Following the postulates of OOO, and in resonance with existing work done 
from within Performance Studies, performance is not simply another name for 
communication or exchange of information. Instead, performance is an instance 
of the latter in which a body is translated into—and therefore enacted in—the 
phenomenal realm as a tangible but always incomplete version of itself. 
“Performance,” as Roger Scruton wrote in his Aesthetics of Music, “is the art of 
translating.”  In other words, performance takes place every time a body, 119
human or nonhuman, is able to encounter another body by playing a role or a 
function. Performance is, therefore, what allows bodies to encounter one 
another and become visible as personae in the space of the theatron, even if 
such personae will always be ephemeral and contingent on each particular 
encounter."
To sum it all up, and as illustrated by Fig. 16 below, when two bodies 
(Performing Bodies ψ and ω in the diagram) encounter one another, they never 
really overcome the distance that separates them, a distance that constitutes 
the theatron where bodies ψ and ω face each other. Therefore, when 
encountering one another, neither of the two bodies is able to witness the other 
in full. Instead, what each of the two experiences is an encounter with an 
ephemeral translation of its counterpart, i.e. with the contingent role performed 
by the latter in that particular encounter (performed personae ψ’ and ω’ in the 
diagram). As the diagram hopefully makes clear, the being of a performing body 
is always more than—and, therefore, never exhausted by—any of the 
phenomenal bodies or roles it might perform at any given instance."
"
"
 Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, 151.118
 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 441.119
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Still, if writing of a body’s ability to ‘witness’ or ‘experience’ another body is fairly 
easy when referring to humans or even animals, the meaning of those terms 
becomes less certain once, along with ‘performance,’ it starts being used to 
describe events in which humans are not present, neither as performers nor as 
audiences. Thus, if the ecological age calls for a rethinking of performance 
beyond the human, one must briefly address the conditions under which 
nonhuman bodies are able to both perform and ‘experience’ or ‘sense’ one 
another. In short, one must tackle the issue of psyche in nonhuman encounters.  "
"
Performance, Translation, and Nonhuman Psyche!
The question of psyche becomes crucial as soon as one posits that all bodies 
are capable not only of performance, i.e. of playing roles for one another, but 
also of ‘experiencing’ each other as such. "
Psyche (ψυχή) was the Greek term for the substance responsible for providing 
bodies with life and it was personified in mythology as the lover of Eros. Already 
Fig. 16: Diagram of a performance encounter.
Key:
Performed Persona ψ’
Performed Persona ω’
Performing Body ψ"
Performing Body ω"
  performance"
theatron
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in pre-Socratic philosophy, all kinds of bodies were considered to possess it.  120
Psyche was also the word chosen by the Greeks to translate the Hebrew 
nephesh, which was, in the Old Testament, the name of the individualised form 
that the principle of life assumed when breathed into a body by God himself.  121
In other words, nephesh is the Hebrew word for soul, that which animates 
bodies after these are filled with rûaħ, i.e. Spirit or the breath of God.  "122
It is pertinent for the purpose of the present argument to note that rûaħ, Spirit or 
the breath of God, is derived from a Hebrew root that means both ‘to breathe’ 
and ‘to smell,’ the same root from which ‘smelling’ was derived and, by 
consequence, also ‘sensation’ and ‘sense perception.’  Therefore, there is a 123
close relationship between psyche as that which animates things and psyche as 
a body’s ability to experience or perceive, i.e. the capacity that a body has to 
encounter another body. Consequently, if, as it was claimed above, all beings 
are capable of performance, that is, of, triggering and experiencing the bringing-
forth of each other as phenomenal personae, then here, like in Parmenides, 
psyche has to be a feature of all beings, human and nonhuman."
Such a panpsychist thesis has been dismissed since the Cartesian split of mind 
and matter made mind the only guarantor of the thinking human being.  124
However, in recent years, panpsychism has been revalued as a legitimate 
philosophical proposition. That was, in part, due to the fact that developments in 
particle physics, cybernetics and information technologies, have unveiled a 
world that is increasingly understood in terms of exchanges of information and, 
 E.g.: Thales attributed psyche to magnetic rocks due to their ability to move small metallic 120
objects; Pythagoras concluded that everything had to somehow be intelligent as everything was 
derived from Number, another name for intelligence; Parmenides saw thought as an essential 
part of being and thus of all that exists; Anaxagoras claimed that the fundamental force in the 
cosmos was Mind; and Empedocles thought the universe was made of the four elements 
organised by two forces, attraction or ‘Love’ and repulsion or ‘Strife.’ See David Skrbina, 
“Panpsychism: An Overview,” in Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millenium, ed. 
David Skrbina (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2009), 3–4.
 See Daniel Lys, “The Israelite Soul According to the LXX,” Vetus Testamentum 16, no. 2 121
(1966): 184.
 See P. A. Nordell, “Old Testament Word-Studies: 2. Constituent Parts of Man,” The Old 122
Testament Student 8, no. 2 (1888): 50. 
 See H. C. Ackerman, “The Nature of Spirit and its Bearing upon Inspiration,” The Biblical 123
World 53, no. 2 (1919): 146.
 See Skrbina, “Panpsychism: An Overview,” 2. Also René Descartes, Meditations on First 124
Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21. 
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therefore, led to a “reconceptualization of our metaphysics in informational 
terms.”  From the early theorists of cybernetic systems such as Norbert 125
Wiener and Gregory Bateson to the quantum theories of David Bohm; from 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory to Manuel DeLanda’s recent work on the 
emergence of synthetic reason, the notion of experience is being expanded and 
agency and volition are being considered as properties of both biotic and abiotic 
bodies understood primarily as informational networks.  As architect Keller 126
Easterling put it:"
We are not accustomed to the idea that non-human, inanimate objects 
possess agency and activity, just as we are not accustomed to the idea 
that they can carry information unless they are endowed with code/text-
based information technologies. [...] Spaces and urban arrangements are 
usually treated as collections of objects or volumes, not as actors. Yet the 
organization itself is active. It is doing something, and changes in the 
organization constitute information. Even so, the idea that information is 
carried in activity, or what we might call active form, must still struggle 
against many powerful habits of mind.  "127
One of the authors more commonly associated with panpsychism or, at least, 
with attempts at demonstrating that psyche is not only present in humans, was 
Gregory Bateson. In his famous 1970 lecture “Form, Substance, and 
Difference,” Bateson called for a heterodoxy of mind under the light of recent 
discoveries in cybernetics, systems theory, and information theory.  In order to 128
reach a definition of mind in line with such discoveries, Bateson famously 
 Floridi, Information: A Very Short Introduction, 17.125
 See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 126
Machine (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965); Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind: 
Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology (Northvale and 
London: Jason Aronson, 1987); David Bohm, “A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and 
Matter,” Philosophical Psychology 3, no. 2&3 (1990): 271–286; David Bohm, On Creativity 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Manuel 
DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2011).  
 Keller Easterling, “An Internet of Things,” e-flux 31 (2012), accessed May 23, 2013, http://127
www.e-flux.com/journal/an-internet-of-things/.
 See Bateson, Steps to An Ecology of Mind, 319.128
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redefined information as “a difference which makes a difference.”  By 129
‘difference,’ Bateson meant that which “gets onto the map from the territory.”  130
In other words, ‘difference,’ for Bateson, was akin to what Harman claimed to be 
the vicarious way in which objects are able to relate to one another. That is, 
information or difference is the phenomenal manifestation of a body which is 
never equal to the real body to which it refers, which it translates. In other 
words, if one considers Harman’s “real object” to be Bateson’s “territory,” the 
“sensual object” of the former is the “map” of the latter, whereby the map is a 
translation of the territory and never the territory in-itself. The real territory 
always withdraws from the encounter and, therefore, can only communicate 
itself through the presence of a vicar, its phenomenal proxy, its map. As 
Bateson claimed:"
The territory never gets in at all. The territory is Ding an sich [thing-in-
itself] and you can’t do anything with it. Always the process of 
representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of 
maps of maps, at infinitum. All “phenomena” are literally appearances.   "131
Therefore, maps or phenomenal bodies are always traces of distant territories. 
Those traces can, in a very elementary level and without having to depend on 
consciousness or even biological life, be read by all kinds of beings, human and 
nonhuman. To that most basic circuitry responsible for the exchange of 
differences or of information, Bateson called the “simplest unit of mind:”"
Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies 
through the air and makes certain sorts of gashes in a pre-existing cut in 
the side of the tree. If now we want to explain this set of phenomena, we 
shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, differences 
in the retina of the man, differences in his central nervous system, 
differences in his efferent neural messages, differences in the behavior 
of his muscles, differences in how the axe flies, to the differences which 
the axe then makes on the face of the tree. [...] This is the elementary 
cybernetic thought. The elementary cybernetic system with its messages 
 Ibid., 321.129
 Ibid., 320.130
 Ibid., 322.131
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in circuit is, in fact, the simplest unit of mind: and the trans-form of a 
difference traveling in a circuit is the elementary idea.  "132
Bateson’s use of the tree, the man, and the axe as an example of a unit of mind 
can also be read as an occasion in which, after Harman, bodies communicate 
with one another through the presence of a phenomenal proxy. In other words, 
when the axe enters into a relation with the tree, the phenomenal version of the 
axe that is ‘perceived’ by the tree is related only to the shape of its blade and its 
ability to effect a cut, the cut being the difference the axe leave on the trunk of 
the tree. Now, it is obvious that the axe can not be reduced to the cut it makes 
and, therefore, the tree’s ‘experience’ of the axe does not exhaust its full being: 
the real axe is always more than any cut it might make. Similarly, the man 
holding the axe cannot, by the simple fact that he is holding it, experience the 
axe in the same way that the tree does, for the way the axe presents itself to the 
man is different from the way it presents itself to the tree; in other words, the 
information exchanged between blade and trunk is different from the one 
exchanged between–say—handle and hand. The tree cannot perceive the 
shape or texture of the axe’s handle nor can the man holding the axe perceive 
its blade in the way the tree does. In short, a different map of the axe is 
provided depending on the contingencies of each encounter. Still, both maps 
are valid, albeit incomplete, phenomenal translations of the same axe. "
A similar conclusion was reached by quantum physicist David Bohm in his 
essay “A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter.” In that essay, 
Bohm used quantum theory to reject both Newtonian physics and the Cartesian 
move. In order to do so, and departing, amongst other premisses, from 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Bohm introduced the notion of ‘wholeness’ 
to mean that: "
[In] an observation carried out to a quantum theoretical level of accuracy, 
the observing apparatus and the observed system cannot be regarded 
as separate. Rather, each participates in the other to such an extent that 
it is not possible to attribute the observed result of their interaction 
unambiguously to the observed system alone. "133
 Ibid., 324–325.132
 Bohm, “A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter,” 275.133
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By ‘participation,’ Bohm meant that both observing apparatus and observed 
system exchange “active information,” that is, not information understood as the 
mere description of the state of a particle, but observation as the gathering of 
data that in-forms, i.e. that gives perceivable or phenomenal form to the 
observed system.  It was in its sense of active in-formation that Bohm saw 134
participation as the primary quality of mind, a quality that the quantum physicist 
and philosopher also claimed to exist, albeit in a rudimentary fashion, at all 
levels of organisation of matter:"
It is thus implied that in some sense a rudimentary mind-like quality is 
present even at the level of particle physics, and that as we go to subtler 
levels, this mind-like quality becomes stronger and more developed. 
Each kind and level of mind may have a relative autonomy and stability. 
One may then describe the essential mode of relationship of all these as 
participation, recalling that this word has two basic meanings, to partake 
of, and to take part in.  "135
 Ibid., 279–283. 134
 Ibid., 283–284. It is also important to note that the thesis whereby observer and observed 135
systems in-form one another also resonates with Donna Haraway’s thesis, put forward in When 
Species Meet, that “[the] partners do not precede their relating; all that is, is the fruit of 
becoming with […].” (Haraway, When Species Meet, 17). Still, although according to the 
argument unfolded thus far it is true that the way bodies appear to one another, the way they 
translate themselves into the phenomenal realm, is contingent on each particular encounter, 
there is nonetheless something in each of those bodies that survives each encounter, 
something that, in philosophy, has often been called ‘essence’ or ‘eidos.’ In other words, there 
will always exist a reality to bodies beyond how they appear to one another. That seems to be 
what recent developments in theoretical physics and philosophy of science appear to point 
towards: that the uncertainty principle identified by Heisenberg in the complementary variables 
position and momentum of particles is neither due to quantum systems being ‘contextual,’ that 
is, dependent on an ‘observer effect’ as it was defended by the so-called Copenhagen 
Interpretation, nor is it due to quantum physics being an incomplete theory that will have to be 
perfected in the future, as it was defended by Einstein. Rather, the indeterminacy of certain 
quantum measurements has only to do with the fact that bodies are entities expanded in space-
time and that, because of that, any encounter with a body is always a throw of a die in which the 
die can only manifest one of its faces or, in the terms of this dissertation, it can only perform one 
of its personae. Therefore, according to quantum physicist and philosopher Gabriel Catren, 
quantum mechanics is, in fact, the only complete theory of the real, one that remains valid at 
both micro- and macro-scales of the universe. In Catren’s words:"
“Indeed, the uncertainty principle is nothing but a signature of the intertwining between the 
invariant eidos that defines an object and its experimental phenomenalisation [what, here, is 
being called ‘performance’]. If the momentum p is an objective property of an object, then the 
position q is necessarily, like the face of a die, a phase with no objective value. In consequence, 
the classical description of physical objects, which includes both q and p, is overdetermined. 
This means that in classical mechanics non-objective properties are wrongly considered 
objective. We can thus conclude that, unlike classical mechanics, quantum mechanics 
describes all the intrinsic object properties of observer-independent objects. Gabriel Catren, “A 
Throw of the Quantum Dice Will Never Abolish the Copernican Revolution,” Collapse V: The 
Copernican Imperative (2009): 498. 
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Participation is also a notion that has been widely discussed in Performance 
Studies since its inception: participation is a way of taking part, a way of 
collectively giving form to something. Participation is, therefore, agency. In a 
way that resembled Bohm’s highlighting of the co-dependency of observing 
apparatus and observed phenomenon, Richard Schechner has also noted 
performance’s dependence on both audiences and performers by stating that:"
Inclusion and participation are not metaphors; they are concrete physical 
acts of the body. [...] without the audience’s collaboration no performance 
is possible. [...Performers and audiences] meet each other on equal 
terms.     "136
Therefore, what one gathers from Bateson and Bohm, are understandings of 
psyche or mind operating as performance at different levels of the real, from the 
subatomic particles of Bohm to the macroscopic level of ecosystemic analysis 
led by Bateson. Even if one accepts that conscious mind is a property only of 
highly developed systems such as the human brain, that fact does not preclude 
rudimentary mind-like structures from existing at other levels of the real, from 
electrons to supernovas. If mind or psyche is that which animates the world by 
allowing undeterminable bodies to be translated into perceivable but yet 
contingent phenomena which are, in turn, read as maps of an inaccessible 
territory, then this elementary unit of cybernetic circuitry can be found in all 
kinds of encounters between bodies, independently of the level of reality which 
they occupy—from strings and particles to solar systems and galaxies. It is only 
in that way that performance as poietic communication or phenomenal 
translation implies a panpsychist position; not through extending consciousness 
or even self-awareness to nonhuman and abiotic bodies. Consciousness and 
self-awareness are properties that emerge at higher levels of complexity such 
as the ones behind the human brain. Nevertheless, the basic units of mind are 
still distributed through the entirety of the universe and are the structures which 
allow for performance as it is being understood here to be democratised into 
what can be seen as the mode of all encounters. "
 Richard Schechner, “Audience Participation,” The Drama Review: TDR 15, no. 3 (1971): 73–136
75.
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There are, however, occasions of performance in which, to use Bauman’s 
terms, performance is displayed as such, therefore triggering the realisation that 
performed personae and performing bodies are not one and the same thing: the 
phenomenal translation is always a mistranslation that can never replace its 
original, whatever and wherever it might be. In those special occasions, often 
called “art” when they take place in the sphere of human ‘Culture,’ performance 
is able to foreground the theatrical space that separates bodies from one 
another and, therefore, to highlight its own contingency and the impossibility of 
bodies ever becoming fully exhausted by the personae they perform. When that 
happens, whether in human or nonhuman realms, previously familiar bodies 
suddenly emerge as distant strangers."
"
Encountering Strangers!
In the previous sections of this chapter, performance, in both its human and 
nonhuman forms, has been understood as a particular kind of communicative 
encounter, one in which a body enacts a role that is then experienced by 
another body. In such a world deprived of ontological hierarchies, performance 
is the way in which bodies are able to become enmeshed in one another 
despite remaining unable to make direct contact. The way they do so is through 
bringing forth one of their ephemeral personae that is performed in the 
phenomenal world of whichever body they encounter. "
As a consequence, such an understanding of performance also implies that all 
bodies, human and nonhuman, must possess mind-like structures, even if only 
rudimentary ones, if they are indeed expected to take an active part in 
performative encounters as either performers or audiences. However, saying 
that a stone standing on top of an iced lake or a computer responding to a 
certain pattern of electrical impulses are the same kind of encounters one 
experiences in black boxes or white cubes is not the same as claiming that the 
bodies involved in them are encountered in the same way. Stating that all 
relations between all kinds of bodies are instances of performance is not the 
same as implying that a tree trunk encounters an axe in the same way that a 
human encounters Pina Bausch’s Café Müller or Kira O’Reilly’s Stair Falling. 
Although all encounters are poietic and, therefore, performative in the sense 
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that they all enact or bring-forth something that was not present, not all 
performances provide the same level of access to the body of the performer. 
Even if all occasions of performance are equally responsible for enacting 
worlds, sometimes the knowledge they convey of the bodies involved in them is 
of a totally different kind. At those times, performance is hyperbolised and 
reveals itself as such, therefore foregrounding the theatron on which it takes 
place. In doing so, it is able to highlight the inaccessible core of a body and 
point in its direction as if pointing towards its own horizon. Those are occasions 
of estrangement. "
In order to understand those particular instances of performance, it is useful to 
go back to the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima of Mantinea mentioned 
earlier. In it, Diotima hints at the same problem by drawing attention to two 
different kinds of poetry. Despite her inclusion of all poietic events under the 
umbrella of poetry, Diotima eventually adds a small caveat to her previous 
statement:"
Nevertheless […], as you also know, these craftsmen are not called 
poets. We have other words for them, and out of the whole of poetry we 
have marked off one part, the part the Muses give us with melody and 
rhythm, and we refer to this by the word that means the whole. For this 
alone is called ‘poetry,’ and those who practice this part of poetry are 
called poets. "137
What, then, is that absolute dedication to poiēsis? How does it differ from a 
mere instance of translation of a body into a phenomenal persona, and what 
does it bring forth or make present? "
In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger claimed that the work of art has to 
do with alētheia (ἀλήθεια), the “unconcealment of beings.”  As such, 138
Heidegger continued, it “is not concerned with the reproduction of a particular 
being that has at some time been actually present. Rather, it is concerned to 
reproduce the general essence of things.”  As a result, if performance is about 139
 Plato, Complete Works, 488.137
 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off The Beaten Track, eds. Julian Young 138
and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16.
 Ibid.139
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bodies role-playing with one another whilst never being exhausted by the roles 
they play, then the performances Diotima of Mantinea associates with the 
muses, and Heidegger with the work of art, are instances of a particular type of 
performance, one that enables a closer level of contact between the bodies 
involved in them, revealing something about the latter that had not been 
contained in any of their phenomenal manifestations. In short, and to use 
Heidegger’s term, in those performances bodies appear somehow 
unconcealed.!
Graham Harman made a similar claim with the introduction of his concept of 
“allure,” which he used to name the moment in which the withdrawn presence of 
a “real object” is highlighted.  “Allure,” which Harman claimed to be a feature 140
of, amongst others, aesthetic experience and humour, is what happens when 
the tension between “sensual qualities” and the “real object” hiding behind them 
somehow disintegrates, thus allowing for the “object” to reveal itself as 
withdrawn, like a barely perceptible light that suddenly starts flickering in the 
dark and from a distance.  According to Harman, “allure” does not reveal the 141
“real object” because, as it was already seen above, “real objects” withdraw 
from relations. Instead, it is alluded to despite remaining inaccessible, it is 
unveiled as having a core that exceeds any of its appearances. Harman’s 
“allure” is, therefore, a kind of knowledge formed not through direct contact—
like the contact made when a body encounters another body’s persona—but 
through the sudden realisation that a previously familiar body is ultimately a 
stranger. As such, “allure” can be equated with the kind of sublime Timothy 
Morton found in Longinus:"
Burkean and Kantian sublimity are both about reactions in the subject. 
Burke locates this reaction in the power of the object, while Kant locates 
it in the freedom of the subject. But these are just two sides of the same 
correlationist coin. Longinus, in contrast, is talking about intimacy with an 
alien presence: the sublime is what evokes this proximity of the alien. 
 See Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 211–221.140
 For an idea of Harman’s development of the notion of ‘allure,’ see Graham Harman, Guerrilla 141
Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 
2005), 142–143; Harman,Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures, 137–138; and 
Graham Harman, L’Object Quadruple: Une Métaphysique des Choses Après Heidegger (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), 118–119.
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The ekphrastic object makes us see ourselves as objects traversed—
translated by others. Longinian ekphrasis is not about the reaction of the 
(human) subject, but about rhetorical modes as affective-contemplative 
techniques for summoning the alien. "142
Therefore, when performance appears as such, bodies are able to emerge as 
strangers from behind the roles they play in the contingency of each encounter. 
Despite their inability to fully reveal themselves to one another, such an 
experience of estrangement has the ability to foreground their strange, hidden 
core. If performance is the way through which bodies translate themselves to 
one another, estrangement is what happens when bodies suddenly flicker from 
behind the contingency of their imperfect translations. In order for that to 
happen, performance needs to be hyperbolised so much that it turns opaque 
and becomes visible as performance, therefore foregrounding the theatrical 
space of the encounter which, to paraphrase Harman, “is both nearness and 
distance.”  Because, when that takes place, performance highlights the 143
theatrical cleavage between persona and witness, estrangement can be seen 
as an expansion of the Brechtian Verfremdung onto the wider theatron of the 
world, beyond the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide. For, as Walter Benjamin wrote of 
Brecht’s epic theatre:"
The task of epic theatre, Brecht believes, is not so much to develop 
actions as to represent conditions. But ‘represent’ does not here signify 
‘reproduce’ in the sense used by the theoreticians of Naturalism. Rather, 
the first point at issue is to uncover those conditions. (Once could just as 
well say: to make them strange [ver fremden].) This uncovering (making 
strange, or alienating) of conditions is brought about by processes being 
interrupted. "144
Through its uncovering of the theatrical artifice of all encounters, estrangement 
reveals the strangeness of bodies that would otherwise pass as familiar. As Fig.
17 shows, in those occasions of everyday performance that trigger nothing but 
 Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui 142
Parle 19, no. 2 (2011): 170–171.
 Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, 218.143
 Walter Benjamin, “What is Epic Theatre?” [second version], in Understanding Brecht, trans. 144
Anna Bostock (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 18.
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recognition, bodies encounter one another only partially through the roles they 
play for each other: i.e. bodies ψ and ω in the diagram are only able to 
encounter each other’s performed personae ψ’ and ω’. However, in instances of 
estrangement, the contingency and ephemerality of their personae is 
highlighted and bodies are revealed as being more than any of the roles they 
might play. Thus, in the diagram, bodies ψ and ω discover the existence of a 
differential between their bodies and the performed ways in which they appear 
to both themselves and one another. As a result of the foregrounding of that 
unsolvable differential, they become estranged. "145
   "
The chapter that now concludes responded to the need for addressing 
performance theory in light of the Anthropocene. Such need, triggered by the 
ongoing ecological crisis and the flattening of the world that came out of the 
blurring of the once unquestionable divide between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture,’ has 
led to a rethinking, reconfiguration, and expansion of the notion of performance 
in such a way that it was eventually said of all occasions in which bodies 
Fig. 17: Diagram of estrangement and recognition. 
Key:
Performed Persona ψ’
Performed Persona ω’
Performing Body ψ"
Performing Body ω"
Estrangement"
Recognition"
 The notion of estrangement will be developed further in Chapter Five, namely in terms of its 145
ecopolitical consequences. As part of that development, examples will be given of both human 
and nonhuman instances of estrangement in order to better clarify the relationship between the 
latter and everyday performance (see below, pp. 228–239).
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encounter one another, regardless of their human or nonhuman nature. 
Performance, this chapter has argued, works in all events in which a body 
presents itself to another body by playing a role, i.e. by being translated into a 
contingent and ephemeral image of itself which will never exhaust its being. 
Understood in that way, performance is a poietic process, one that creates 
images that stand for bodies even if only tangentially and only for the duration 
of each encounter. "
Further to that, attention has also been paid to those encounters which, despite 
still falling under the category of performance, are able to bring-forth a different 
kind of knowledge, one that points in the direction of the strange core of bodies. 
In such occasions of estrangement, performance can become visible as such 
and foreground the theatrical conditions under which it takes place, therefore 
allowing bodies to rediscover one another as strangers."
The next chapter—Chapter Three—will examine the consequences that such 
an opening of performance theory to the nonhuman can have for critical 
responses to performance encounters: if performance happens in the 
encounters between all kinds of bodies, human and nonhuman, and if, at the 
same time, if never grants access to the full reality of a body, what tools does 
the scholar have in his or her possession for responding to such events? Can 
scholarly writing also trigger the kind of estrangement that allows the withdrawn 
reality of bodies to become noticed while still not being grasped?"
However, before delving into those questions, an Interlude will now follow. 
Through it, the general theory of performance that has just been sketched will 
intersect two very different works: Art Orienté Objet’s Che Le Cheval Vive en 
Moi and Pina Bausch’s Café Müller, two pieces that, despite their very striking 
differences, can be seen to enact a similar blurring of the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ 
divide as well as a foregrounding of the ultimate strangeness of all bodies, in 
line with the argument that has been put forward in the chapter that now 
concludes. 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—INTERLUDE—!
Tales on the Impossibility of Touch!
"
"
"
[The] gate does not simply connect inside and outside nor the door one 
space and another; rather, the door puts inside and outside into a 
special relation in which the outside first becomes properly outside and 
the inside first becomes properly inside.!
—Bernhard Siegert "1"
The rock does not just sit there being a rock,!
although it is that, too. !
—Peter Pabst "2
"
"
1. Scene: Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi!
It’s the 22nd of February 2011 at Galerija Kapelica, Ljubljana. Inside, at the 
centre of a large white room punctuated with white columns, there’s a panoply 
of hospital and lab equipment. Surrounding it, the bodies of the spectators who 
have turned up to witness an historical event: the engineering of a centaur, live. "
Kapelica is a gallery renowned for taking risks. As its director, Jurij Krpan, noted 
in the gallery’s curatorial statement: "
[We] favour artists who abide at the edge, who widen our cognitive 
horizons and provide the means for us to see, through their poetics, the 
world from a different perspective; to reflect it and wake from the daze of 
a virtual world which is persuading us that we have never felt better. "3
No surprise, then, that Kapelica, a space that had previously welcomed works 
by, amongst many others, Stelarc, Franko B, Critical Art Ensemble, Ron Athey, 
 Bernhard Siegert, “Doors: On the Materiality of the Symbolic,” trans. John Durham Peters, 1
Grey Room 47 (2012), 9.
 Peter Pabst quoted in Norbert Servos, Pina Bausch: Dance Theatre, trans. Stephen Morris 2
(Munich: K. Kieser Verlag, 2008), 260.
 Jurij Krpan, “Curatorial Statement,” Galerija Kapelica, accessed April 8, 2014, http://3
www.kapelica.org/index_en.html#content=2.
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Oleg Kulig, and Orlan, was eventually chosen as the right place for such 
controversial event.  "
The work, entitled Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi (May the Horse Live in Me), is 
the latest output by Art Orienté Objet, the French duo comprised of biochemist-
turned-artist Marion Laval-Jeantet and Benoît Mangin who, since 1991, have 
been producing works that address the relationship between art and science 
through exploring notions of hybridity in the context of the global ecological 
crisis. "4
At the centre-left of the room stands Benoît Mangin, wearing a white lab coat, 
next to all the tools that are both functional and symbolic: the stainless steel 
furniture, the syringes and blood collection tubes, the tank full of liquid nitrogen, 
the Petri dishes… On the other side of the room, centre-right, Marion Laval-
Jeantet awaits, dressed in black, sat on a bare hospital bed (Fig. 18)."
  "
Suddenly, the audience is distracted by a neighing sound coming from the far-
right of the room. There, a horse appears on a screen, opening up the 
projection of video documentation of the in vitro research stages that preceded 
the live performance. Once the projection ends, a real flesh-and-bone horse is 
Fig. 18: Art Orienté Objet, Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi, 2011. Photo: Miha 
Fras.
 See Pascal Pique, “Art Orienté Objet: vers une nouvelle alchimie de l’art et du vivant; 4
Entretien avec Marion Laval-Jeantet,” ETC 88 (2009–2010): 28–31; and Chloé Pirson, Art 
Orienté Objet: Marion Laval-Jeantet & Benoît Mangin (Dijon: Les Presses du Réel, 2013), 29–
42. 
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led into the room from the left-side door, its presence disrupting both the sterility 
of the lab and the conventions of the performance space—as an animal, the 
horse belongs in neither of them."
As the horse enters the space and circulates around the room, Mangin fills a 
syringe with horse plasma—including forty different kinds of horse 
immunoglobulins—and injects it into Laval-Jeantet’s bloodstream, whilst she 
sits calmly on the bed. The aim: to synthesise Chiron, to turn the mythical 
centaur into organic matter.  "
Once injected with the plasma, Laval-Jeantet’s body enters an immunological 
frenzy in response to the foreignness of the horse-parts pushed into its veins. 
Such internal inflammatory reaction, invisible to the audience witnessing the 
scene, is illustrated by the projection of a video which aims to represent that 
which cannot be seen: the artist’s body turned into a war zone, a familiar 
territory ransacked and occupied by foreign troops driven by rhetorics of 
integration and the promise of a new, better future together. As Chloé Pirson 
noted:"
The virtuality of the film is answered by a concrete reality that escapes 
the spectators. Marion Laval-Jeantet lives, in her body, the effects of the 
injection. The forty families of immunoglobulins inoculated affect her 
metabolism. Her body starts boiling, making her move between 
alternating states of coldness and intense fever. Such classic symptoms 
of inflammation are joined by headaches, falling blood pressure, vertigo, 
and fatigue.   "5
Once the initial shock of the inflammatory process fades away, the negotiation 
between human and horse taking place within the body of the artist is 
eventually materialised in the gallery space, where artist and horse are brought 
together in an encounter choreographed as the recognition of a shared 
interiority, aided by Mangin’s fitting of prosthetic horse hoofs on Laval-Jeantet’s 
legs (Fig. 19)."
"
 Pirson, Art Orienté Objet, 50 (my translation).5
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"
  "
After accompanying the horse on a tour of the gallery space whilst on her 
prosthetic legs, Laval-Jeantet goes back to the hospital bed, ready for the last 
stage of the performance: to have some of her newly-hybridised blood taken, 
placed in Petri dishes, and lyophilised by Benoît Mangin as centaur blood—a 
fragile memento, the frozen trace of a hybrid body that was never really fully 
present (Fig. 20)."
   "
Fig. 19: Art Orienté Objet, Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi, 2011. 
Photo: Miha Fras.
Fig. 20: Art Orienté Objet, Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi, 2011. Photo: Miha 
Fras.
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1. Aftermath: Intimate Distances!
In the days that followed the Ljubljana performance, Marion Laval-Jeantet noted 
severe changes in mood and behaviour, something that she was quick to 
attribute to the horse immunoglobulins injected into her bloodstream and to the 
resulting becoming-horse of her own human body:"
In the days following […] I had the impression of being extra-human. I 
was not in my ordinary body. I was hyper powerful, hypersensitive, 
hypernervous, very fearful, with the emotionality of an herbivore. I 
couldn’t sleep. I had the feeling, a bit, that I was possibly a horse. "6
The artist’s narration of her symptoms in the minutes and days following the 
inoculation of filtered horse plasma, as well as her claim to have become horse-
like, appear to point to the successful accomplishment of the performance’s 
aims, namely, 1) to use the human body as a vessel to save an animal species 
through in vivo storage of its DNA, and 2) to invert the usual exploitation of 
animals by humans in the name of Science, all whilst 3) exploring interspecies 
hybridity and the human-animal continuum. As she explained:"
The idea was born from the exhibition Art Biotech organised by Jens 
Hauser at Lieu Unique in 2003. There was the problem of the lab 
animal, of animal consumption, of the tissue culture aimed at replacing 
livestock meat still depending on the slaughter of animals in order to 
obtain proteins for culture… and all those approaches have 
systematically presented a conception of the animal exploited on behalf 
of a humanity that depletes the living. […] And, naturally, the idea was 
born to invert that given, to exploit myself on behalf of that animal.  "7
Notwithstanding the importance of drawing attention to the exploitation of 
animals by humans in the name of scientific development, of highlighting the 
paradoxical nature of the sciences as life-savers for some and death-bringers 
 Marion Laval-Jeantet quoted in Leon J. Hilton, “’The Horse in My Flesh’: Transpecies 6
Performance and Affective Athleticism,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 19, no. 4 
(2013), 501.
 Marion Laval-Jeantet, Che Le Panda Vive en Moi: Projet de Recherche Biomédicale de Art 7
Orienté Objet, ethics report (2012), accessed April 14, 2014, http://dl.dropbox.com/u/7574350/
Que%20le%20panda%20vive%20en%20moi.docx (my translation). See also Hilton, “‘The Hose 
in My Flesh’,” 488. 
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for others, the remainder of this section will focus on the apparent success Art 
Orienté Objet had in producing a human-horse hybrid and documenting it 
through the lyophilisation of ‘centaur’ blood. In doing so, it will be claimed that 1)  
such hybridisation did obviously never take place, and 2) that the value of Che 
Le Cheval Vive en Moi  lies elsewhere, namely, in how it draws attention to the 
ways in which bodies are able to enmesh themselves deeply in one another 
whilst simultaneously being unable to give themselves entirely to the grasp (or 
ingestion) of the other. In short, how bodies can never be reduced to the traces 
(or aftertastes) they nonetheless leave in the world. "
The history of the inoculation of animal blood in humans can be traced back to 
1667, when Jean-Baptiste Denis injected 300ml of sheep’s blood into the 
bloodstream of a febrile young man. The patient eventually died of haemolytic 
shock as a consequence of his immune system’s attempt at destroying the 
foreign red blood cells.  As Chloé Pirson wrote:"8
One had to wait until 1900 for the Austrian Karl Landsteiner to discover 
the different human blood groups and until 1940 for him to associate 
them with the Rhesus factor. The transfusion between humans has 
since then been under control, but the human-animal incompatibility 
remains total, the crossing of interspecies blood causing immediate 
coagulation. "9
In order to control the physiological reactions to the inoculation of horse blood in 
Laval-Jeantet’s bloodstream, the French artistic duo turned to Switzerland and 
to the Laboratoire Inflammation, Tissus Épithéliaux et Cytokines (LITEC) of the 
University of Poitiers, where they followed, in vitro, the inflammatory process 
triggered by the inoculation of horse blood into a human organism. By doing so, 
the artists were able to model the damage the inoculation would cause in vivo 
and take the necessary measures to reduce the likelihood of its happening. As 
 See Laval-Jeantet, Che Le Panda Vive en Moi.8
 Pierson, Art Orienté Objet, 43 (my translation). For more on the immune response to 9
interspecies transplants, also known as xenotransplantation and which include blood 
transfusions between different mammals, see Daniel Candinas and David Adams, 
“Xenotransplantation: postponed by a millennium?,” QJM: An International Journal of Medicine 
93, no. 2 (2000): 63–66; Mohantha Dooldeniya and Anthony Warrens, “Xenotransplantation: 
where are we today?,” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 96, no. 3 (2003): 111–117; and 
Marcel Levi, “Disseminated intravascular coagulation,” Critical Care Medicine 35, no. 9 (2007): 
2191–2195.
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a result of the in vitro stage of research, it became necessary to filter out all the 
elements of horse blood that could lead to death once injected in Laval-
Jeantet’s human bloodstream: all horse erythrocytes, lymphocytes, 
macrophages, and some dangerous immunoglobulins. In the end, the artists 
were only left with horse plasma purified of all horse cells, and containing 
nothing other than a few hormones, lipides, and less dangerous proteins 
including some families of immunoglobulins, cytokines, and alarmins. "10
Immunoglobulins, cytokines, and alarmins are all important proteins that play 
active roles in animal immune responses and in cellular communication. Whilst 
immunoglobulins, also known as antibodies, are Y-shaped proteins that bind 
themselves to foreign bodies such as viruses in order to neutralise them, 
cytokines are a looser category of chemical messengers released by cells to 
affect the behaviour of other cells. Alarmins, on the other hand, are a kind of 
molecules produced by dying or damaged cells to signal tissue damage and 
trigger an immune response to it.  In the words of Laval-Jeantet: "11
[All those] proteins represent, in fact, vectors of information that, as part 
of a chain of immune reactions akin to a system of keys and locks, reach 
different organs of the body triggering changes in their functioning. "12
Now, if one agrees that the artists intended to force human and horse so close 
together that some kind of hybridisation of the two bodies would take place, it is 
interesting that in order to purportedly do so and still manage to survive, they 
have had to filter the horse blood so much that the only thing they were left with 
was a ‘soup’ of various proteins floating in serum that had been purified of all 
cells and horse DNA, i.e. of everything that could be read as too foreign and 
trigger life-threatening events such as haemolysis, disseminated intravascular 
coagulation, shock, or cardiac arrest. In short, to be able to inoculate horse 
blood into the human bloodstream, the artists have had to purify it and be left 
 For more on the in vitro work that preceded the performance and the inoculation in vivo see 10
Pierson, Art Orienté Objet, 47–48; and Laval-Jeantet, Che Le Panda Vive en Moi. 
 See Marco Bianchi, “DAMPs, PAMPs and alarmins: all we need to know about danger,” 11
Journal of Leukocyte Biology 81, no. 1 (2007): 1–5; and “Immune Cells and Their Products,” 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, last modified October 2, 2008, accessed 
April 25, 2014, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/immunesystem/immunecells/Pages/default.aspx. 
 Laval-Jeantet, Che Le Panda Vive en Moi.12
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with only the blood components that would be able to pass as less foreign. By 
the time they did so, the liquid they were left with was only very remotely related 
to horse blood and, therefore, even more distant from the ‘horseness’ it was 
meant to carry within it. In their attempt at forcing a fusion of human and horse, 
the artists have had to further push both animals apart. "
The problem with choosing horse blood as a vehicle of ‘horseness’ is that, in 
line with the argument that unfolded in the previous chapter, bodies cannot be 
reduced to their parts and a horse can certainly not be reduced to the contents 
of its veins. Horse blood is not able to gallop, it doesn’t neigh, nor can it be 
forced to run the Grand National and probably die whilst doing so. Horse blood, 
that soup made of water, horse blood cells, proteins, hormones, sugars, lipids, 
and electrolytes, does not eat hay nor does it bite or kick when threatened. In 
other words, horse blood cannot exhaust a horse anymore than human blood 
can exhaust a human. If an individual human does not become someone else 
after receiving blood or an organ from another human, and if the donor doesn’t 
cease to be him or herself after donating some of his or her own tissue, it 
makes no sense to expect the ‘horseness’ of the horse—i.e. that which makes it 
a horse and not a cow—to be reducible to its blood, nor the human who 
received it to suddenly cease being human and become centaur or horse-like. 
Were the ‘horseness’ of the horse to be exhausted by the blood in its veins, the 
horse would no longer remain itself after having had some of its blood taken. 
Nor would a human donor be allowed to remain human if his or her 
‘humanness’ was reducible to whichever organ or tissue he or she decided to 
give away."
Furthermore, because the human body safeguards its autonomy and survival 
through immune self-nonself discrimination, once inoculated with foreign blood 
corpuscles, the body of Laval-Jeantet had no choice other than to neutralise the 
intruders or be defeated.  As it was already noted, had the foreign corpuscles 13
been actual horse blood cells, the body of the artist would most certainly not be 
able to safely cope with the threat and would therefore eventually succumb to 
disseminated intravascular coagulation, haemolysis, shock, or cardiac arrest. 
 For more on the human body’s ability to differentiate between antigens that belong to it and 13
foreign antigens, see Abul Abbas and Adnrew Lichtman, Basic Immunology: Functions and 
Disorders of the Immune System (Philadelphia: Saunders Elsevir, 2011), 173–187.
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However, as the inoculated liquid was made of less threatening elements, the 
body was able to trigger a successful immune response to fight off and 
neutralise the threat, thus guaranteeing its own recovery and survival. As a 
result, one could argue that, rather than being signs of her becoming-centaur, 
the symptoms that Laval-Jeantet claimed to have experienced were, in fact, 
nothing other than the classical signs of infection and immune response: fever, 
chills, headaches, disorientation, fatigue, disturbances in sleep patterns, 
hypersensitivity to sound and light, etc.—all symptoms one can easily associate 
with acute immune reactions to several kinds of pathogenic microorganisms 
from seasonal flu viruses to HIV.  In the end, the fact is that the body of the 14
artist was able to identify the inoculated components of horse blood as foreign 
antigens and proceed to neutralise them, thus precluding the possibility of any 
kind of lasting successful incorporation of horse-parts into the human body of 
the artist. More, never was the immune reaction of the artist a response to the 
‘horseness’ supposedly carried by the inoculated liquid. Instead, it was simply a 
reaction to the foreignness of its particles, to its non-identity with the body into 
which they were injected. "
Against the premise grounding the performance, the fact that the artist was able 
to be inoculated with horse plasma and somehow have horse-parts inside her 
human body was no evidence of the success of its promised human-horse 
hybridisation. Instead, it was exactly through its highlighting of the possibility of 
foreign bodies to enter a human body that the performance managed to 
simultaneously foreground the impossibility of their hybridity. With its creation of 
an opening or gate through which horse plasma entered Marion Laval-Jeantet’s 
body, the needle did not so much break the distinction between the horse and 
the human but it posited the two as distinct and incommensurable bodies. 
Thanks to its stepping through the door opened by the needle into the body of 
the artist, the horse plasma subjected itself to the order of the space it entered, 
to the immunological law that was enacted through a differentiation of interior 
self and exterior nonself, of familiar human blood and foreign horse plasma. 
What becomes crucial is that the gate opened by the needle into the body of the 
 See, for instance, “Flu—Symptoms,” NHS Choices, accessed April 28, 2014, http://14
www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Flu/Pages/Symptoms.aspx; and “HIV and AIDS—Symptoms,” NHS 
Choices, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/HIV/Pages/Symptomspg.aspx. 
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artist both signalled its closure to the body of the horse whilst simultaneously 
allowing their enmeshment or cohabitation, however fragile and temporary."
In conclusion, if there is any way in which Art Orienté Objet’s attempt at 
hybridising human and horse was successful, it was so only in the domain of 
representation—as theatre, as role-playing—for both human and horse 
remained separated at all times throughout the duration of their encounter. The 
only thing that entered the body of Marion Laval-Jeantet was a watered down 
version of horse blood, a flavourless ‘soup’ of water and proteins, deprived of 
blood cells and horse DNA. Only in that way was the artist able to be injected 
with the plasma and survive to tell the story. But even if the inoculated liquid had 
been full-on horse blood, it would still not have been able to carry the 
‘horseness’ of the horse into the body of the artist, for the horse would never 
cease to be less of a horse after having had some of its blood taken. "
It is there, one can therefore argue, that the ecological value of the piece 
resides: in the failure of its promise. In other words, the performance succeeded 
not in its attempt to hybridise human and horse, but in the way in which it 
revealed the impossibility of such hybridisation and, therefore, in how it 
highlighted the distance that separates human and horse even at the peak of 
their enmeshment in one another. In having to distance the inoculated liquid 
from the horse where it came from through the filtration of several of its 
components parts, Art Orienté Objet did nothing other than draw attention to the 
impossibility of a safe grasp—that is, containment—of horse by human, whilst 
simultaneously highlighting their ability to still affect one another. "
Rather than pushing Marion Laval-Jeantet’s body away from ‘humanness’ and 
closer to ‘horseness,’ Che Le Cheval Vive en Moi presented instead human and 
horse as autonomous, irreducible, and irreconcilable bodies that will always 
remain apart even when closely tied together."
"
"
"
"
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2. Scene: Café Müller!
The café is barely lit by the light coming through the revolving glass door that 
separates inside from outside. From the left hand side, Woman No. 1—long 
dark hair, white petticoat—enters the space and moves down towards the 
revolving door, her body hitting the tables and chairs that do not just sit there 
being tables and chairs, although they are that, too. As she moves, her body is 
barely visible in its attempt to negotiate the desired trajectory with the obstacles 
it finds in the space of its surroundings. The distant sounds of her movement 
hint at the nudity of her feet rubbing against the floor. There is no music."
Suddenly, the revolving door meets everybody’s expectations and delivers a 
woman who arrives from the outside. The lights come on—or just about. With 
red hair, wearing a dark fur coat, and walking on high-heels, the Red-Haired 
Woman from the outside moves like she knows where she’s going. She walks 
around the stage managing to avoid the furniture and then leaves, taking with 
her the sound of her high-heels hitting the floor. toc toc toc toc… toc toc toc 
toc… "
Woman No. 2, also in a petticoat, enters and crosses the café, left to right, her 
eyes closed, bumping into the tables and chairs. She stops. Music comes on—a 
lament. She turns back and runs while Man No. 1, dressed in a black suit, does 
his best to clear the furniture out of her way. A dry sound: the wall stopped her 
body from running farther (Fig. 21). "
Neither Woman No. 1 nor Woman No. 2, in their white petticoats—one 
restricted to the back of the stage, the other desperately running back and forth 
across it—are able to see the space that surrounds them nor the man in the 
black suit who prevents the chairs from blocking their movement and bruising 
their bodies. "
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Taken by exhaustion, Woman No. 2 crosses the stage once again, this time 
slowly, towards the embrace of Man No. 2, his eyes similarly shut. At that 
moment, Man No. 3 comes in and reshapes their encounter so that Woman No. 
2, rather than embraced, ends up laying in the arms of Man No. 2. However, he 
can’t hold her because her body is that of a rock. She falls on the floor but 
quickly stands up and, once again, tries the original embrace. Man No. 3—who 
by now was about to leave the stage—on watching what had just happened, 
returns and reshapes the encounter that still fails, for a second time, to be 
maintained. The whole cycle is repeated at increasingly fast speeds until 
Woman No. 2 leaves, bumping into the furniture, to the back of the stage, where 
she sits at a table, her petticoat taken off and dropped by her feet."
At this moment Red-Haired Woman returns to see what’s going on even if, 
despite seeing, she doesn’t seem to understand. She leaves."
Man No. 3 comes in and carries Man No. 2, shifting his position as if he was 
another piece of the furniture environing him."
Red-Haired Woman comes back. She does her best to grasp what she sees. 
She fails (Fig. 22). "
Fig. 21: Pina Bausch, Café Müller, 1978. Film still.
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Music: a second lament. "
Woman No. 1 who, up until now, had spent all her time at the back of the stage, 
moves forward and dances as if wanting to reveal what lies behind her shut 
eyelids. Whilst that happens, Man No. 2 moves frantically across the stage—left 
to right to left—followed by Red-Haired Woman (who sees but cannot grasp) 
and by Man No. 1 (who clears the furniture out of the way). "
Man No. 1 and Man No. 3 leave accompanied by Red-Haired Woman. At this 
moment, Woman No. 1 makes a move towards the revolving door that refuses 
to deliver her to the outside despite her increasing efforts to force her way out.  "
Man No. 2, who had been left on the café floor, heads towards Woman No. 2 
who is still sat at the table. She gets up, puts her petticoat on, turns to him, and 
they embrace each other. He drops her like the first time around, albeit this time 
without the intervention of Man No. 3, who sits at the table with Red-Haired 
Woman watching the events unfold. "
Suddenly, Man No. 2 throws himself on the floor while Woman No. 2 sits once 
again at the table, her petticoat taken off and dropped by her feet. We’ve seen 
this before."
Music: Yet another lament. "
Fig. 22: Pina Bausch, Café Müller, 1978. Film still.
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Man No. 2 gets up and starts running desperately across the stage while an 
incredulous Red-Haired Woman follows him and Man No. 1 (who arrives to, 
once again, move the furniture). They’ve seen it all before but still they haven’t 
grasped."
Eventually Man No. 2 falls, exhausted, on the floor whilst Red-Haired Woman 
drops her long dark coat and, in her light blue dress, goes on to—repeatedly— 
perform a series of familiar gestures she brought from the outside perhaps as a 
way of reminding everybody and herself of whom she thinks she is. While she 
does so, Woman No. 2 leaves the stage, carrying in her hands, placed against 
her chest, the petticoat she once wore. "
Red-Haired Woman suddenly remembers who she thinks she is and, realising 
that she does no belong there, leaves the café (although it is hard to believe 
she will not return)."
Woman No. 2 comes back and, for a third time, goes for the ever-failing 
embrace of Man No. 2. "
Red-Haired Woman returns although she knows she shouldn’t have do so. She 
searches for Man No. 2 and kisses him, tenderly. He leaves and she follows 
him, they kiss. He leaves and she follows him, they kiss. He runs and she 
chases him. He runs and she chases him. He runs and she chases him. He 
runs. She chases him, lost. "
Man and Woman No. 2 attempt a final embrace. For once it all seems to go well 
but, as they reach the edge of the stage, they start throwing each other 
repeatedly against the wall. “Even just the attempt to break through a surface 
and to fail is, to our mind, a worthwhile adventure,” they think."
While the interior world of the café appears to crumble with the impossibility of 
touch, Red-Haired Woman, once again, searches for comfort and certainty in 
familiar gestures (Fig. 23). "
Slowly, Woman No. 1 moves from the back to centre-stage, driven by her own 
interiority, which is seen but not grasped by Red-Haired Woman. "
In a final gesture of recognition or, perhaps, resignation, Red-Haired Woman 
puts her red wig on the head of Woman No. 1 and her long dark coat over her 
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shoulders. Red-Haired Woman No. 1 moves across the stage as the lights 
slowly go off, leaving only the sound of the furniture being hit by her body. "
toc… toc… toc…!
  !
"
2. Aftermath: Ecological Negotiations"
Pina Bausch’s Tanztheater is often associated with the struggle of human 
bodies with their interiority and the forces from the outside that try to tame and 
civilise them. It is, therefore, commonly seen to make power and the social 
explicit through its persistent staging of human bodies encountering and 
struggling with one another both as individuals and as representatives of the 
wider gender, race, and class divides. As a result, Bausch has become known 
for alienating what would otherwise have been recognised as familiar. Through 
her repetitive presentation of recognisable gestures of everyday life in a way 
that draws attention to the power structures behind them, Bausch, like Brecht, 
succeeded in “[freeing] socially-conditioned phenomena from that stamp of 
familiarity which protects them against our grasp today.”  By appropriating 15
Brechtian techniques while simultaneously creating pieces that, in their 
Fig. 23: Pina Bausch, Café Müller, 1978. Film Still.
 Bertold Brecht, “A Short Organum for the Theatre,” in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of 15
an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 192.
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eschewing of dramatic text and ‘fourth walls,’ and in their favouring of process 
and immediacy, are closer to Artaud’s theatre of cruelty than to Brecht’s epic 
theatre, Bausch’s body of work is consensually seen as having taken modern 
dance and turned it into a laboratory for the investigation of the forces, internal 
and external, that, through meeting on its surfaces, ‘write’ the human body.  As  16
Johannes Birringer wrote:"
The borderline in Bausch’s tanztheater is the concrete human body, a 
body that has specific qualities and a personal history—but also a body 
that is written about, and written into social representations of gender, 
race, and class.  "17
Notwithstanding its exploration of human bodies, their materiality, interiority, and 
the conditions under which they encounter one another, there is an important 
element of Bausch’s work that is not paid sufficient attention in critical discourse 
despite the insistence with which it is foregrounded in all of her pieces. That 
element is the nonhuman."
Although also a defining feature of her style, the nonhuman bodies in Bausch’s 
work are normally treated as supporting elements by a mostly human-centred 
scholarly literature. That has been the case even if too often Bausch’s human 
performers find their movement impaired or otherwise affected by the 
nonhumans with which they share the stage: In Das Frühlingsopfer (1975), 
 For more more on that established reading of Bausch’s Tanztheater, see Raimund Hoghe, 16
“The Theatre of Pina Bausch,” trans. Stephen Tree, The Drama Review: TDR 24, no. 1 (1980): 
63–74; Norbert Servos, “The Emancipation of Dance: Pina Bausch and the Wuppertal Dance 
Theatre,” trans. Peter Harris and Pia Kleber, Modern Drama 23, no. 4 (1980): 435–447; Norbert 
Servos, Pina Bausch: Dance Theatre, trans. Stephen Morris (Munich: K. Kieser Verlag, 2008), 
11–32; Royd Climenhaga, Pina Bausch (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009), 50–68; and 
Emily Coates, “Beyond the Visible: The Legacies of Merce Cunningham and Pina Bausch,” PAJ: 
A Journal of Performance and Art 32, no. 2 (2010): 1–7. "
It is worth mentioning, however, that, as Kate Elswit noted, what is commonly seen as the 
Bauschian style is only really evident in the works produced during the first eight years of a 
career spanning over thirty years. See Kate Elswit, “Ten Evenings with Pina: Bausch’s ‘Late’ 
Style and the Cultural Politics of Coproduction,” Theatre Journal 65, no. 2 (2013): 215–233. "
For more on Bausch’s marriage of Brecht and Artaud in her work, see David W. Price, “The 
Politics of the Body: Pina Bausch’s ‘Tanztheater,’” Theatre Journal 42, no. 3 (1990): 324–328; 
and Susan Manning, “An American Perspective on Tanztheater,” in The Pina Bausch 
Sourcebook: The Making of Tanztheater, ed. Royd Climenhaga (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 33–34. See also Brecht, “A Short Organum for the Theatre;” and “The 
Theater of Cruelty (First Manifesto),” in Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, trans. Mary 
C. Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 89–100.  
 Johannes Birringer, “Pina Bausch: Dancing Across Borders,” The Drama Review: TDR 30, 17
no. 2 (1986), 86.
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there is the peat covering the stage and progressively getting stuck to the 
sweaty bodies of the dancers, leaving the theatre, in the words of Arlene Croce, 
“[smelling] like a stable.”  In Arien (1979), there is a hippopotamus longing for 18
the love of a female dancer.  In Masurca Fogo (1998), a chicken eats 19
watermelon. In Nefés (2003), a wooden floor is filled with water from below. In 
Vollmond (2006), there is the giant rock that appears illuminated by a full moon, 
and the torrential rain that floods the stage and soaks the evening dresses and 
suits worn by the dancers. In Café Müller (1978), of course, there are the tables 
and chairs that need to be cleared out of the way so that dancers can move 
freely and don’t hurt themselves.!
Originally the responsibility of Bausch’s partner Rolf Borzik, the set design was 
passed on to Peter Pabst, who kept Borzik’s style alive and evolving after his 
death in 1980.  Due to the economy of style favoured by both Borzik and Pabst 20
that often saw their black boxes stripped down to their bare walls and their sets 
reduced to a minimal number of features, each of the elements placed on 
Bausch’s stage carries a presence that is hard to ignore. In Pabst's words, 
“[when] something is just standing there, with no other function than to be 
attractive, that’s not enough. A set design cannot be merely beautiful.”  As 21
such, for Bausch, the elements that make up the set play a more active role 
than most critics appear to recognise. Like her human performers, Bausch’s 
nonhuman bodies are there to face the challenge of encountering other bodies, 
never being allowed to become the background of a main narrative that, in any 
case, is never present in her work.  In Bausch’s Tanztheater, all bodies perform 22
irrespectively of their nature. As the choreographer has been quoted saying: "
 Arlene Croce, “Bausch’s Theatre of Dejection,” in The Pina Bausch Sourcebook: The Making 18
of Tanztheater, ed. Royd Climenhaga (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 194.
 In Bausch’s words, the relationship between hippopotamus and dancer is “a love story 19
between [the] two.” Bausch quoted in Servos, Pina Bausch: Dance Theatre, 239.
 See Norberto Servos, “Rolf Borzik,” trans. Stephen Morris, on Tanztheater Wuppertal official 20
website, accessed August 15, 2013, http://www.pina-bausch.de/en/dancetheatre/set_design/
borzik_rolf.php; and Servos, Pina Bausch: Dance Theatre, 249–261.
 Pabst quoted in Servos, Pina Bausch: Dance Theatre, 254–255.21
 For the absence of plot or narrative in Bausch’s work, see Servos, “Pina Bausch and the 22
Wuppertal Dance Theatre,” 436–437, namely in relation to the “principle of montage” identified 
by the author in the choreographer’s work. See also Price, “The Politics of the Body: Pina 
Bausch’s ‘Tanztheater,’” 327.
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For me, many different things play a role. What something does to your 
body: a meadow—you walk on it, and it is totally quiet, and it has a very 
particular smell. Or water—suddenly your clothes get very long and wet 
and the water is cold, the sound it makes, or the way the light reflects on 
it. It’s alive in a different way. Or earth—suddenly everything is sticking to 
your body when you sweat.   !23
In no longer presenting nonhumans as subjected to the human but, instead, as 
equally participating elements in a complex ecosystem of relations amongst 
bodies, Bausch invited her audience to look at her performers—humans, 
animals, peat, water, rocks, furniture, etc.—in a different way, to see the extent 
in which the roles they play are conditioned by their enmeshment in one 
another, therefore foregrounding the strangeness beyond the contingency of 
their familiarity. Ultimately, her work uses alienation techniques to show that 
bodies, human and nonhuman, can’t be exhausted by their appearances.  To 24
paraphrase Gabrielle Cody, Bausch’s works take place in the aftermath of 
certainty, and that is the reason why isolation and longing are central features of 
her work. "25
Within that context, Café Müller becomes a paradigmatic piece. In it, the 
audiences are confronted with two worlds, one interior and another one exterior. 
The interior world is represented not only by the two female performers wearing 
petticoats and dancing with their eyes closed, but also by the only man who 
dances without seeing. The exterior world, on the other hand, is represented by 
the red-haired woman that moves around the set wearing high-heels and a fur 
coat. While her gestures and dance moves are aimed outwards and easily 
associated with bustling urban environments and popular forms of 
entertainment, the gestures of the two women in petticoats are aimed inwards, 
often towards the interior of their chests. The external world is also populated by 
 Pina Bausch quoted in Servos, Pina Bausch: Dance Theatre, 237.23
 Bausch’s use of alienation is different from Brecht’s. Whereas the latter used alienation to 24
reveal the social truths behind someone’s behaviour, i.e. to show “people as they really 
are” (Brecht, “A Short Organum for the Theatre,” 204), the laboratorial aspect of Bausch’s work 
was more concerned with investigating what moves bodies rather than demonstrating 
certainties acquired a priori. See Gabrielle Cody, “Woman, Man, Dog, Tree: Two Decades of 
Intimate and Monumental Bodies in Pina Bausch’s Tanztheater,” TDR 42, no. 2 (1998): 115–
131.
 See Cody, “Woman, Man, Dog, Tree,” 124.25
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the man who clears the furniture out of the way and by the last man who tries, 
unsuccessfully, to shape the ways in which one of the interior women is 
embraced by the interior man. "
At the boundary between interior and exterior, one finds the café, the place 
where the performance takes place, populated with black tables and empty 
chairs, and connected to the outside by the revolving glass door. In that space, 
full encounters are impossibilities and, therefore, bodies appear strange both to 
one another and to the audience looking in. On the one hand, there are the two 
women in their petticoats who are blind to their surroundings except when 
bumping against the furniture of the café, their world being an internal one. On 
the other hand, there are the bodies from the outside, better represented by the 
Red-Haired Woman who can see her surroundings and avoid bumping into 
furniture, but is still unable to grasp the interiority from within which the women 
in the white petticoats draw their movement. The encounters between the two 
worlds can be nothing but partial and contingent, the appearances of bodies are 
never really able to exhaust their full reality. That is true of the human bodies 
that cannot see—or, if they can, are still not able to successfully grasp one 
another—and it is also true of the nonhuman bodies placed on set and that, like 
their human counterparts, are always somewhat inaccessible, even shy, able to 
either be seen and, therefore, avoided, or to be touched and, therefore, bumped 
into."
Never fully encountered by the human performers, the chairs and tables on 
stage are also never fully grasped by the audience due to their constant 
oscillation between being a physical presence that obstructs the movement of 
the performers, and being a symbol of absence and of the distance that will 
always separate bodies. For as long as they are chairs, they will always be 
chairs in waiting. Therefore, like the familiar gestures of the human performers 
that become alien through repetition, so do the nonhuman bodies appear 
increasingly strange due to the myriad of contingent roles they are forced to 
play in their encounters with other bodies."
However, as it is hinted by the final sequence in which the red-haired woman 
places her wig on the head of one of the other women in what comes across as 
a gesture of recognition, interior and exterior are not separate realities; rather 
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they are permeable to one another. Or, as it was hinted at in the previous 
chapter, there is always something of the body that is translated into whichever 
role it plays. What estrangement reveals is that performed appearances are 
always contingent and, therefore, can never exhaust the body for which they 
stand as proxies. "
In conclusion, Café Müller is a paradigmatic example of the ecologics of 
Bausch’s works, where human bodies never perform in the vacuum but are 
always thrown into an environment populated with other bodies that affect their 
movement, get stuck to their skin, soil their clothes, mix with their sweat. 
Nevertheless, despite their tight entanglement and ability to affect one another, 
Café Müller also stresses how all bodies, whether human or nonhuman, 
products of ‘Culture’ or fruits of ‘Nature,’ will always remain strangers even 
when standing beside one another. 
 147
—THREE—!
Estranging Words: Performance, Writing, Metaphor !
"
"
"
"
After the words stopped their dances, !
some other noise, not exactly poetry, !
not exactly music, filled the air. !
—Peggy Phelan "1"
"
"
""
In Chapter Two, a general theory of performance has been proposed. According 
to it, performance is understood not only as a human doing, transformative 
experience, presentation of truth, or restored behaviour. Instead, performance is 
approached primarily as a communicative event during which a body is 
translated into a phenomenal version of itself that is encountered by another 
body. Through that flattening of its meaning, performance was opened up to all 
encounters between all kinds of bodies, human and nonhuman, on and beyond 
theatre stages and gallery floors. "
However, a problem arises from the thesis that has just unfolded: if performance 
can indeed happen without the intervention of humans playing the roles of 
either performers or audiences, how is one to think those occasions of 
performance from which one has been excluded and proceed to write about 
them? Furthermore, even if there were human audiences present at the scene, 
how is it possible to translate into words that which has been witnessed and 
how legitimate is that knowledge if, as it was claimed, one only really has 
access to a contingent and distorted version of the performing body? How can 
one overcome the paradox of not being able to witness a performance—or 
being able to do so but always in a distorted manner—whilst, at the same time 
and under the pressures of the ecological age, having to find a way to think 
 Peggy Phelan, Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories (London and New York: 1
Routledge, 1997), 7.
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performance in all of its human and nonhuman actualisations? In other words, 
how can one speak for that which is strange, ungraspable and, therefore, 
unspeakable?"
In order to address those questions, this chapter will investigate the ways in 
which writing is able to communicate knowledge about bodies despite never 
losing sight of the contingent nature of what, at any moment, it is able to say,  
i.e. without overlooking the strangeness of that which it tries to address. The 
argument will unfold via an exploration of how images function as traces or 
maps of bodies and of how different kinds of writing have, for centuries, been 
evoking the memory of bodies, of territories unable to be exhausted by 
cartographic practices. Starting with a reflection on autobiographical writing and 
the memoir through an analysis of Samuel Delany’s The Motion of Light in 
Water and, in particular, of the ways in which the author attempted to translate 
into words his experience of Allan Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts, 
the chapter will then move on to address ekphrasis as one of the oldest literary 
devices aimed at translating images into words. Ultimately the argument will be 
one that, grounded on the long histories of both the memoir and ekphrasis, will 
posit writing itself as an encounter with bodies and, therefore, as an instance of 
performance. By becoming aware of the performativity of his or her writing and 
of the structures that make it so, the scholar will be able to push writing up to a 
tipping point where bodies are revealed as inexhaustible by their personae and 
evoked as strangers. "
"
Forensics!
It should be fairly easy to accept that, every time one writes about something, 
one establishes a relation with the subject of one’s writing. In that way, it can be 
said that if one can write about a certain body, one must have some kind of 
access to the reality of that body no matter how contingent or blurred such 
access might be. However, that realisation does not solve the problem that has 
just been identified: if, for instance, one is not directly involved in the encounter 
of the blade of an axe with the trunk of a tree, how can one still access it? The 
answer to that question lies in the fact that even if one does not take part as a 
participant in a given encounter, the encounter itself can still become the object 
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of one’s thought and be accessible through a kind of forensic practice. Example: 
while walking in a forest, one encounters a tree trunk that has been cut by an 
axe. At that moment, one does not have access to the axe because the 
lumberjack has already taken it home with him nor, more importantly, does one 
have access to the blade of the axe in the way that it was experienced by the 
tree. What one does have access to, however, is the trace of the axe on the 
trunk of the tree: the shape, depth, and surface of the cut it opened in the wood. 
Now, what that cut is, is evidence of the blade of the axe as it encountered the 
trunk of the tree; it is a translation of a particular encounter in which one did not 
take active part but that nonetheless one is able to grasp, even if only 
tangentially, by entering into a relation with the traces it left behind. That is the 
practice of forensics. "
Another example: A bloody murder is committed. When the police arrive at the 
crime scene, the crime has already taken place and, therefore, the police can 
only access it by reading the evidence left behind, for evidence are translations 
of that deadly encounter. Through blood-splatter analysis, DNA tests, finger-
print analysis, etc., forensic investigators eventually form a picture of what 
happened on the night of the crime. They are not, however, able to form an 
image of the whole series of events or to know with absolute certainty 
everything all that has happened. That is because the evidence, as trace or 
translation, won’t ever be able to replace its lost original."
Or yet another one: in 1975 Carolee Schneeman, standing naked on top of a 
table, pulled a scroll of paper from her vagina and started reading from it. The 
audience present at the scene could only access Schneeman’s intentions 
indirectly, tangentially via the artist’s actions, via her translation of an idea. In 
the meantime someone took photographs which, in turn, became documents, 
i.e. traces or translations of Schneemann’s performance. Twenty-two years 
later, art historian Amelia Jones wrote about that event, one in which she was 
never present.  In order to access it, Jones, like any good crime scene 2
investigator, had to translate the existing photographic documentation in order 
to gain access to the event, even if only tangentially. "
 See Jones, “‘Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation,” 12–14.2
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What all those examples demonstrate is that, even if one has not taken part in a 
given performance encounter, there is always the possibility that one might be 
able to gain some kind of knowledge of it through the traces it leaves. That is 
also what happens when one identifies the presence of HIV in the blood by 
searching for anti-HIV antibodies—another case of forensic investigation. 
However, what the example of Schneemann’s performance also shows is that, 
even if one takes an active part in the performative encounter as an audience 
member or even as a performer, one still only has limited access to what goes 
on, one is still only able to grasp a tiny fraction of the whole event. As Amelia 
Jones wrote:"
[…] I specifically reject such conceptions of body art or performance as 
delivering in an unmediated fashion the body (and implicitly the self) of 
the artist to the viewer. The art historian Kathy O’Dell has trenchantly 
argued that, precisely by using their bodies as primary material, body or 
performance artists highlight the ‘representational status’ of such work 
rather than confirming its ontological priority.  "3
Hence, the problem found in trying to write about performance is always the 
same, regardless of the distance between the writer and the body his or her 
words try to grasp: it is the problem of the cleavage spectator/performer that 
makes up the theatron of all encounters. The question, then, is how to write 
about something that is never fully present, something that will always remain at 
a distance, hidden behind smoked glass windows. In other words, the question 
for the writer will always be a question of access, no matter how close the 
object of one’s writing might seem. It will, therefore, be a problem of forensics, 
one concerned with how to best read traces in order to draw more accurate 
pictures; a problem, therefore, of translation, of trying one’s best to filter 
information from noise, even if only tentatively. And so, in the end, the problem 
for the writer is the problem of performance itself, or, as it was argued in 
Chapter Two, the problem of translating a body into an image of itself. For if 
performance can be found everywhere, if it can be found in the formation of 
molecules understood as translations of the electric charges of atoms which, in 
 Ibid., 13. That statement by Amelia Jones also resonates with one of the main postulates of 3
Graham Harman’s philosophy, one that has already been presented in Chapter Two, whereby 
“real objects” are not exhausted by the relations in which they enter and can only relate to one 
another through proxy (see above, pp. 106–111).
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turn, translate the movements of electrons; if it can be found in the formation of 
social movements, in identity, and in the behaviour of crowds; if it can be found 
in the way moss grows on tree trunks and even in the movement of celestial 
bodies, then it will also be found in the encounter between words and their 
referent. "
Accordingly, if all writing is the actualisation of an encounter and if all 
encounters depend on performance, then writing should not shy away from 
investigating its performative nature in the hope that, in doing so, it will be able 
to get closer to the fleeting body signalled by the words written on the page.  4
Out and proud as performance, writing will not concern itself simply with 
describing or analysing the personae its author has encountered in the hope 
that that will suffice to convey a sense of the bodies to which those personae 
refer. Instead, like any forensic practice, writing that embraces its own 
performative character will evoke or invoke the presence of the bodies it 
addresses even if their presence will always remain strange and, therefore, not 
fully graspable—a bit like the electricity whose presence is betrayed by the 
bright light of a lamp once it is switched on, even if the light won’t ever be able 
to exhaust the being of the electricity of which it is nonetheless part. In short, 
writing that foregrounds its own performance as writing is writing that enacts 
knowledge through estrangement. "
"
Evoking Strangers!
In his autobiography entitled The Motion of Light in Water, science fiction writer 
Samuel Delany described the occasion when, in the late Summer of 1960, he, 
then 18 years old, and his cousin Boyd went to see a presentation of Allan 
Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts. In no more than nine pages of the 
over five hundred page-strong memoir, Delany presented his readers with a 
first-hand account of Kaprow’s work and of the events leading to and following 
its presentation at a Second Avenue apartment. "
 For more on how performance can, at times, point in the direction of the strange body lying 4
behind an image or translation of itself, see above, pp. 121–126.
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Having encountered a black-and-white poster announcing the event on the side 
of a postbox somewhere on Eighth Street a few days earlier, Delany noted his 
immediate interest in its use of the word ‘happening:’"
An idea was abroad—and it had saturated the times so that even a bright 
eighteen-year-old might respond to its modernist scrip, if not the 
Wagnerian bullion behind it—that art must somehow get up off the 
printed page, must come down from the gallery wall. [...] And the word 
‘happening’—with its lack of fanfare on the poster—spoke of just such a 
moment  in which art might step from its current frame into a larger and 
more theatrical concept and context. "5
On the evening of the event, Delany and Boyd took the subway to the East 
Village and walked to the apartment where Kaprow’s work was to be shown. 
What happened then was met with the uncertainty of someone who does not 
know what to pay attention to in a work that seems deprived of clear, or at least 
recognisable, form: "
The only truly clear memory I have of the performance proper was that I 
wasn’t very sure when, exactly, it began. One of the assistants came in 
and set a small, mechanical windup toy to chatter and click around the 
floor [...]. I also recall a dish of water sitting on the floor, and a ball of 
string on a small table […]. During the brief performance, while we sat in 
our room, now and again from one of the other chambers we could hear 
the sound of a single drum or tambourine beat—or, at one point, laughter 
from one of the isolated groups [...]. There was general silence, general 
attention: there was much concentration on what was occurring in our 
own sequestered ‘part’; and there was much palpable and uneasy 
curiosity about what was happening in the other spaces, walled off by the 
translucent sheets, with only a bit of sound, a bit of light or shadow, 
coming through to speak of the work’s unseen totality. "6
After a while and a few more ‘incidents,’ the end of the happening was 
announced leaving both Delany and Boyd not knowing what to make of it. 
 Samuel Delany, The Motion of Light in Water: East Village Sex and Science Fiction Writing, 5
1960–1965 (London: Paladin, 1990): 179–180.
 Ibid., 181–182 (emphasis added).6
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Delany confessed that, after having seen the poster for the event, he had 
expected it to be "
[…] rich, Dionysian, and colorful [,...] far more complex, denser, and 
probably verbally boundable [,...] rich in meanings and meaning 
fragments, full of resonances and overlapping associations, playful, 
sentimental, and reassuring—like a super e. e. cummings poem.  "7
What Delany encountered, instead, was a “spare, difficult, minimal [work], 
constituted largely by absence, isolation, even distraction, [...] difficult to locate 
as to its start, content, style, or end.”  Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts was, to 8
follow Delany’s firsthand account of it, a work with no clear boundaries: not 
something hanging on a wall calling for the educated gaze of the spectator 
while at the same time keeping itself at a reassuring distance from the daily 
lives of those looking at it. Nor was it a series of epic events unfolding on 
familiar theatrical stages—sterile, fictitious, formulaic. Eighteen Happenings in 
Six Parts did not belong to the gallery nor to the stage; it belonged somewhere 
else, its place being amongst the audiences rubbing shoulders with it. "
It was through that shattering of recognisable conventions, carried out by 
placing the audiences in the middle of whatever was happening, not allowing 
them full access to the totality of the work, and erasing any recognisable walls 
between audience and work, that Allan Kaprow fulfilled his aim of blurring ‘art’ 
and ‘life.’ As the artist wrote in 1979 in relation to his happenings of the late 
1950s:"
Instead of making an objective image or occurrence to be seen by 
someone else, it was a matter of doing something to experience it 
yourself. It was the difference between watching an actor eating 
strawberries on a stage and actually eating them yourself at home. Doing 
life, consciously, was a compelling notion to me.  "9
 Ibid., 183.7
 Ibid.8
 Allan Kaprow, Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, ed. Jeff Kelley (Berkeley: University of 9
California Press, 2003), 195.
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What Delany’s account of that summer evening of 1960 highlighted, though, 
was the impossibility of making sense of Kaprow’s work, of grasping it with 
absolute certainty by placing it within a precise and comforting epistemological 
frame—Delany’s was a “broken or clouded vision.”  In the absence of a frame, 10
then, how can one make sense of a body, in this case, of Kaprow’s piece? 
When ‘art’ becomes ‘life’ or a text uses a foreign grammar, how can 
communication take place? Or, better, and in Delany’s own words, “how [are] 
we to distinguish facilitation from content—that is, how [are] we to distinguish 
‘information’ from ‘noise’?”  "11
The problem Delany faced when trying to grasp Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings 
in Six Parts was, it too, a problem of translation, the problem everyone faces 
when prompted to make sense of a body as it enters one’s field of perception. 
In that context, how can one separate the essential from the accidental, 
information from noise? As it has already been seen in Chapter Two, all 
encounters between bodies involve translations, role-playing. That, as it has 
been proposed, is the reason why all encounters depend on performance. Still, 
the attempt at constructing an understanding of any of those encounters, often 
through reminiscence, becomes also a problem of translation as the encounter 
becomes the object of one’s writing. "
In other words, a body exists and is translated into an image of itself so it can 
be experienced by another body, that being the first translation. The second 
translation happens when the encounter with the first body acquires autonomy 
and becomes itself another body—the plastic body of a memory, the reassuring 
certainties of a document, the pattern of the blood splattered on the walls—
bodies of evidence that go out in the world ready to be translated by other 
bodies. The difference between translation n and translation n+1 is only one of 
degree or level, not one of kind. For if everything is a body or, in Graham 
Harman’s terms, an “object”—from quarks to ideologies to supernovas—and if 
bodies at the n level make connections to form new bodies at level n+1, bodies 
that then encounter other bodies as parts of higher (n+1)+1 assemblages and 
 Gavin Butt, “Happenings in History, or, The Epistemology of the Memoir,” Oxford Art Journal 10
24, no. 2 (2001): 121.
 Delany, The Motion of Light in Water, 185.11
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so on, then translations are performed at every step of the way, they are the 
stuff of connections at whichever level of complexity of the world. "
Example: Beethoven had a musical idea which he then translated into a musical 
score. The musical score was read by Ferenc Fricsay who translated it as a 
performance of the Berliner Philharmoniker, which was then heard by its 
audience as Beethoven’s 9th Symphony. "
Yet another one: The HIV virus started spreading amongst the gay male 
population of the East and West coasts of the USA. The infection of those 
individuals’ CD4 cells progressed to a stage in which it was translated into a 
series of symptoms that were initially unable to be read in their relation to one 
other and to their cause. Those symptoms were eventually translated from the 
early ‘80s onwards as AIDS, which was then translated by the media and the 
public consciousness and read in a variety of ways, from “the result of moral 
decay and a major force destroying the Boy Scouts,” to “Nature’s way of 
cleaning house,” “the price paid for the 1960s,” “science fiction,” or “God’s 
punishment.”  "12
Or yet still: Allan Kaprow translated a series of creative ideas into a work 
entitled Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts which took place within"
temporarily erected polythene walls on unpainted wooden frames 
[dividing] the performance area into [...] six square chambers, each about 
eight feet by eight feet, each accessible from a door-wide space on the 
outside, but separated from one another, and through whose translucent 
wavering walls, you could make out only the ghost of what was going on 
in the chambers beside or across from yours.  "13
In each chamber of Kaprow’s piece, different happenings were expected to take 
place—18 in total, according to the title. That work, including its title, was 
witnessed by Samuel Delany who then, albeit tentatively, translated it as a 
“representation and analysis of the situation of the subject in history.”  14
 See Paula Treichler, How to Have Theory in an Epidemic: Cultural Chronicles of AIDS 12
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999): 12–13.
 Delany, The Motion of Light in Water, 180.13
 Ibid., 186. 14
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Therefore, following Gavin Butt following Samuel Delany, Kaprow’s Eighteen 
Happenings in Six Parts “[came] to speak of the multiple and contingent 
viewpoints that go to make up postmodernist discourses on history,” a feature 
that was then replicated by Delany himself when writing his autobiography, in 
that it “[eschewed] linear narrative in favour of building a representation of its 
subject through a fragmentary montage-like style.”  Hence, it can be said that, 15
in The Motion of Light in Water, Samuel Delany appropriated the poietic 
strategies of Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts by making his book go 
from the promise of an autobiography to a reflection on the multiple narrative 
layers or viewpoints that constitute one’s relationship with any given body or 
event, be it an early happening, one’s personal history, or one’s identity as an 
African-American gay science-fiction writer. In that sense, it is possible to argue 
that both Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts and Delany’s The Motion 
of Light in Water constituted two examples of meta-performance or meta-
translation, i.e. performances about performing, translations about translating."
"
Translating Absence!
When trying to reflect on the uses, methods, and meanings of translation, the 
one text that undoubtedly eventually comes to mind is Walter Benjamin’s “The 
Task of the Translator,” originally published in 1923 as an introduction to 
Benjamin’s own translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens.  In that much 16
discussed essay, Benjamin pointed out that an original work and its translation 
are closely connected in a “natural” or even “vital” way, whereby the translation 
constitutes the “afterlife” of the original work, its “stage of continued life.”  In 17
that context, ‘life’ ought not to be understood as an exclusive feature of cellular 
bodies but as the unfolding of a body’s personal history, whatever its nature 
may be. As Benjamin wrote, “[in] the final analysis, the range of life must be 
determined by history rather than by nature, least of all by such tenuous factors 
as sensation and soul.” "18
 Butt, “Happenings in History, or, The Epistemology of the Memoir,” 119–120.15
 See Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 257.16
 Ibid., 71–72.17
 Ibid., 72.18
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Translation is responsible for providing a body with an afterlife, a life beyond its 
first life or its previous history, a bio-graphy, i.e. a record or evidence of life. The 
problem with attempting to provide an account of the life of a body is that, as it 
has been seen in Chapter Two, one never really has access to the full being of 
the bodies one encounters. That had already been the problem faced by 
Samuel Delany when trying to translate both Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings 
and his own personal history onto the pages of a book: like all other bodies, 
human and nonhuman, Kaprow’s happening and Delany’s life shied away from 
full disclosure, hiding behind tinted glass screens. What that entails is that every 
attempt at reaching, making sense of, or otherwise knowing a body will always 
involve facing the problem of translation, the problem of trying to create an 
afterlife for a reality that keeps on slipping away. In other words, when all bodies 
lead distant and strange lives that can never be fully grasped, how can 
translation point somewhere beyond the contingency of their manifestations in 
experience? How can one highlight the fact that there will always be something 
of a body that will exceed its translations? That is the kind of problem that 
Benjamin himself encountered when reflecting on his role as translator of 
literary bodies:"
For what does a literary work ‘say’? What does it communicate? It ‘tells’ 
very little to those who understand it. Its essential quality is not statement 
or the imparting of information. Yet any translation which intends to 
perform a transmitting function cannot transmit anything but information
—hence, something inessential.  "19
For Benjamin, like for the object-oriented thinkers that came after him, the 
essence of a literary work was “what it contains in addition to information [...,] 
the unfathomable, the mysterious, the ‘poetic’.”  For that reason, the task of the 20
translator, like that of Delany when writing his memoirs, is always a tentative 
one. As Benjamin continued:"
This, to be sure, is to admit that all translation is only a somewhat 
provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languages. An 
 Ibid., 7019
 Ibid.20
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instant and final rather than a temporary and provisional solution of this 
foreignness remains out of the reach of mankind. "21
It is worth stressing that, although Benjamin was concerned with the particular 
task of translating literary works from one language to another, in the context of 
this dissertation and following Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology, 
literary works are not exceptional bodies. In other words, being is said equally of 
works of literature, car brakes, or dreams of a better future. Therefore, the 
problem one faces when attempting to translate a body, when trying to 
communicate it, is always the same regardless of it being a translation of 
Baudelaire from French into English, a translation of the brakes of a car into 
negative force, or a translation of dreams of a better future into a particular form 
of political or social organisation. In all those cases, like in all imaginable others, 
the task of the translator is the paradoxical task of provisionally connecting a 
body with one of its contingent personae whilst simultaneously knowing that the 
latter will never exhaust the former. Hence, the most successful translations are 
the ones that are aware of their contingency and incompleteness while, at the 
same time, being able to foreground the strangeness of the bodies they seek to 
translate. As occasions of estrangement, successful translations are therefore 
akin to the proper name, to the name that points towards the unfathomable core 
of a body without ever grasping it. In Benjamin’s words:"
Just as a tangent touches a circle lightly and at but one point, with this 
touch rather than with the point setting the law according to which it is to 
continue on its straight path to infinity, a translation touches the original 
lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the sense, thereupon 
pursuing its own course according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of 
linguistic flux. "22
That is the reason why, like the proper name, translations can only be further 
translated because, in “pursuing their own course,” they become bodies in their 
own right. That, too, is what happens with the proper name: saying one’s name 
is João is not the same as saying one is also Juan, Jean, John, Johannes, or 
Giovanni, although all the latter are translations of the former. As such, like all 
 Ibid., 75.21
 Ibid., 80–81.22
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bodies in their own right, their reality will also always exceed any translations 
which might, nonetheless, establish amongst them a relation of identity. In other 
words, translations can never be translated back to their original. Because all 
translations, as Benjamin wrote, pursue their own course and acquire their own 
autonomy as bodies in the world, a translation is always a first-degree 
translation, i.e. a translation of a body considered in its autonomy before it can 
even be thought as a translation of a translation (for the translated body will 
normally always already be a translation of another body that preceded it). In 
order to illustrate this point one can go back to the example of AIDS mentioned 
above: even if AIDS has, in the past, been translated as ‘God’s punishment,’ 
‘God’s punishment’ cannot  be translated back to ‘AIDS’ without leaving a 
remainder for ‘AIDS’ is unable to exhaust the full reality of ‘God’s punishment.’ 
‘God’s punishment’ has its own strange core and ‘AIDS’ is as much part of it as 
‘The Great Flood’ or ‘The Ten Plagues of Egypt’ or, for that matter, any of the 
other ways in which ‘God’s punishment’ might perform itself. None of those, 
however, neither individually nor added together, are able to stand for the 
entirety of ‘God’s punishment.’"
"
Ekphrasis as Translation!
When researching the problem of translation, especially in an art historical 
context, one will necessarily come across the age-old practice of ekphrasis, the 
rhetorical technique associated with the translation of works of visual art into 
literary texts. Having originated from the combination of the Greek words ek 
(meaning ‘out’) and phrazein (meaning ‘tell,’ ‘declare,’ or ‘pronounce’), ekphrasis 
originally meant ‘telling in full’ or ‘speaking out’ but has eventually come to stand 
for “the verbal representation of graphic representation.”  "23
It is consensual within literary critical circles that the first known instance of 
ekphrastic writing, at least in the West, appeared in Book 18 of Homer’s Iliad, in 
 See Amra Raza, “Artistic Adaptation: Ekphrasis in Pakistani Poetry in English,” Alif: Journal of 23
Comparative Poetics 28 (2008): 188; also, James Heffernan, “Ekphrasis and Representation,” 
New Literary History 22, no. 2 (1991): 299.
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the section known as “The Shield of Achilles.”  In that scene, Thetis, Achilles’ 24
goddess mother, visits Hephaestus, son of Zeus and Hera and god of the 
blacksmiths, craftsmen, technology, fire, and volcanoes, and asks him to make 
Achilles a new armour to replace the one her son lost. The importance of that 
passage stems from the fact that Homer decided to direct most of his focus to 
describing Achilles’ shield, a description that, rather than being static, assumed 
a dynamic narrative form which the poet used not only to emphasise the 
process of making the shield but, most importantly, to animate the images with 
which Hephaestus had decorated it. According to James Francis, in describing 
those ornaments—the earth, the sea and sky, a city at peace, a city at war, a 
harvest scene, and the river Ocean—Homer did not limit himself to describe 
fixed images but created, instead, a detailed account that included “the 
sequential action of the stories that would be difficult if not impossible to convey 
by solely visual means.”  Homer gave voice to the images forged by 25
Hephaestus onto Achilles’ shield and, in doing so, he made those images 
literally speak themselves out, as it is demonstrated by the excerpt below:"
Two cities in the spacious field he built with goodly state,"
Of divers-languag’d men: the one did nuptials celebrate,"
Observing at them solemn feasts; the brides from forth their bow’rs"
With torches usher’d through the streets; a world of paramours"
Excited by them, youths and maids, in lovely circles danc’d,"
To whom the merry pipe and harp the spriteful sounds advanc’d,"
The matrons standing in their doors admiring. "26
What Homer did in this passage was adopt narrative as the rhetorical style best 
suited to writing about images, about a particular kind of bodies which, today, 
are nevertheless more often read as static entities than as events or 
performative encounters worthy of a time-based narrative approach. As such, 
 See James Francis, “Metal Maidens, Achilles’ Shield, and Pandora: The Beginnings of 24
Ekphrasis,” American Journal of Philology 130 (2009): 1–23; Heffernan, “Ekphrasis and 
Representation,” 297; Norman Land, “Ekprasis and Imagination: Some Observation on Pietro 
Aretino’s Art Criticism,” The Art Bulleting 68, no. 2 (1986): 212; and Svetlana Alpers, “Ekphrasis 
and Aesthetic Attitudes in Vasari’s Lives,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 23, 
no. 3&4 (1960): 196.
 Francis, “Metal Maidens, Achilles’ Shield, and Pandora,” 9.25
 Homer, The Iliad, trans. George Chapman (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2003), 309.26
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what is found in ekphrastic writing since Homer is not a description of a 
representation but, instead, an attempt at evoking what lies beyond the static 
flatness of the image. In “The Shield of Achilles,” Homer did not simply describe 
the images with which Hephaestus decorated the armour of the Greek demigod. 
Instead, he evoked what those images stood for, he translated them by making 
them speak and, in doing so, he somehow managed to bypass the contingency 
of their original manifestation and to give them an afterlife in the text. "
As a result, what one finds in Homer is a practice of translation that does not 
simply describe images or attempts to convert them into words in a literal 
manner as much as it highlights the unfathomable reality hidden behind each 
representation, lying beyond each appearance. Ekphrastic writing is writing that 
points towards the body that is simultaneously made visible and camouflaged 
by its performance, to the performer concealed by its persona. Still, and like the 
images it aims to translate, ekphrasis is, itself, also a provisional and incomplete 
translation, one that is also contingent on the encounter between a particular 
audience and a specific performance. In other words, both the images in the 
shield of Achilles and Homer’s ekphrastic description of them are both 
translations of an always already veiled reality. In the case of the actual shield, 
bodies were translated and carved onto metal by Hephaestus, the god of fire. 
The shield then became a body in its own right, irreducible to any of its 
appearances and named “the shield of Achilles.” Afterwards, it was translated 
into words by Homer, the poet, who approached it as a translation of a 
translation, a representation of a representation, but only after it had acquired 
its autonomy as a body in itself, unable to be fully reduced back to the body 
from which it had initially emerged. As James Heffernan wrote:"
Yet Homer never forgets that he is representing representation itself: that 
he is describing both the act of sculpting and a work of sculpture as well 
as all the things it represents. He starts each narrative by referring to the 
making and placing of the scene he narrates; he concludes his most 
dramatic narratives on a note of charged suspension that evokes the 
stasis of sculpture; and he fully exploits the representational friction 
between the sculptor’s medium—the various metals of the shield—and 
its referents. He thus bears continual witness to the Daedalian power, 
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complexity and verisimilitude of visual art even as he aspires to rival that 
art in language that both imagines and represents it. "27
With his use of ekphrasis as a narrative response to the pictorial stasis of the 
shield of Achilles, Homer inaugurated a mode of translating images into words 
that would be mimicked by other classical poets such as Hesiod and Virgil and, 
like many other features of classical thought and artistic practice, recuperated 
during the Italian Renaissance by early critics such as Pietro Aretino or, more 
famously, Giorgio Vasari.  "28
However, despite it having been quite a popular literary technique during the 
beginnings of art historical writing, ekphrasis would eventually became more 
associated with poetry than with ‘serious’ criticism, as James Heffernan’s book 
Museum of Words clearly highlights. In the book, Heffernan concerned himself 
with writing a history of literature through literature’s “perennially conflicted 
response to visual art.”  In doing so, he searched for a definition of ekphrasis 29
“sharp enough to identify a distinguishable body of literature and yet also elastic 
enough to reach from classicism to post-modernism, from Homer to Ashbery.”  30
The result was a definition of ekphrasis as “the verbal representation of visual 
representation.”  Neverthelesss, and as the passage just quoted also hints at, 31
Heffernan was only concerned with ‘traditional’ works of literature and their 
writers, something that the subtitle of his book, The Poetics of Ekphrasis from 
Homer to Ashbery, clearly shows. Nowhere in Museum of Words is critical 
writing ever mentioned. From Homer to Ashbery via Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, 
Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, Byron, Browning, Auden, and William Carlos 
Williams, Heffernan’s ekphrasis is more a literary genre than a rhetorical device 
able to be used by different writers working in a variety of contexts from poetry 
to criticism. "
 Heffernan, Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery (Chicago and 27
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 22 (emphasis added).
 See Francis, “Metal Maidens, Achilles’ Shield, and Pandora,” 13; Heffernan, Museum of 28
Words, 23; Land, “Ekphrasis and Imagination;” and Alpers, “Ekphrasis and Aesthetic Attitudes in 
Vasari’s Lives.” 
 Heffernan, Museum of Words, 2.29
 Ibid., 3.30
 Ibid.31
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Still, and notwithstanding the long history of its literary use, can ekphrasis be 
recuperated by scholars not merely as a stylistic device but as a legitimate 
epistemic tool? Can scholars use it to highlight the strange, distant core of 
bodies without risking having their work dismissed as ‘mere’ poetry, a kind of 
easy criticism that, as Norman Land and Svetlana Alpers have pointed out, has 
often been directed at earlier critics such as Aretino and Vasari?  Can 32
ekphrastic writing be a solution for scholars who are aware of the poietic nature 
of their work whilst simultaneously refusing to have their writing overlooked as 
‘mere’ poetry? Or, looking at the same problem from a different angle: is it 
possible to trace a genealogy connecting early moments of ekphrasis such as 
the ones found in Homer’s “The Shield of Achilles” with more recent styles of 
scholarly writing that make use of similar rhetoric and epistemic devices?"
"
Evocative Writing!
Faced with the task of writing about performance, some authors have, in recent 
years, developed an interest in styles of writing that refuse the clinical, self-
assured, analytical tone of ‘objective’ academic writing. Inspired by emergent 
feminist approaches to scholarly work, those new takes on writing, commonly 
known as performative writing, reject the primacy given to mind, reason, and 
judgement in the phallogocentric history of Western thought, promoting instead 
an awareness of the embodied character of all knowing and of its contingent 
nature. In other words, performative writing, as it will be demonstrated below, 
sets itself against the idea that there is such a thing as an ‘objective’ approach 
to the subject of one’s writing, an approach that, because centred in reason, is 
normally assumed to be independent from the writer’s position in space, time, 
and memory, both individual and collective. Thus, due to its being unashamedly 
wary of all positions of certainty and of their often silent ideological grounds, 
performative writing also avoids the usual interpretative drive of academic 
writing by not pretending to succeed in grasping the full breadth of a body. 
Consequently, this chapter will argue, in its openness to the contingency of all 
encounters, performative writing is a strong contemporary candidate for solving 
 See Land, “Ekphrasis and Imagination,” 207; and Alpers, “Ekphrasis and Aesthetic Attitudes 32
in Vasari’s Lives,” 191.
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the problem one faces when having to give a voice to bodies that, very much 
like the shield of Achilles in The Iliad, are either silent or no longer audible. In 
doing that, the remainder of the chapter will situate contemporary performative 
writing in a long lineage of ekphrastic writing which, in both literature and 
criticism, has tried to speak for that which was absent.   "
Writing about bodies and the ways they perform themselves to one another is, 
as it was argued in Chapter Two, writing about a kind of experience that is 
necessarily embodied and, therefore, contingent on a particular encounter. It is 
writing about specific translations, about specific instances of bodies playing 
roles for other bodies, of bodies living contingent lives and passing as the 
personae they happen to perform. Therefore, one thing that writing about 
bodies and their performances must achieve is to remind its readers of the 
ultimate strangeness of all bodies, highlighting the contingency of their 
personae and the inaccessibility of the bodies presenting themselves through 
them. By attempting to convey the strangeness of bodies rather than simply 
describing their roles or taking the latter as final truths, writing is able to get 
closer to the bodies about which its words are being written. That is what 
Benjamin must have meant when he claimed the paradoxical task of the 
translator to be that of translating what will always remain indecipherable.  "33
One way in which writing can attempt to translate the strangeness of bodies is 
by becoming aware of and embracing its performative character. Performance 
is, after all, another name for translation. That is something writers of ekphrastic 
poetry have known since Homer, for, as it was claimed, ekphrasis does nothing 
other than turning a body into a text that is able to speak for it. As James 
Francis wrote: "
Far from a calm, contemplative pause [in the unfolding of the main plot of 
the literary work], ancient ekphrasis [...was] filled with movement on 
several levels, sometimes reinforcing, sometimes subverting the 
narrative, often calling into question the very processes of sight, 
language, and thought.   "34
 See above, pp. 156–158.33
 Francis, “Metal Maindens, Achilles’ Shield, and Pandora,” 6.34
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What is needed when writing about bodies, about any body, is a writing that 
becomes movement, writing that becomes aware of itself as the translation of a 
performed gesture, writing that vibrates in sympathy with the body about which 
it is written like the strings of a piano vibrate in sympathy with each other in 
order to create that je-ne-sais-quoi of its timbre. What is needed is a kind of 
writing like the one evoked by Simon O’Sullivan when trying to write about the 
work of Turner Prize nominee Cathy Wilkes: "
With such a practice as Wilkes’s, writing’s only role—in addition to 
carefully documenting and describing the work (in all its ‘matter-of-
factness’), and providing an account of an encounter with such work (that 
will necessarily be personal)—must be to somehow accompany the 
work, to seize upon certain aspects and to amplify or develop them. This 
might involve writing as itself a kind of fiction, writing that produces the 
same ‘structure of feeling,’ the same constellation of affect. "35
O’Sullivan’s words are crucial at this point and highlight some of the features of 
the writing that is being called performative. As a form of ekphrastic writing, 
performative writing goes beyond ‘matters of factness,’ beyond the comforts 
that stem from taking contingencies for final truths. In doing so, it is a writing 
that tends to stress the dependency of ‘facts’ on particular configurations of 
observing apparatuses and observed realities, on arrangements of performing 
bodies and bodies that witness. The way it often goes about that is by providing 
an unashamedly personal and, therefore, contingent, account of the encounter. 
However, as O’Sullivan also notes, personal accounts are not enough to evoke 
the subject of one’s writing and, therefore, even if performative writing is usually 
associated with the personal and the autobiographical, it mustn’t be reduced to 
it. Personal accounts of encounters are not enough to bring-forth or enact the 
ultimate strangeness of bodies. "
According to Jeffrey Williams, the autobiographical turn in criticism can be 
traced back to Jane Tompkins’ 1987 essay “Me and My Shadow,” a text in which 
the author built a passionate argument against the post-Kantian idea that, in 
order to remain valid, knowledge must transcend the domain of the private and 
 Simon O’Sullivan, “Ten Concepts Following Cathy Wilkes’ Practice,” Afterall 12 (2005): 65 35
(emphasis added). 
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personal.  That need for knowledge to transcend the personal was seen by 36
Tompkins as a symptom of the broader conflict between the public realm of 
knowledge and the private realm of feeling which, in her words, was also a 
“founding condition of female oppression.”  Still, Tompkins’ essay is not only 37
important for what it says, but for how it says it (or, following the argument of 
this chapter, it is through its ‘how’ that Tompkins’ text is able to provide its 
readers with a glimpse of its ‘what’). For instance, in one of its passages, 
Tompkins wrote:"
Intellectual debate if it were in the right spirit would be wonderful. But I 
don’t know how to be in the right spirit, exactly, can’t make points without 
sounding kind of superior and smug. Most of all, I don’t know how to 
enter the debate without leaving everything else behind—the birds 
outside my window, my grief over Janice, just myself as a person sitting 
here in stocking feet, a little bit chilly because the windows are open, and 
thinking about going to the bathroom. But not going yet.  "38
However, even if, by inaugurating the personal or autobiographical turn in 
criticism, Tompkins has highlighted the contingent character of all encounters 
and, therefore, of all criticality, writing autobiographically is not enough to 
successfully evoke the strangeness of bodies or to achieve what Peggy Phelan 
called the “summoning [of the] the incorporeal.”  By that, Phelan meant that the 39
main task one faces when writing about performance is that of somehow 
making present the body about which one is trying to write whilst, 
simultaneously, being aware that the body is and will forever remain out of 
reach. In her words:"
 See Jeffrey Williams, “The New Belletrism,” Style 33, no. 3 (1999): 414–442. For the Kantian 36
origin of that paradigm, one that equates knowledge with the public use of reason, see Kant, An 
Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, 3–7. 
 Jane Tompkins, “Me and My Shadow,” New Literary History 19, no. 1 (1987): 169.37
 Ibid., 173.38
 Peggy Phelan, Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories (London and New York: 39
Routledge, 1997), 2.
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One of the deepest challenges of writing about performance is that the 
object of one’s meditation, the performance itself, disappears. In this 
sense, performance theory and criticism are instances of writing history. "40
Yet, as it has been claimed in the previous chapter, there is a divergence 
between the way in which Phelan viewed the absence of the object of one’s 
writing and the argument of this thesis. The difference between Phelan’s 
approach to the absence of the body and the one being put forward here is that, 
while Phelan’s body is absent in the moment of writing because it has once 
been present and has since then disappeared into memory, the body in this 
thesis is distant and has always been so. Thus, the approach to writing being 
claimed here is itself different from Phelan’s: whilst Phelan’s writing mourns a 
lost object and lives, by consequence, in the past, the approach to writing being 
defended in this chapter is marked by an unconditional drive forward, by an 
eroticisation of the future. This is writing based on the conviction that, whatever 
happens, each step of the way will bring bodies closer than they have ever 
been before, even if never close enough to grasp. It is a writing that longs for 
future glimpses of that which has always been distant rather than a a writing 
that mourns that which was present and has now been lost. To go back to the 
argument of the Introduction, this is not the mourning of a lost ‘Nature;’ it is the 
scary and yet unavoidable realisation that ‘Nature’ has never been there. It is 
also, nevertheless, a writing that, very much like Phelan’s, is concerned with 
writing history, albeit in a different manner. Not history as remembrance of the 
past but history as the making and remaking of the past through a permanent 
evocation of the future; history first and foremost as historia, as the account of 
one’s run towards what one will never be able to reach. History, yes, but history 
as the kind of ‘afterlife’ that is aware of its nature as ‘after-death.’ "
Still, despite approaching it with from a slightly different angle, Phelan’s 
reflections on writing about performance are extremely useful in the context of 
this dissertation. As O’Sullivan noted when reflecting on the task of writing about 
Wilkes’ work, Phelan also believed that writing must become something more 
than a description or a record of one’s personal encounter with a body. Writing 
must attempt to translate into words the “affective outline” of that encounter, it 
 Ibid., 3.40
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must try to evoke the strangeness of that specific body.  The way to do this, 41
Phelan claimed, is by remembering how to “love the words the harder way: not 
‘for themselves,’ since they were supremely for us, but for the more-in-them-
than-themselves,” i.e., by using words for what, in them, exceeds their direct 
meaning.  In doing so, writing is taken a step further than Tompkins’ 42
autobiographical writing, and allows the body being translated to emerge as the 
body of a stranger. Consequently, and like a shaman, the writer becomes a 
vehicle for that which cannot speak whilst never forgetting that his or her words 
will never be able to replace the body in the name of which they are spoken. As 
Phelan, herself, wrote:"
Performative writing is different from personal criticism or 
autobiographical essay, although it owes a lot to both genres. [...] Rather 
than describing the performance event in ‘direct signification,’ a task I 
believe to be impossible and not terrifically interesting, I want this writing 
to enact the affective force of the performance event again [...]. 
Performative writing is solicitous of affect even while it is nervous and 
tentative about the consequences of that solicitation. Alternatively bold 
and coy, manipulative and unconscious, this writing points both to itself 
and to the ‘scenes’ that motivate it. "43
If performative writing is the most efficient way of conveying a sense of the 
strangeness of all bodies even at the moment of their encounter, it remains to 
understand what exactly does performative writing entail, what are its most 
commonly used strategies; what kinds of evocative, quasi-shamanic tools does 
it have at its disposal in order to function as a map or road sign that, as 
ekphrasis, points in the direction of a body as its ever distant and, therefore, 
strange horizon.  "
One of the texts that better answers those questions is Della Pollock’s 1998 
essay “Performing Writing.” In it, Pollock presented what she termed “six 
excursions into performative writing,” an attempt at sketching the defining 
 Ibid.41
 Ibid., 7.42
 Ibid., 11–12 (emphasis added).43
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features of the style.  According to her, performative writing is “evocative,” 44
“metonymic,” “subjective,” “nervous,” “citational,” and “consequential.”  45
However, of those six traits, two acquire more importance in the context of the 
argument being developed here. Although performative writing is indeed 
“subjective” because it embraces the contingency of all encounters, “citational” 
because it points to a reality that is not present, “nervous” because it is aware of 
the impossibility of ever making the body about which it writes fully present, and 
“consequential” because it affects one’s perception of a given body, the two 
characteristics that are most telling of the rhetorical devices used in 
performative writing are its “evocative” and “metonymic” aspects. "
Metonymy is the figure of speech whereby a body is referred to not by its name 
but by the name of another body with which it is contiguous. Example: When 
“the kettle is boiling,” what is actually boiling is the water adjacent to it. 
Therefore, according to Pollock, performative writing is metonymic because it is 
“a self-consciously partial or incomplete rendering” of its referent.  A similar 46
claim could also be made from the standpoint of Harman’s Object-Oriented 
Ontology, namely from its thesis that the “the withdrawn object is always more 
than what we perceive of it.”  However, if, according to Harman, all relations 47
are already metonymic because all access to “real objects” is always mediated 
by a “sensual object” with which they are contiguous, then metonymy alone 
cannot trigger an awareness of the “real object” that hides behind its sensual 
double or, in the terms of this dissertation, an awareness of the body 
camouflaged by its performed persona. That is where metaphor comes in as the 
rhetorical device that is responsible for pointing towards the strangeness of 
bodies and for giving performative writing its evocative character. As Della 
Pollock wrote:"
Performative writing is evocative. It operates metaphorically to render 
absence present—to bring the reader into contact with “other-worlds,” to 
those aspects and dimensions of our world that are other to the text as 
 Della Pollock, “Performing Writing,” in The Ends of Performance, ed. Peggy Phelan and Jill 44
Lane (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998), 80.
 Ibid., 80–94.45
 Ibid., 82.46
 Graham Harman, “Dwelling With the Fourfold,” Space and Culture 12 (2009): 301.47
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such by re-marking them. Performative writing evokes worlds that are 
other-wise [sic] intangible, unlocatable. "48
Like metonymy, metaphor also establishes a relation between two bodies that 
encounter one another but, unlike the former, it does not require contiguity. In 
metaphor, bodies are, instead, summoned through association. In other words, 
when using metaphor, the writer evokes a body by referring to another body 
with which the former shares some qualities. By writing “the city is a jungle,” for 
instance, the writer is not replacing the city with the jungle adjacent to it; rather, 
he or she is pointing to the strangeness of the city by depriving it of its expected 
qualities and then associating it with qualities belonging to another body from 
which it is detached, in this case, the jungle. "
Harman, too, recognises the important role played by metaphor in summoning 
the withdrawn reality of his “objects:” "
For this sort of pointing, let’s use the general term ‘allure,’ for a thing 
becomes alluring when it seems to be a ghostly power exceeding any of 
its lists of properties, one that animates those properties from within by 
means of some ill-defined demonic energy. Allure splits an object from its 
qualities. [...] We see it in metaphor, in which ‘man is a wolf’ [...] seems to 
split the human from his qualities and replace them with wolf-qualities.  "49
In the terms of this dissertation, by forcing the split of a body from its persona, 
metaphor is able to point towards the core of that body that lies beyond the 
contingency of any role it might play. If the body survives that split, then it 
means that the body is not reducible to any of its performances and is, 
therefore, ultimately strange."
In conclusion, this chapter has tried to find an answer to the epistemological 
problem posed by the realisation that bodies will always remain strangers to 
one another despite their tight ecological entanglement, i.e. their ability to affect 
each other. If all bodies are essentially strange, then existing paradigms of 
knowledge will have to find a way of embracing the ultimate contingency of the 
world whilst nonetheless being able to make claims of truth about the reality of 
 Pollock, “Performing Writing,” 80.48
 Harman, Towards Speculative Realism, 137.49
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bodies and the conditions of their encounter, however tentatively and 
temporarily. One way the Arts and Humanities scholar has to go about that, this 
chapter has argued, is through a reawakening to the ekphrastic power of 
metaphor and performative writing as legitimate technologies of knowledge that, 
in their working as both technē and poiēsis, are able to highlight the contingent 
nature of all encounters and, therefore, bring forward the strangeness of all 
bodies. In doing so, the scholar becomes an important interlocutor with the 
scientist and no longer its enemy or annoying sibling. By embracing the 
performative aspect of their writing and no longer scared of being labeled ‘mere’ 
poets, scholars are able to portray a world made of bodies that are 
simultaneously entangled and estranged, in resonance with, and no longer 
against, recent postulates of disciplines such as theoretical physics.  Thus, 50
rather than being an instance of post-structuralist or even ‘postmodern’ self-
centred ‘belletrism’ devoid of content as so many have claimed, performative 
writing is a legitimate form of communication that, in reenacting the performative 
nature of all encounters, is able to function as a vehicle of truth, albeit one that, 
rather than aiming at clarity and universal certainty, has noise, strangeness, and 
contingency as its only postulates.   51
 For more on this argument’s relation to theoretical physics, see above, pp. 118–119, 50
especially note 228.
 For examples of some of the negative views on contemporary forms of writing known as 51
‘performative’ or ‘art writing,’ in particular in relation to its use as a form of art criticism, see 
Baker, George et al., “Round Table: The Present Conditions of Art Criticism,” October 100 
(2002): 200–228; and Charlesworth, JJ, “What has happened to art criticism?,” Spiked, 
accessed June 25, 2013, http://www.spiked-online.com/site/article/1265.
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—FOUR—!
Blue, or Performing Metaphor!
"
"
"
I fill this room with the echo of many voices!
Who passed time here!
Voices unlocked from the blue of the long dried paint!
—Derek Jarman !1"
"
"
"
"
In the previous chapter, a case was made for performative writing to be 
embraced as a valid technology of knowledge, one that, following the tradition 
of ekphrastic writing, makes use of metaphor for highlighting the strangeness of 
all bodies. No longer associated with the tropes of subjectivity, relativism, or 
social constructivism that have marked the post-structuralist critical project and 
postmodern aesthetics, metaphor appeared as a legitimate strategy for 
accessing a world in which bodies are increasingly entangled in one another 
whilst remaining estranged and, therefore, irreducible to the roles they play in 
each encounter. "
The chapter that now follows will analyse an example of metaphor being used 
to point in the direction of the unspeakable core of bodies. That example is 
Derek Jarman’s Blue, a film that facilitates several performative encounters and 
that is, itself, a successful instance of performative writing bringing forth the 
strangeness of its subject. The reasons behind the choice of a film as the main 
case-study in a dissertation focused in the notion of performance are manifold: 
Firstly, using a work that is not normally associated with performance—not only 
because it is a film but also because it does not show any actors performing on 
screen—comes in line with the stated aim of this project, i.e. that of pursuing an 
ecological redefinition of performance that goes beyond human performances 
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film (London: Channel 4 Television and BBC Radio 3), 10.1
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and the so-called ‘performing arts.’ Secondly, Derek Jarman’s Blue is, as it will 
be argued, first and foremost an essay on epistemology, a work that not only is 
concerned with a subject that is difficult to grasp—HIV/AIDS—but also a work 
concerned with knowledge, its conditions, and its possibility. Thirdly, Blue 
deserves being discussed much more than it has been: at the time of the writing 
of this dissertation, the number of critical essays and monographs widely 
available on such important work of late 20th-century cinema could be counted 
by the fingers of both hands and mostly addressed a readership primarily 
concerned with the cultural impact of HIV/AIDS, queer theory, or both. However, 
as this chapter will make clear, Blue’s importance as both a film made by a 
visual artist and a quasi-philosophical meditation on the conditions and limits of 
knowledge goes well beyond the specificity of those areas of concern. That is 
due to the fact that, as it will be seen, Blue is a metaphor for all knowledge that 
emerges out of all encounters with a world made of both human and nonhuman 
bodies enmeshed in one another with no prejudice to their absolute 
strangeness. "
Thus, in order to argue for the importance of Blue as a metaphysical meditation, 
this chapter will start with a small introductory section inspired by Derek 
Jarman’s diaries and the text of Blue. Following from that, a short history of the 
film will be presented, including Jarman’s intentions while making it, as well as 
the problems concerning the public representations of HIV/AIDS he was trying 
to address. Finally, through an analysis of the crucial role played by metaphor 
throughout the film—both visually in the form of the monochromatic screen and 
aurally in the text read by the actors and in the film’s sound-effects—the chapter 
will claim that the film reenacts four major performative encounters: the 
encounter between Jarman and Yves Klein’s ultramarine blue, the encounter 
between Jarman and his alter-ego character named Blue, the encounter 
between Jarman and AIDS, and, finally, the encounter between Blue’s audience 
and the AIDS pandemic. In reenacting those four encounters, Blue highlights 
the nature, conditions, and limits of knowledge while still being able to convey 
something of the reality which it tries to grasp in all its strangeness. !
"
"
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  !
Wednesday, 23"
As I sit here, Blue playing in front of me, coming after me from the depths of the 
all-powerful home cinema speakers, the sky has suddenly opened up over 
London and the clouds have gone leaving behind the sky-blue that the painter 
tries, unsuccessfully, to reproduce. However, there is no painting in this room; 
only the voices of John, Nigel, Tilda, and Derek bathing in the flickering 
ultramarine blue of the screen. (Or is it the other way around?)"
Still, home is not the cinema and the sky today is cyan, at best celeste, but 
definitely not ultramarine."
Last night, in an attempt to join the others and bathe myself in blue as well as in 
words, I tried to overcome the atmospheric barriers and those posed by 
affordable televisual technology by laying in bed, C.M. next to me, with all the 
lights off and Blue playing off the larger than life computer screen sat on the 
desk in the corner of the room."
O Blue come forth!
O Blue arise!
O Blue ascend!
O Blue come in "2
Fig. 24: Derek Jarman, Blue, 1993. Film Still.
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 3.2
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Blue came forth and filled the bedroom with all the intensity of electromagnetic 
ultramarine and with the tranquility of words flowing—sometimes as whispers, 
sometimes as shouts—out of the mouths of all those who have finally resigned 
themselves to their inability to speak. C.M. asked me “What is it about?.” I 
looked at him (what a silly question... Had he not read the title?):"
—It is about blue."
"
June, 1993!
Blue came out less than a year before Derek Jarman died of an AIDS-related 
illness in February 1994. According to Tim Lawrence, the film premiered without 
any hype in June of the previous year at the Venice Biennale with “Jarman 
himself, a single reporter, a small audience, and seventy-six minutes of 
unchanging blue celluloid backed by a soundtrack about the director’s 
experience of living and dying with AIDS.”  In Lawrence’s opinion, there was an 3
explanation for the quiet nature of the first-ever screening of Jarman’s last film 
at Lido’s Palazzo del Cinema: that same evening, at the Palazzo Venier dei 
Leoni, a few vaporetto stops away on the Canal Grande and home of the Peggy 
Guggenheim Collection, Elizabeth Taylor was making her own bit of glitzy AIDS 
history by presiding over “Art against AIDS,” a charity gala where each place at 
the fine dining table fetched US$2,500 for the American Foundation for AIDS 
Research.  Faced with the choice of sitting through seventy-six minutes of 4
flickering ultramarine blue, hospital and war sounds, and fragments of text on 
AIDS, blindness and death read in the first person by John Quentin, Nigel Terry, 
Tilda Swinton and Derek Jarman, or paying US$2,500 for dining in the company 
of Elizabeth Taylor and the likes of Chaka Khan, Yoko Ono, and Valentino, all 
with the extra reassurance that one was doing ‘good,’ that one was ‘helping,’ the 
‘right’ choice wasn’t certainly that hard to make.  As Tony Peake noted, quoting 5
a Time Out report of that same month, “the glitterati were at Peggy 
Guggenheim’s, ogling Liz Taylor as she presided over a gala dinner and auction
 Tim Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 3
Social Text 15, no. 3&4 (1997): 241.
 Ibid.4
 See ibid. for information on the guests present at the gala dinner. 5
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—the fundraising ‘Art Against AIDS’.”  To most of the press following what was 6
the 45th edition of the Venice Biennale, AIDS was neither about Jarman nor 
was it about Blue. Instead, it was all about Liz, who, according to the press, 
sported a “chic chiffon outfit adorned with a diamond necklace” while parading 
herself along the marble foyers and brocade walls.  Death and uncertainty had 7
been turned into glitz and glamour. The following was, according to Lawrence, 
what Newsday had to say about the event:"
Elizabeth Taylor brought her deep tan, her even deeper cleavage, and 
her fierce anti-AIDS stance to Venice last weekend. [...] Despite the heat, 
the paparazzi and Elizabeth’s chronically painful back, the happenings 
were a great success and Miz Liz was in fine, cooperative fettle.  "8
According to that report, in Venice, that day, there was no ‘black cancer,’ no 
blindness, no hospital rooms, no night sweats, no IV drips, no Blue; just pure 
lush and class. "
"
Evoking the Strange Within!
Known for his extremely critical views on television, the epitome of the “spurious 
egalitarianism and lack of concentration of the media,” consumer culture, and 
for his ambivalent relationship with mainstream cinema and its use of narrative, 
Derek Jarman had, on several occasions, preferred to consider himself a 
painter working with other languages such as cinema and poetry.  Also, given 9
his own self-styling as an “old-fashioned conservative” artist with statements 
such as “Politically I am not a Tory. Culturally I am. My art has always been 
Tory” and “The older I get, the more I believe in tradition,” and given the 
 Peake, Tony. Derek Jarman (London: Abacus, 2001), 524.6
 Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 241.7
 Ibid., 245.8
 Derek Jarman, Modern Nature: The Journals of Derek Jarman (London: Vintage, 1992), 82, 9
177. For details on Jarman’s relationship with mainstream cinema and for how both the artist 
and the critics thought of himself as primarily a painter, see Steven Dillon, Derek Jarman and 
Lyric Film: The Mirror and the Sea (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 2–4; Lawrence, 
“AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 248; Peter 
Wollen, “Blue,” New Left Review 6 (2000): 123; and Jim Ellis, Derek Jarman’s Angelic 
Conversations (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 2.
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influence artists such as William Blake had on his work, Jarman is today 
considered one of the heirs of English Romanticism as well as a prominent 
figure of the New Romantics movement of the 1980s.  As a consequence of all 10
that, it comes as no surprise that the artist held extremely negative views on 
popular culture and on the representations of AIDS and of People with AIDS 
(PWA) circulating in the Western media during the 1980s and early ‘90s. At one 
point in Blue, for instance, Jarman can be heard, through the voice of one of his 
actors, saying the following:"
I shall not win the battle against the virus—in spite of the slogans like 
‘Living with AIDS.’ The virus was appropriated by the well—so we have to 
live with AIDS while they spread the quilt for the moths of Ithaca across 
the wine dark sea."
"
Awareness is heightened by this, but something else is lost. A sense of 
reality drowned in theatre. "11
With that passage, Jarman announced, loud and clear, the reservations he held 
on the famous AIDS Memorial Quilt and what he classed as its theatrics of 
remembrance. The quilt, at present made of more than 47,000 individual 3-by-6 
foot memorial panels, was initiated in 1987 as a way of both celebrating and 
remembering the lives of those who have died of AIDS-related illnesses, and 
worked as a counterpoint to the images of suffering and dying PWAs that were 
mass circulated in the media at the height of the AIDS crisis.  Such a 12
counterpoint was badly needed as most of the images of dying PWAs that 
circulated at the time were only able to evoke pity along with, undoubtedly, fear 
and horror. In the opinion of Douglas Crimp, what was needed in order to 
balance those out from both from a social and a public health point of view, 
were, instead, images that were able to trigger solidarity.  "13
 See Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 10
246–247; and Roger Hallas, Reframing Bodies: AIDS, Bearing Witness, and the Queer Moving 
Image (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009): 219–221.
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 9.11
 See The Names Project Foundation, “The AIDS Memorial Quilt,” accessed June 2, 2013, 12
http://www.aidsquilt.org.
 See Douglas Crimp, Melancholia and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics 13
(Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2002), 99. 
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Notwithstanding the above, in Jarman’s opinion the shift from pity-inducing 
photographs of dying PWAs to solidarity-evoking memorial quilts was doing 
nothing to publicly unveil the true reality of living with AIDS. Instead, what the 
AIDS Quilt was doing was yet again masquerading reality with spectacle: "
All art failed [in portraying AIDS]. [...] When the AIDS quilt came to 
Edinburgh during the film festival, I attended just out of duty. I could see it 
was an emotional work, it got the heartstrings. But when the panels were 
unveiled a truly awful ceremony took place, in which a group of what 
looked like refrigerated karate experts, all dressed in white, turned and 
chanted some mumbo jumbo—horrible, quasi-religious, false. I shall 
haunt anyone who ever makes a panel for me. "14
Therefore, the challenge, for Jarman, was to talk about AIDS and about his own 
experience of it without falling in either of the two traps; without, in other words, 
adopting the strategies of mass-circulated portrayals of PWAs in their death 
beds as individualised doomed promiscuous white male bodies deprived of 
personhood and subjectivity; but also without going along with public rituals of 
remembrance and their “mumbo jumbo” aesthetics.  Jarman’s aim was that of 15
bringing his own private experience as a PWA into the public realm without 
letting it become a simple and depoliticised account of the struggle of an 
individualised body with the disease killing it, nor a broad public statement that, 
due to the high levels of generalisation and abstraction it would necessarily 
require, would end up diluting the reality of his own private daily battles with 
both HIV and opportunistic fellows such as all the AIDS-related illnesses of both 
individual and social bodies. "
That difficult rubbing of, and negotiation between, private and public realms was 
already, at the time of Blue’s premiere, a core feature of Jarman’s work. As the 
artist, himself, is quoted saying:"
My world is in fragments, smashed in pieces so fine I doubt I will ever 
reassemble them. So I scrabble in the rubbish, an archaeologist who 
stumbles across a buried film. An archaeologist who projects his private 
 Derek Jarman, Derek Jarman’s Garden (London: Thames & Hudson, 1995), 91.14
 See Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 15
243.
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world along a beam of light into the arena, till all goes dark at the end of 
the performance, and we go home… Now you project your private world 
into the public arena and produce the flashpoint; the attrition between the 
private and public world, is the tradition you discover. All you can do is 
point the direction that everyone in the audience who wishes to “travel” 
has to take. "16
As that passage demonstrates, Jarman positioned his own work half way 
between the two poles of private and public, inside and outside, concrete and 
abstract and it was also there, between those poles, that Blue realised its 
promise of bridging internal battles with an unbeatable killer virus and external 
social representations and collective epistemologies. "
Writing about the necessity of bridging those two sides of AIDS, which he called 
the “two epidemics,” George Piggford defined the first, “empirical” one, as the 
one that takes place within a particular human body and with which medical 
practice is usually most concerned, and the second, “tropic” one, as the one 
concerned with the social body, popular discourse, and its strategies of 
signification.  However, as the author went on to say: "17
From the vantage of most AIDS theory, the first [tropic] epidemic is the 
only one to which we must be most carefully attentive, but in the 
subjectivities of those for whom AIDS signifies an everyday struggle, the 
second [empirical] seems much more real.  "18
The problem Jarman faced when creating Blue was that most existing 
discourses on AIDS tended to privilege one of its sides in detriment of the other. 
In other words, when looking for portrayals of HIV/AIDS, what was common to 
find during the late 1980s and early ‘90s were two diametrically opposed 
narratives positing themselves against each other: either AIDS was a private, 
concrete and individual, health condition or it was a public and abstract 
 Jarman quoted in Hallas, Reframing Bodies, 220.16
 See George Piggford, “‘In Time of Plague:’ AIDS and its Significations in Hervé Guibert, Tony 17
Kushner, and Thom Gunn,” Cultural Critique 44 (2000): 178. Also, for more on what Piggford 
called the “tropic epidemic” see Paula Treichler, How to Have Theory in an Epidemic, 1, 
particularly in relation to what the author called an “epidemic of signification.”
 Piggford, “‘In Time of Plague,’” 178.18
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representation that lived in popular discourse. By adopting any of those 
positions, the reality of HIV/AIDS was explained away either by reducing it to its 
parts, i.e. the entry of HIV in the body, the reverse transcription of viral RNA into 
DNA, the integration of viral DNA into the host cell’s DNA and so on until the 
appearance of the first opportunistic infections and the eventual death of the 
infected body; or by pretending to exhaust its being at the level of its 
manifestations in public consciousness as the “gay plague” or “God’s 
punishment of our weaknesses.”  However, either solution was untenable for it 19
was unable to deal with the full dimensions of AIDS as a body existing in the 
world alongside humans, prawn cocktails, Margaret Thatcher’s hats, 
accumulation of capital, exploitation, and strawberry milkshakes. Reducing it to 
either a series of microscopic biological and chemical processes or to a set of 
macroscopic apparatuses of signification and production of the Self could only 
explain AIDS away and, therefore, never really grasp the full scope of the crisis 
and of the lives of those most affected by it. In other words, in Graham 
Harman’s terms, the dominant approaches to HIV/AIDS had mostly been 
marked by either an “undermining” or an “overmining” of its existence. As 
Harman explained:"
One option is to claim that objects are unreal because they are derivative 
of something deeper—objects are too superficial to be truth. This is the 
more cutting-edge version of those recent European philosophies that 
have a certain realist flavor. The other and more familiar option, anti-
realist in character, is to say that objects are unreal because they are 
useless fictions compared with what is truly evident in them—whether 
this be qualities, events, actions, effects, or givenness to human access. 
Here objects are declared too falsely deep to be the truth. […] While the 
first approach ‘undermines’ objects by trying to go deeper, we can coin a 
term and say that the second strategy ‘overmines’ objects by calling 
them too deep. "20
 See Treichler, How to Have Theory in an Epidemic, 12–13.19
 Graham Harman, “On The Undermining of Objects: Grant, Bruno, and Radical Philosophy,” in 20
The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and 
Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 24.
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In the particular case of the AIDS crisis in the early ‘90s, the trouble with those 
approaches was that infected people were 1) still suffering and dying regardless 
of how much AIDS was overmined as a product of language and collective 
apparatuses of signification, and 2) they were still being taken to represent a 
taxon of unclean people regardless of how much the condition was undermined 
by scientific empiricism. A decade after the first diagnosis, AIDS was striving, 
ungraspable but always present, unable to be grabbed by microscopes, AZT, or 
by one’s favourite post-structuralist game. "
The question was, then, how to draw a path between scientific naturalism with 
its breaking down of reality into ever small parts, and social relativism with its 
reduction of reality to a made-up product of (human, all too human) formations 
of power and knowledge. In other words, how to open a space for thinking AIDS 
somewhere between its reality as a private chemical battle against a virus and 
its being a public political war against stigma and discrimination. Within that 
context, Jarman’s project emerged, like the artist himself noted above, as a 
pointing-towards, a signalling that one’s campaign must head in the direction of 
some unfathomable destination, half way between the concrete private reality of 
a body living—and struggling, and dying—with AIDS, and the abstract public 
dimension of an epidemic being made sense through popular discourse.  21
While doing that, Blue would also constitute itself as a meditation on the 
impossibility of ever grasping AIDS fully: no matter how close to it one gets, one 
will always remain somewhat blind to it although, at times, it is blindness itself 
that allows for better seeing."
Hence the reason why, according to Lawrence, “Blue is in fact three films rolled 
into one.”  Those three filmic strands which Jarman interwove with one another 22
in order to create Blue are 1) a biographical account of the artist’s own life with 
AIDS, of his AIDS-related blindness caused by an opportunistic cytomegalovirus 
infection, of his first-hand experience of AIDS medical care, and his own 
thoughts on his imminent death; 2) a reflection on the broad difficulties faced by 
someone trying to represent AIDS; and 3) the development of blue, the colour, 
 See Derek Jarman’s quote above, pp. 178–179.21
 Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 249. 22
Lawrence’s claim is also supported by other critics and by Jarman, himself. See, for instance: 
Dillon, Derek Jarman and Lyric Film, 229; Jarman, Modern Nature, 127, 137.
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as a metaphor via the insertion of a character called Blue, a little boy standing 
as a fictional version of Jarman himself. "23
However, despite Lawrence’s very convincing analysis and division of the film’s 
structure, in the context of the argument being unfolded in this chapter, it is 
more useful to divide the film into four, rather than three, different strands. The 
reasons for that have only to do with the fact that this dissertation is being 
guided by a series of concerns that is rather different from the ones that appear 
to ground Lawrence’s analysis. Whereas, in his division of the film in three 
different narrative sections, Lawrence could be said to have restricted himself to 
a literalist reading of the film (as, indeed, those are the three literal narratives 
that make Blue), the division of the film’s structure into four parts proposed in 
this chapter was the result of a reading of the film primarily as a performing 
metaphor, one that is not only aligned with the argument of the previous chapter 
of this dissertation, but that also reflects the important role played by metaphor 
in Jarman’s work. However, before dividing Blue into four parts according to its 
metaphoric strategies, it is worth examining how metaphor is used in the film as 
an alternative to both the undermining and overmining that has become 
characteristic of dominant epistemologies of AIDS.!
"
AIDS as Metaphor!
Metaphor plays a very important role in Blue due to Jarman’s constant use of 
that figure of rhetoric in his attempt to make his audience (and himself) grasp 
the reality of AIDS. Metaphor is, in Blue, first epistemology. There is not one 
single occasion throughout the seventy-six minutes of film in which AIDS is 
addressed or described in a ‘literal’ manner. Instead, rather than trying to 
portray the pandemic with all the certainties of a supposedly ‘realistic’ approach, 
Jarman used a flickering International Klein Blue screen, a haunting soundtrack 
made of commissioned music and ambient sounds, his telling of the adventures 
of the fictional boy named Blue, and his own everyday experiences of medical 
care, hospital waiting rooms, blindness, and the side-effects of medication, as 
strategies to convey something about AIDS and his own dying of it that would 
 See Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 23
249.
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transcend both medical knowledge and mass-circulated views on the epidemic. 
As Roger Hallas noted, not only was metaphor the main actor in Jarman’s film 
rhetoric, but it was also an epistemological tool found in many works by other 
artists dealing with the reality of AIDS and the problem of its representation. In 
Hallas words:"
As much as Blue permits me access to the subjective space of the 
witness, the acoustic and optical qualities produced by the film’s 
screening in physical space prevent me from either pinning down the 
other with my eyes and my ears or forgetting my own embodiment.  Such 
witnessing dynamics reveal a resonance between Jarman’s film and 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s AIDS-themed installation art, which foregrounds 
corporeality just as it displaces the visual figuration of the body onto 
metaphor and trace. "24
Such a need for the use of metaphoric strategies in so-called ‘AIDS art’ had 
came as a result of the realisation, on the part of the artists involved, that the full 
dimensions of AIDS would always remain too big and ineffable, too strange 
even for the person living with it, to allow any attempts at being portrayed in a 
realistic aesthetics. No portrait of a dying man would ever be able to convey the 
disease hosted within him nor the full dimensions of a pandemic spreading 
across the globe from San Francisco to London, Paris to Johannesburg; from 
the dropping CD4 counts of those infected to the shock tactics of tabloid 
newspapers and the growing myths surrounding both infection and cure; from 
the lack of proper political response to the denialism found in the most obscene 
instances of the surrounding rhetoric. AIDS was, in the early 1990s, a reality 
that was only ever encountered in character, through one of its symptoms, one 
of its personae, be it the Kaposi’s Sarcoma appearing on someone’s skin or the 
acts of civil disobedience staged regularly by activist groups like ACT UP. Even 
its medical designation ultimately denounces its ungraspability: AIDS can only 
be recognised tangentially through forensic operations, through reading a series 
of clues. AIDS is a syndrome, a series of symptoms that, only because they 
happen concurrently, point to the presence of a specific reality lying underneath. 
And so, like the territory that cannot be replaced by its map, so the full reality of 
 Halas, Reframing Bodies, 230 (emphasis added).24
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AIDS will always remain inaccessible even to someone who has, willing or 
unwillingly, encountered one of its many manifestations: from mappings of the 
HIV genome to the pneumocystis pneumonia that fills one’s lungs; from public 
displays of the AIDS Memorial Quilt to the angst caused by the sight of Tom 
Hanks’ character in Philadelphia listening to Maria Callas. That, too, is a view 
that Jarman appeared to share:"
No ninety minutes could deal with the eight years HIV takes to get its 
host. Hollywood can only sentimentalise it, it would all take place in some 
well-heeled west-coast beach hut, the reality would drive the audience 
out of the cinema and no one viewpoint could mirror the 10,000 lives lost 
in San Francisco to date, so we are left with documentaries and diaries 
like mine and even they cannot tell you of the constant, all-consuming 
nagging, of the aches and pains. How many times I’ve stopped to touch 
my inflamed face even while writing this page, there’s nothing grand 
about it, no opera here, just the daily grind in a minor key. But in spite of 
that we would wish our lives to be recorded in an oratorio by a 
Beethoven or Mozart not in the auction sale of Keith Haring tea towels.  "25
Jarman’s awareness of the difficulty or even impossibility of grasping and 
portraying AIDS brings to mind what object-oriented philosophers such as 
Graham Harman or Ian Bogost have written about the nature of relations 
between what they call “objects.” As it was already seen in Chapter Two, 
according to Object-Oriented Ontology, “objects” can only relate to one another 
through a sensual version of themselves acting as a vicar. That thesis, central 
for Object-Oriented Ontology, has served as one of the crucial foundations for 
the development of the expanded notion of performance undertaken above. Still 
according to object-oriented ontologists, because “objects” withdraw from direct 
relations, full access to their being, or, in the terms of this dissertation, to the 
performer behind the performance, remains an impossible task, giving “objects” 
no other option than to appear to each other as what Timothy Morton called a 
“strange stranger:”"
 Derek Jarman quoted in Peake, Derek Jarman, 514–515. That passage can also be found, 25
albeit in an abridged version, in Derek Jarman, Smiling in Slow Motion, ed. Keith Collins 
(London: Vintage, 2001), 290.
 185
The strange stranger […] is something or someone whose existence we 
cannot anticipate. Even when strange strangers showed up, even if they 
lived with us for a thousand years, we might never know them fully—and 
we would never know whether we had exhausted our getting-to-know 
process. We wouldn’t know what we did not know about them—these 
aspects would be unknown unknowns […]. They might be living with us 
right now. They might, indeed, be us. That is what is so strange about 
them. We can never tell. "26
AIDS is one of those strangers. It is even, perhaps, and in a rather strange way, 
the strangest of strangers because it is a stranger that lives within: so close to 
the point of being able to steal one’s life, but yet so distant that it won’t ever 
allow a “pleased to meet you” followed by a cordial shake of hands and a nice 
cup of tea. If, indeed, AIDS is the strangest of strangers, what tools does the 
artist or thinker have at his or her disposal to tackle such body? How is it 
possible to simultaneously avoid both the failure of documentary photography 
and the sentimentality of Tom Hanks’ character dying to Giordano’s “La Mamma 
Morta”? How can one escape the “mumbo-jumbo” aesthetics of the AIDS 
Memorial Quilt whilst being able to highlight, in an ecological manner, the 
strangeness of AIDS as well as the ways in which, despite the theatrical 
distance at which it is encountered, it is able to enmesh itself in bodies, 
biological, social, and political? The answer, for Derek Jarman, like for the 
object-oriented ontologists after him, came in the form of metaphor. "27
By using metaphor as the principal device of his film rhetoric, Derek Jarman  
aimed to highlight the unfathomable reality of AIDS beyond the contingency of 
its personae. By refusing to take on a ‘realist’ aesthetics, Jarman tackled AIDS 
not in the style of the mass-mediated ‘docummentary’ portrayals of dying young 
men—always deemed to fail in their attempt to frame reality—but, instead, in a 
way that constituted itself as a kind of metareality, i.e. as a reflection on the 
performative nature of all encounters with AIDS and on the impossibility of ever 
making AIDS fully visible beyond the contingency of its medical, social, or 
 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 42.26
 See p. 170 above, for Graham Harman’s association of metaphor with what he termed 27
“allure.”
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political symptoms. In short, in having metaphor as his weapon of choice, 
Jarman was able to present AIDS as a stranger."
"
Blindness as Metaphor!
According to the above, and in order to maximise its evocative potential, 
Jarman used metaphor in various different occasions and at various different 
levels throughout Blue. In its soundtrack, for instance, there is a constant 
vertigo-inducing shift between private and public realms, with sounds of hospital 
equipment immediately following those of buzzing public spaces such as cafés 
and busy roads. Unsurprisingly, Jarman himself claimed, in the statement 
already quoted above, that his aim was to produce some kind of generative 
contrast or friction between private and public worlds, between interior and 
exterior realities.  As Steven Dillon saw it, in Blue “sound does not support a 28
three-dimensional world, but rather appears as supporting or contrasting 
annotation, and so allows fluid and instantaneous movement between radically 
disconnected points.”  "29
However, that movement of friction between disconnected realities is nowhere 
more evident than in the actual text of the film, where there are plenty of literary 
metaphors right from the beginning:"
The doctor in St. Bartholomew’s Hospital thought he could detect lesions 
in my retina—the pupils dilated with belladonna—the torch shone into 
them with a terrible blinding light."
Look left"
Look down"
Look up"
Look right"
"
Blue flashes in my eyes."
"
Blue Bottle buzzing"
 See above, pp. 178–179.28
 Dillon, Derek Jarman and Lyric Film, 236.29
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Lazy days"
The sky blue butterfly"
Sways on the cornflower"
Lost in the warmth"
Of the blue heat haze"
Singing the blues"
Quiet and slowly"
Blue of my heart"
Blue of my dreams"
Slow blue love"
Of delphinium days "30
With such a constant, almost obsessive friction between separate realities—
Jarman’s private experience of having his pupils dilated with belladonna versus 
the sky-blue butterflies in an unidentified outside swaying on the cornflower and 
quietly singing the blues on the blue heat haze—the artist worked metaphor to 
the extreme. As it was seen in the previous chapter and expanding Harman’s 
thesis, metaphor allows bodies to detach themselves from their contingent 
personae. In doing so, it is able to, albeit tangentially, reveal that there is an 
essential and yet withdrawn core in all bodies that survives their being stripped 
of their masks.  Therefore, in occasions of metaphor, readers or audiences are 31
made aware of the strange presence of bodies not through delusions of 
immediate contact but through the stressing of the indexicality of all masks, of 
all performed personae. Therefore, in the passage of Blue just quoted what the 
audience is left with is an awareness of the incommensurability of Jarman’s 
developing blindness thanks to the collision of the the blue light flashing in his 
CMV-ridden eyes and the sky-blue butterfly that sings the blues on a warm lazy 
day somewhere outside."
"
"
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 4.30
 See above, pp. 123, 170. For further details of Harman’s argument on metaphor and “allure,” 31
see Harman, “Physical Nature and the Paradox of Qualities,” 137–138; and Harman, L’Objet 
Quadruple, 117–118.
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Blue’s Strange Encounters!
Following on from that argument, it is possible to argue that Blue is, first and 
foremost, a film about witnessing or, in other words, a film about the ways in 
which all bodies encounter one another. By reflecting on his condition of witness 
to the slow demise of his own body and to the virus shutting down his immune 
system, while simultaneously trying to come to terms with the increasing CMV-
induced blindness that was affecting his ability to witness anything, Jarman 
created a film that goes well beyond literalist readings of its structure such as 
the one proposed by Tim Lawrence.  In its attempt to highlight the strangeness 32
of AIDS, Blue, itself, became an über-metaphor able to point to the theatrical 
conditions under which bodies, human and nonhuman,encounter one another. 
As a result, Blue ought to be divided into four different sections, one for each of 
the four main strange encounters explored within the film. Those are: the 
encounter between Derek Jarman and 1) International Klein Blue; 2) the 
fictional boy named Blue; 3) AIDS; and, finally, 4) the encounter between the 
film’s audience and AIDS-cum-Blue."
"
Jarman versus International Klein Blue"
Derek Jarman’s fascination with ultramarine blue was the result of the influence 
Yves Klein had had on the British artist. According to Tony Peake, the first 
sketches of Blue can be traced back as far as 1986, when Jarman wrote down 
the first ideas for the film, then named Bliss, on the pages of one of his 
journals.  However, it was not until the following year that a clear reference to 33
Yves Klein appeared in his journals in reference to the film, by then renamed 
International Blue:"
[A] fictional film exploring the world of the painter Yves Klein, inventor of 
the void, International Blue, the symphony monotone. A film without 
compunction or narrative existing only for an idea. In the cacophony of 
voices Yves found the silence of the immaterial, expressed in a series of 
 On Tim Lawrence’s division of the film into three literal parts, see above, pp. 181–182.32
 Peake, Derek Jarman, 362.33
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symbolic gestures performed in six short working years before his early 
death at 32. "34
Yves Klein’s famous ultramarine monochromes were created by Klein as a way 
of liberating colour from the “prison” of line, contour, and form, and to present it 
as a vehicle of contemplation of what he called “the Immaterial.”  However, by 35
showing his monochromes on stanchions placed approximately 20 cm away 
from the walls, and by extending the colour from the front of the canvas all the 
way around the edges of the panels, Klein managed not only to create an 
experience of colour as a kind of immaterial vibration but also to present that 
immateriality in tension with the materiality of the pigment.  Nevertheless, 36
according to Kaira Cabañas, Klein did end up “[privileging] color’s ‘immaterial’ 
status and effects as a way to work against an empiricism that believes too 
much in the objectivity of visual perception.” "37
Established readings of Klein such as the one above have led most theorists to 
understand Jarman’s choice of ultramarine screen as a rejection or negation of 
representation, a reading that is somehow supported by both Klein’s and 
Jarman’s idea that blue was the most efficient colour in providing an experience 
of void and nothingness, possibly due to its association with the perceived 
infinity of the sky.  As Tim Lawrence wrote, “[inspired] by Klein, Blue is a refusal 38
of representation. Unwilling to reduce people with AIDS to a fixed category, the 
 Ibid., 398.34
 See Yves Klein, “The Evolution of Art Towards the Immaterial,” in Art in Theory 1900–2000: 35
An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Malden, Oxford, and 
Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2003): 818–820.
 See Kaira Cabañas, “Yves Klein’s Performative Realism,” Grey Room 31 (2008): 9–10.36
 Ibid., 12.37
 As Klein wrote:"38
“In the realm of the blue air more than anywhere else one feels that the world is accessible to 
the most unlimited reverie. It is then that a reverie assumes true depth. The blue sky yawns 
beneath the dreams, the dream escapes from the two-dimensional image; soon in a paradoxical 
way the airborne dream exists only in depth, while the two other dimensions, in which 
picturesque and painted reverie are entertained, lose all visionary interest. The world is thus on 
the far side of an unsilvered mirror, there is an imaginary beyond, a beyond pure and 
insubstantial, and that is the dwelling place of [Gaston] Bachelard’s beautiful phrase: ‘First there 
is nothing, next there is a depth of nothingness, then a profundity of blue.’” Klein, “The Evolution 
of Art Towards the Immaterial,” 819."
For the way Jarman read Klein’s blue and his own, see Jarman, Modern Nature, 82; also, 
Wollen, Blue, 125.
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monochrome screen dramatically reveals the artificiality of art.”  Or, as one 39
hears in Blue:"
To be an astronaut of the void, leave the comfortable house that "
imprisons you with reassurance. Remember,"
To be going and to have are not eternal – fight the fear that engenders"
the beginning, the middle and the end."
"
For Blue there are no boundaries or solutions. "40
However, monochromes should not be understood as a literal rejection of 
representation. As Jim Ellis has shown, neither Klein nor Jarman have taken the 
monochrome literally as a rejection of representation. Rather, they have used it 
as a particular kind of representation, one that abandons certainty to become a 
“throbbing site of possibility.”  In other words, instead of trying to represent 41
AIDS in a realistic manner and being doomed to fail, what Jarman did with his 
choice of an International Klein Blue screen was create a metaphor that evoked 
AIDS while simultaneously stressing its ungraspability. In Blue’s own terms:"
Over the mountains is the shrine to Rita, where all at the end of the line 
call. Rita is the Saint of the Lost Cause. The saint of all who are at their 
wit’s end, who are hedged in and trapped by the facts of the world. 
These facts, detached from cause, trapped the Blue Eyes Boy in a 
system of unreality. Would all these blurred facts that deceive dissolve in 
his last breath? For accustomed to believing in image, an absolute idea 
of value, his world had forgotten the command of essence: Thou Shall 
Not Create Unto Thyself Any Graven Image, although you know the task 
is to fill the empty page. From the bottom of your heart,  pray to be 
released from image."
"
Time is what keeps the light from reaching us."
"
 Lawrence, “AIDS, the Problem of Representation, and Plurality in Derek Jarman’s Blue,” 252.39
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 16–17.40
 See Ellis, Derek Jarman’s Angelic Conversations, 237.41
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The image is a prison of the soul, your heredity, your education, your 
vices and aspirations, your qualities, your psychological world."
"
I have walked behind the sky."
"
For what are you seeking?"
"
The fathomless blue of Bliss. "42
Jarman knew that a direct portrayal of AIDS would be out of reach as is, indeed, 
a direct grasp of any body. By choosing International Klein Blue as a metaphor 
for the blindness involved in all encounters, Jarman created a metareality and 
forced the film’s audience to become aware of the performed nature of all 
perceptions. Furthermore, in Blue, metaphor allowed for the fathomless 
qualities of International Klein Blue and its association with the void to be 
separated from the colour itself and become attached to AIDS, which was then 
revealed as ungraspable stranger. "
"
Jarman versus Blue !
The second encounter explored in Blue is the one between Jarman and the 
fictional boy named Blue:"
Blue fights diseased Yellowbelly whose fetid breath scorches the trees"
yellow with ague. Betrayal is the oxygen of his devilry. He’ll stab you in"
the back. Yellowbelly places a jaundiced kiss in the air, the stink of pubs"
blinds Blue’s eyes. Evil swims in the yellow bile. Yellowbelly’s snake eyes"
poison. He crawls over Eve’s rotting apple wasp-like. Quick as a flash he"
sting Blue in the mouth – “AAAUGH!” – his hellish legion buzz and"
chuckle in the mustard gas. They’ll piss all over you. Sharp nicotine-"
stained fangs bared. Blue transformed into an insectocutor, his Blue"
aura frying the foes. "43
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 15.42
 Ibid., 17.43
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Blue appears in the film as a metaphor for Jarman himself, as his own alter-ego 
or persona. By evoking the Blue Eyed Boy, Jarman tried to evoke that part of 
his body that transcends his own knowledge of his own reality. Blue was the 
artist’s attempt to unveil and make public the theatron separating him from 
himself, and, therefore, the distance at which even the closest of encounters 
take place. That strangest of separations is evident in Jarman’s use of the 
possessive determiner ‘our’ to denote both separation and unity when 
addressing Blue in the final verses of the film’s poem:"
No one will remember our work"
Our life will pass like the traces of a cloud"
And be scattered like "
Mist that is chased by the"
Rays of the sun"
Four our time is the passing of a shadow"
And our lives will run like"
Sparks through the stubble."
"
I place a delphinium, Blue, upon your grave. "44
Therefore, the metaphor of the boy named Blue, was used by Jarman to 
foreground the distance separating him from the reality of his “zero-person,” 
Harman’s chosen term to designate that part of a body that is always removed 
even from its knowledge of itself. In Harman’s words,"
[it] refers to the ‘essence’ or intrinsic nature of an entity apart from any 
access we might have to it. The problem shared by first- and third-person 
descriptions is obvious: namely, both are descriptions. Against any 
ontology in which things are reducible to a listing of attributes, I hold that 
the being of things is never commensurate with descriptions of any 
sort.   "45
Therefore, the usage of first- and third-person descriptions will never deliver the 
full reality of a body even if, in the case of a first-person statement, the removed 
 Ibid., 30.44
 Harman, “Zero-Person and the Psyche,” 253–254.45
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body is also the author of the claims made about itself. Thus, and in line with 
the argument of Chapter Two, zero-persons are unreachable, ungraspable, and 
can only make themselves known through role-playing, like when people speak 
“as a scholar,” “as a man,” “as a woman,” “as a victor,” “as a republican,” “as a 
queer,” “as a Blue Eyed Boy,” in order to be understood. "
The boy named Blue is Jarman’s metaphor for his own withdrawn reality, a 
metaphor that is revelatory of the gap existing between the artist and his 
knowledge of himself. With Blue, Jarman has set himself in action as the blue-
eyed hero of a series of battles against Yellow, Jarman’s metaphor for the 
enemy within, for disease, danger, and death:"
The executioner in Spain was dressed and painted in yellow. / For every 
yellow Primrose that commemorates Disraeli there is a Yellow Star. 
These are the stars extinguished in the gas chamber. (Old as the ghetto.) 
Jews were wearing yellow hats in the Middle Ages. They were 
condemned to yellow like thieves and robbers who were coloured yellow 
and taken to the gallows.  "46
"
Jarman versus AIDS "
There is a third encounter that is played out in Blue, the encounter between 
Jarman’s own body and the virus living within it. That encounter is mostly 
explored through the telling of the various medical procedures Jarman 
underwent in order to slow down the progression of his CMV-induced blindness, 
as well as through the artist’s account of the physical symptoms and side-
effects of medication he experienced. In a truly exceptional passage, Jarman is 
voiced by one of the actors who spends two-and-a-half minutes reading the full 
list of potential side-effects of DHPG, a drug Jarman had been taking 
intravenously twice a day:"
The side effects of DHPG, the drug for which I have to come into "
hospital to be dripped twice a day are: Low white blood cell count, "
increased risk of infection, low platelet count which may increase the "
 Derek Jarman, Chroma: A Book of Color (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 1995), 91.46
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risk of bleeding, low red blood cell count (anaemia), fever, rush, "
abnormal liver function, chills, swelling of the body (oedema),"
infections, malaise, irregular heart beat, high blood pressure"
(hypertension), low blood pressure (hypotension), abnormal thoughts or"
dreams, loss of balance (ataxia), coma, confusion, dizziness, headache,"
nervousness, damage to nerves (paraesthesia), psychosis, sleepiness"
(somnolence), shaking, nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite (anorexia),"
diarrhoea, bleeding from the stomach or intestine (intestinal"
haemorrhage), abdominal pain, increased number of one type of white"
blood cell, low blood sugar, shortness of breath, hair loss (alopecia),"
itching (pruritus), hives, blood in the urine, abnormal kidney functions,"
increased blood urea, redness (inflammation), pain or irritation"
(phlebitis)."
"
Retinal detachments have been observed in patients both before and"
after initiation of therapy. The drug has caused decreased sperm"
production in animals and may cause infertility in humans, and birth"
defects in animals. Although there is no information in human studies, it"
should be considered a potential carcinogen since it causes tumours in"
animals."
"
If you are concerned about any of the above side-effects or if you would"
like any further information, please ask your doctor. "47
Jarman’s thorough listing of all the 48 side-effects resembles what has come to 
be known in Philosophy as ‘Latour litanies,’ lists of apparently unrelated items 
that are frequently used as rhetorical devices in the work of Bruno Latour. Of 
those ‘litanies’ Ian Bogost said they are an example of an “ontography:”"
Let’s adopt ontography as a name for a general inscriptive strategy, one 
that uncovers the repleteness of units and their interobjectivity. From the 
perspective of metaphysics, ontography involves the revelation of object 
relationships without necessarily offering clarification or description of 
any kind. Like a medieval bestiary, ontography can take the form of a 
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 18–19.47
 195
compendium, a record of things juxtaposed to demonstrate their overlap 
and imply interaction through collocation. "48
By having a list of all the side-effects of DHPG read against a soundtrack made 
of hospital and synthesised sounds, Jarman was able to convey the breadth of 
a reality that exceeds the sum of its appearances. With such a gesture, closer in 
effect to a multiplication than to an addition, the artist managed to evoke the 
unfamiliarity of the daily battles taking place inside his tired dying body, the 
foreignness of a reality impossible to be fully portrayed by—say—documentary 
images or ‘objective’ verbal descriptions. Granted, having the side-effects of 
DHPG listed and slowly read did not succeed in what the other approaches to 
representation have failed, namely in providing a clear and unobstructed 
pathway towards the full reality of AIDS. However, as a technique used for 
highlighting the strangeness within the familiar, it did succeed in foregrounding 
the alien reality of AIDS, a reality that refuses to be fully grasped even by the 
host from whom it borrows its life. "
"
Public versus AIDS"
Finally, the fourth encounter that is staged by or within Blue is the encounter 
between its audience and the global AIDS epidemic. Jarman, like it was already 
seen, had often stressed his disappointment with the ways in which AIDS was 
normally portrayed in the media, as well as his desire to present an alternative 
to those highly problematic mass-circulated images of people dying with AIDS. 
As Tom Peake noted in his biography of the artist, “[there] was a great deal in 
society’s reaction to sexuality, and to AIDS, which he [Derek Jarman] 
passionately believed needed addressing and altering.”  In order to do so, 49
Jarman had to make the film’s audience become aware of the active role they 
play in their own encounter with the pandemic; he had to make them aware that 
AIDS is as much about HIV and those infected as it is about people themselves. 
After all, AIDS was not, in the early 1990s, simply a condition that affected 
isolated individuals; it was also a public reality and, as such, every single 
 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 38.48
 Peake, Derek Jarman, 461.
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member of society had a duty of responsibility over the future of the pandemic, 
both medically—by, for instance, voicing the need for more research funding—
and socially—by demanding free access to medication on a global scale, by 
fighting for the end of stigma and discrimination, etc. "
While reminding his audience of their co-implication in AIDS, Jarman also 
needed to make the members of the public aware of their own blindness to the 
full breadth of the pandemic, to its ultimate strangeness, and, as a 
consequence, highlight the contingency of any knowledge they might have had 
of it. In order to do so, Jarman had to trigger in his audience a feeling of what 
Roger Hallas called “corporeal implication.”  That was achieved through the 50
use of the International Klein Blur screen as well as through the voices of three 
different actors and of Jarman himself, who all read what could otherwise be 
read by a single person. Thanks to those devices, Jarman managed to free his 
diegetic voice from any visual or aural referents including himself and, through 
that, allow it to rub against the bodies of his audience and to implicate them as 
witnesses in a strange encounter:"
I fill this room with the echo of many voices"
Who passed time here"
Voices unlocked from the blue of the long dried paint"
The sun comes and floods this empty room"
I call it my room"
My room has welcomed many summers"
Embraced laughter and tears"
Can it fill itself with your laughter"
Each word a sunbeam"
Glancing in the light"
This is the song of My Room"
"
Blue stretches, yawns and is awake. "51
This chapter has shown how Derek Jarman’s Blue ought to be seen as a giant 
metaphor, one in which, through performative sounds, text, and flickering 
 See Hallas, Reframing Bodies, pp. 225–230.50
 Derek Jarman, Blue: Text of a Film, 10.51
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ultramarine screen, the audience is made aware of the strangeness of all 
encounters with the ungraspable body of AIDS. However, through its portrayal 
of Jarman’s encounter with International Klein Blue and with his own withdrawn 
body, through depicting the relation between his body and the virus 
progressively killing it, and through staging society’s implication in the present 
and future of AIDS, Blue went beyond AIDS and became a metaphysical 
meditation on the strangeness of all bodies, human and nonhuman, and on the 
ways in which metaphor is able to highlight the theatron of all encounters. In 
short, Blue became metareality. "
In the film, the colour blue operated as a metaphor for blindness, the kind of 
blindness that not only makes it impossible for a body to ever fully grasp 
another, but also, paradoxically, the kind of blindness that constitutes an 
opening-up of a new kind of expanded vision, of new modes of encountering—
of new epistemologies—throbbing with possibility after having embraced noise 
and contingency and freed themselves from expectations of mastery and 
absolute clarity. Through its use of text, sound and flickering ultramarine screen, 
the real for which the film stood was evoked in its interior transcendence as a 
whisper heard from the depths of the real, as a strange voice that is present and 
yet impossible to be pinned down, anchored, or located. In short, and in line 
with Derek Jarman’s intentions, Blue as the blindness that sees. 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—FIVE—!
Blind Dates: The Ecopolitics of Facing Strangers!
"
"
"
"
"
The face is present in its refusal to be contained.!
—Emmanuel Lévinas "1"
""
"
Urgencies!
In the previous chapters of this dissertation, a general theory of performance 
performance was proposed, one in which performance was understood 
primarily as the contingent translation of bodies, human and nonhuman, into 
roles, functions, or personae every time they encounter one another. After that, 
and via a reflection on the evocative power of metaphor, a case has been made 
in support of performative writing as an epistemological tool that, when 
embraced and pushed to its tipping point, can both highlight and interrupt the 
smooth running of the performative apparatus of all encounters, and to bring 
forth bodies as ungraspable strangers. Following on from that, it is now time to 
let the political consequences of both theses unfold in order to reveal how such 
an understanding of performance as the stuff of all encounters can bring about 
a new ecopolitics that is able to respond in a more efficient manner to, amongst 
others, the age of global warming, the rhetorics of ‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalisation,’ 
the exhaustion of food resources, and—yet again—the rise of nationalist and 
fascist political agendas in Europe. In the claustrophobic times of the 
Anthropocene, when the dark clouds above appear to permanently stand for 
imminent annihilation and paradoxically ground the development of increasingly 
myopic political views which, in turn, do nothing more than feeding existential 
 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburg: Duquesne 1
University Press, 1969), 194.
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anxieties and speeding up the arrival of certain doom, what does performance 
stand for? In this moment, right now, when the world seems to be holding itself 
by a very fine thread to ‘T minus 1,’ what kind of change can be brought about 
by an ecological expansion of performance beyond the persistent encounters 
with the human that make up ‘Culture’? Can the general theory of performance 
proposed in this dissertation contribute to the filling of the theoretical potholes 
left open by the narcissistic fascination with the human as the sole architect of 
the world? "
In order to answer these questions, this chapter will depart from one of the first 
and, arguably, most important scholarly works to have tackled the relationship 
between performance and politics, a book that stands out amongst all others 
and that cannot be avoided due to both the timeliness of its argument and the 
way in which it has become deeply inscribed in the theoretical apparatus of 
Performance Studies. That book is, as it was already pointed out in Chapter 
Two, Peggy Phelan’s Unmarked, one of the most cited works whenever 
scholars have tried to relate performance as something of the stage and of the 
gallery with performance as the way in which one appears in, and makes sense 
of, the world. After analysing the main political argument found in Unmarked, 
this chapter will then trouble the kind of queer politics of which Phelan’s work is 
representative. In order to do so, two notions will be measured against one 
another, the notions of ‘policing’ and ‘politics’ as they have appeared in the work 
of Jacques Rancière but also as they echo Michel Foucault’s work on 
governmentality and Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory. Following on from 
that, a new queer politics of performance will come to the fore, one that is no 
longer property of humans but that is shared by bodies as diverse as hammers, 
orchids, wasps, and works of ‘art.’ Through the openness to the strangeness of 
bodies that such a politics entails, a different understanding of community will 
emerge, a community that is no longer based on shared qualities, but is, 
instead, a community of strangers, human and nonhuman, in line with an 
ecological reading of the work of Roberto Esposito and Emmanuel Lévinas."
"
"
"
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Ephemeral Reproductions!
In Unmarked, Peggy Phelan made a case against the politics of representation 
and, in particular, against the role played by economies of representation and 
circulation of representations in the sociocultural actualisation of sexual 
difference. Drawing, as it has already been seen in previous chapters, from 
feminist theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the author eventually concluded 
that the mass reproduction and circulation of representations of femininity not 
only failed to capture the reality of female subjectivities but also, and perhaps 
most importantly, that it led to a shutting down of the space of emancipatory 
politics. According to her argument, the problem with representation, with 
having images standing in for the real, is that, as an attempt to survey that 
which is there, images will always be partially phantasmatic, inauthentic, unable 
to correspond, point by point, to the real they claim to represent. 
Representation, Phelan wrote, “always conveys more than it intends; and it is 
never totalizing.”  Therefore, Unmaked emerged as an attempt to “[examine] 2
the implicit assumptions about the connections between representational 
visibility and political power” and thus expose “the blind spot within [that] 
theoretical frame.”  "3
Even today, twenty years after Unmarked was published for the first time, the 
party political consensus still equates visibility with political power and that is 
nowhere more evident than in LGBT politics. True, visibility politics have allowed 
LGBT citizens not only to find each other, organise themselves, and demand 
State action against discrimination, but also to show themselves as a critical 
mass, one that must be taken into account when trying to recruit voting 
intentions during electoral campaigns. As such, one could be easily led to 
argue, along with many, that representation and visibility are the way forward 
towards emancipation, i.e. the most efficient weapons in the fight for the right to 
be recognised in, and to speak from, one’s difference. "
However, according to Phelan’s argument, that is not the case. Representation, 
through its dialectics of Self and Other, always implies the sacrifice of part of 
 Phelan, Unmarked, 2.2
 Ibid., 1–2.3
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what is represented, something to which Adorno had already drawn attention in 
Negative Dialectics:"
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do 
not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to 
contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. [...] It indicates the untruth of 
identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. "4
In order for a politics of visibility to exist, individuals will necessarily have to let 
go of part of themselves, a part that cannot be included in the representational 
image operating, as it does, through what could be called a politics of the lowest 
common denominator. But furthermore: when entering the realm of visibility 
through being framed by a representation or an identity—when being classified
—minority bodies will always have their image arrested and fixed in society’s 
attempt at re-establishing a norm, at reaching a new homeostasis, a new State, 
a state of the new ‘normal.’  In that economy of representations, like in any 5
other dialectic, what starts by being identified as Other is eventually subsumed 
as the Same for the sake of the survival of the social system and reduction of its 
levels of entropy. Like cold water that is mixed with hot water and becomes 
indifferentiable warm water, in the politics of representation what starts as an 
increasingly visible Other tends to end up being turned into more of the Same. 
Like the child who, during the Lacanian mirror stage, finds its identity through 
discovering its resemblance with the image of the other, the ultimate end in a 
politics of representation and visibility is not the safeguarding of a right to differ 
but, rather, the expansion of an homogenised space of the Same. To go back to 
the case of LGBT politics, what started as “we’re here, we’re queer!” turned into 
“we’re here, and we’re just like everybody else!”"
However, in performance, Phelan found a different kind of politics, one that was 
able to provide an alternative to the subsumption of the Other in the Same that 
marks the politics of images and their reproduction: "
Performance, insofar as it can be defined as representation without 
reproduction, can be seen as a model for another representational 
 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1990), 5.4
 See Phelan, Unmarked, 2.5
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economy, one in which the reproduction of the Other as the Same is not 
assured. "6
For Phelan, and unlike other art forms such as photography, painting, or even 
theatre, performance enables audiences to encounter bodies whilst avoiding 
being caught in economies of reproduction, thanks to its necessarily contingent 
and ephemeral nature:"
Performance is the art form which most fully understands the generative 
possibilities of disappearance. Poised forever at the threshold of the 
present, performance enacts the productive appeal of the 
nonreproductive. "7
However, as it was already seen, and notwithstanding its contingency in time 
and space, performance still only produces images that cannot exhaust the 
reality of the bodies for which they stand. Regardless of how close to the body 
of the performer an audience member might be, regardless of how real the 
performer’s actions on stage might be, regardless of there being a script being 
followed or not, still the audience will never be able to access the full being of 
the performer.  "8
Moreover, and as Philip Auslander demonstrated, performance and 
performance documentation exist in what can be seen as an ecological co-
dependency, i.e. one does not exist without the other. It is documentation, the 
reproduced and reproducible image of a performance, that, by serving as 
 Ibid., 3.6
 Ibid., 28.7
 For the full exposition of this claim, see above, pp. 104–114.8
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evidence that the performance has indeed taken place, performatively and 
retroactively confers the status of performance to the performance itself.  "9
Finally, there is another sense in which the opposition between performance 
and reproducible images cannot be taken all the way through: even if a painting 
can be seen several times or reproduced in a book, magazine, or tablet screen; 
even if a play is always the reenactment of the dramatic text that precedes it; 
even if a photograph owes its existence to the technological developments that 
made possible the mechanical reproduction of images; even if all that is true, 
the precise conditions of an encounter with a painting, a play, or a photograph 
can never be fully reproduced or reenacted—they, too, are contingent. "
As an example, every time one faces a painting, whether in a gallery or in a 
book, an encounter takes place, one that is often the result of an unknown 
number of vectors of causation converging in a particular instance of space-
time: mood and memories intersect wall and catalogue texts, eyes encounter 
someone else’s gaze, the certainties of previous knowledge are challenged by 
different arrangements of light in the room (or the lack thereof). In short, all 
encounters are irreproducible, all encounters have a duration, all encounters 
disappear into memory and memories sometimes come in USB drives. "
Even if the same painting is encountered again and again, in an art book or 
hanging on a different gallery wall; even if the play is seen again on a different 
stage, performed by a different company, directed by a different director, 
illuminated by different lights, played on a different set; or even if the play, the 
stage, the company, the director, the light, and the set are the same and only 
one’s memory of it is new because that show has already been seen before, still 
every new encounter, every new reiteration of the same body, will be a different 
one. For that reason, no body is ever experienced without glitches or contingent 
 See Philip Auslander, “The Performativity of Performance Documentation.” One example of 9
the places in which the dynamic co-dependency of performance and performance 
documentation is most evident in contemporary culture is the social networking site Facebook. 
On Facebook one is able to broadcast to the world that an event has taken place. Be it a 
wedding (one’s own or a friend’s), a night out, a music gig, an unexpected flash mob, a 
demonstration, or a piece of club performance, events are proven to have existed and officially 
ascribed their ephemerality through the medium of status updates, check-ins, and photo 
uploads. It could even be possible to argue, half-jokingly that “if it isn’t on Facebook, it did not 
take place!” Facebook, as the archive of one’s life, is also the place where the events in which 
one has taken part are retroactively re-cognised as ephemeral, transient, contingent, relational
—“if you’ve missed it, here’s the pictures.”
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contaminations—without noise. Or, better still, every encounter with a body, be 
it artistic or not, is always an encounter with either something new or with 
something old that is being performed, translated, brought-forth anew. In other 
words, if, as it has been claimed in Chapter Two, no body can ever fully 
encounter another, and if, therefore, all encounters are encounters with 
contingent personae, then the chances of them being repeated or reproduced 
point by point is, to say the least, extremely low. In conclusion, it is because 
encounters are always mediated by a body-image that stands for a body-in-
itself, that they are always necessarily reenactments and re-presentations, 
albeit always, as Phelan claimed, also ephemeral ones. And neither is painting, 
sculpture, photography or theatre, nor performance art, able to avoid that."
What, then, does that entail for politics? If all encounters are simultaneously 
reproducible and ephemeral; if all body-images are always simultaneously 
copies and originals in the sense that, as copies, they stand for an always 
distant body and, as originals, they are unable to take place in the exact same 
way the next time around; if that is the case, what kind of politics is brought forth 
by the realisation of that fact?"
"
Queer, All Too Human!
As it was seen in Chapter One, the Humanities were, in the late twentieth-
century, dominated by the critical attitude that had, since Kant, been 
progressively enveloping humans in their own self-reflections. From Foucault’s 
work on the power-knowledge dyad to Derrida’s deconstruction of 
phallogocentrism, Continental Philosophy made a name for itself through 
critiquing hegemonic discourses in order to reveal the inescapable political 
situatedness of all knowledge. That is nowhere more evident than in the work of 
Queer Theory, marked as it is by a desire to unveil how supposedly neutral 
discourses on ‘facts’ are, in fact, the product of existing ideologies embedded in 
language itself, and responsible for retroactively constructing that about which 
they speak. As Judith Butler wrote:"
The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as 
prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the 
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very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as 
that which precedes its own action. If the body signified as prior to 
signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or 
representational status of language, which claims that signs follow 
bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary, it 
is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch 
as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to 
find prior to any and all signification. "10
 As a consequence of that awareness of the power that discourse and 
representations have on bodies, Queer Theory has, since the early 1990s, 
concerned itself with deconstructing discourse in order to highlight what in it is 
implied but, nonetheless, left unsaid, i.e. its ideological foundations. As Noreen 
Giffney noted, influenced by Psychoanalysis, Poststructuralism, and Literary 
Theory, "
[queer] theorists seek out the ways in which texts are constructed by 
interrogating and denaturalising the text’s manifold assumptions, and 
exposing the text’s internal contradictions and reliance upon excluded 
properties to evoke a sense of unity. What is not said—slips, silences 
and unfinished thoughts—garner as much interest as that which is 
verbalised; unpicking the latent content becomes as important a task as 
understanding that which is stated directly. "11
However, and as it was highlighted in Chapter One, the problem with many 
works of Queer Theory is, in the context of this dissertation and the ecological 
crisis that triggered it, not only that they tend to place discourse before reality, 
but also that, in doing so, they are not ecological enough. In other words, in 
restricting their thought to the world-making power of (human) language, most 
queer theorists have contributed to the maintenance of the divide between 
nonhuman ‘Nature’ as that which is given and human ‘Culture’ as that which is 
constructed. As Rosi Braidotti has recently claimed:"
 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 6.10
 Noreen Giffney, “Introduction: The ‘q’ Word,” in The Ashgate Companion to Queer Theory, 11
eds. Noreen Giffney and Michael O’Rourke (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 7.
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The distinction [between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’] allows for a sharper focus 
in social analysis and it provides robust foundations to study and critique 
the social mechanisms that support the construction of key identities, 
institutions, and practices. In progressive politics, social constructivist 
methods sustain the efforts to de-naturalize social differences and thus 
show their man-made and historically contingent structure. […] This 
insight into the socially bound and therefore historically variable nature of 
social inequalities paves the road to their resolution by human 
intervention through social policy and activism. "12
The result of such an inability or unwillingness to think beyond the human is 
that, today, dominant paradigms in Queer Theory leave the field unable to 
respond to pressing issues beyond the construction of human identities, issues 
such as global warming or the spread of deadly viral epidemics and remains, 
therefore, more interested in that which is ultimately the same, i.e. the human, 
than in what is ultimately queer, the nonhuman. As a result, in that impasse, 
while Queer Theory remains silent or thinks about how to speak, an ecological 
crisis has started and extinction is the only certain human future. "
Granted, critique is important at a time when discourse still leads to 
segregation, oppression, and even death. But how can it account for the 
increasing entanglement of nonhuman beings and human lives? What happens 
to the subaltern when Twitter allows her to speak? Will deconstruction of 
authority in language ever prevent the glaciers of Greenland from melting? Is it 
enough to think the 2011 London riots from the point of view of class and/or 
race oppression? What about the role apparently played by Blackberry devices 
in the lead up to and during the events? Is a punch enough to break a window 
or does the window also need to be made of glass? If the glass window is 
replaced by a concrete wall, will that punch (or that stone that is thrown) still be 
enough to break it? "
In a complex world of relations, where encounters are performative and 
contingent on the bodies of performers and audiences, agency and causation 
are never a matter of a single human individual deciding how to act and 
therefore being fully accountable for the consequences of his or her act. In a 
 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2013), 2–3.12
 207
world of social media, mobile telecommunications, cyber warfare, and 
impending environmental catastrophe, no event can ever be fully explained by 
simply positing human agents as their direct and sole cause, neither when 
throwing stones nor when carrying explosive vests nor when using language or 
allocating identities. Not only do trees often fall without the intervention of 
lumberjacks but also, being the lumberjack present, he or she cannot normally 
do much without the intervention of an axe or a saw. "
Therefore, Queer Theory, as radical as it might be, still privileges the human as 
the primary site of politics. As Jeffrey Cohen beautifully and concisely put it in 
his book Medieval Identity Machines:"
Queer theory is undoubtedly the most radical challenge yet posed to the 
immutability of sexual identities, but it seems strange that a critical 
movement predicated upon the smashing of boundary should limit itself 
to the small contours of human form, as if the whole of the body could be 
contained within the porous embrace of its skin. "13
In other words, the problem is that, by restricting itself to the realm of the human 
and to the ways human identity is retroactively constructed or enacted through 
discourse, dominant strands of queer thought end up maintaining the 
‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide, whereby ‘Culture’ is that which, as a text, can always 
be deconstructed, and ‘Nature’ that which, although existent like the flesh of 
human bodies, is always either safely out of reach or impossible to be grasped 
outside its relationship with human language. By wanting to denaturalise the 
human and simultaneously neglect the realm of the nonhuman, Queer Theory, 
in its fight against essentialism and human ‘nature,’ has paradoxically 
contributed to the reaffirmation of the divide upon which the human is 
dependent.  "
Given the above, how can queer, understood both as a theory and a politics of 
irreconcilable difference, tackle the nonhuman under the light of the global 
ecological crisis? If, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, queer refers to “the open 
mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and 
excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of [identity] aren’t made (or 
 Jeffrey Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 13
2003), 40. 
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can’t be made) to signify monolithically,” how can it dare to venture beyond 
human identity into the realm of those bodies with which humans share 
responsibility for the world?  In order to think such an expansion of queer into 14
the political existence of both human and nonhuman bodies alike, as well as its 
relation to the ecological theory of performance put forward in this dissertation, 
it is important to, first, understand what politics means. That shall now be done 
by departing from the notions of ‘policing’ and ‘politics’ as they have appeared in 
the work of Jacques Rancière."
"
Policing!
In Disagreement, Rancière proposed an understanding of ‘police’ and ‘policing’ 
that is extremely useful in the context of the task being undertaken here. In 
everyday discourse as it is heard on the streets and broadcast through the ether 
to radios and TV screens, ‘the police’ usually means the law enforcement 
institution and its employees, the officers that are responsible for fighting crime 
and maintaining order in our cities, be it the London Metropolitan Police, the 
New York Police Department, or the Berliner Polizei. Rancière, however, used 
‘the police’ to name a completely different reality. For him, ‘policing’ is closer to 
what happens indoors in Whitehall, Strasbourg, or Washington, D.C. and not so 
much what happens out on the streets often involving truncheons, horses, fire 
or taser guns, helmets, water cannons, and men in uniforms.  ‘Policing,’ for 
Rancière, has to do with creating and administrating a particular social order 
and cannot be reduced to a specific law-enforcement agency of the State 
apparatus. In other words, ’policing’ is closer to the everyday meaning of 
‘politics:’"
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of 
powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems of 
legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution 
and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the police.  "15
 See Eve Sedgwick, Tendencies (London: Routledge, 1994), 7.14
 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of 15
Minnesota Press, 1999), 28.
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In enacting such renaming, Rancière wanted to highlight the fact that “[the] 
petty police is just a particular form of a more general order that arranges that 
tangible reality in which bodies are distributed in community,” i.e. a particular 
form of what Michel Foucault named ‘governmentality.’  Foucault was, as 16
Rancière has acknowledged on several occasions, the only late twentieth-
century philosopher to have significantly influenced him, the notion of ‘police’ 
being one he borrowed from Foucault’s writings on the specific type of 
rationality at work in the exercise of State power.   "17
In “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” his Tanner 
lectures delivered at Stanford University in 1979, Foucault investigated the 
relationship between mechanisms of rationalisation and State power by looking 
at two sets of doctrines: the raison d’état and the police. From the 
Enlightenment onwards, according to Foucault, raison d’état had been a 
principle of rational State government that sought to reinforce and sustain not 
the arbitrary powers of God or of the sovereign but, rather, the strength and 
survival of the State itself.  It was in that context of rationalised State power 18
that ‘the police’ eventually appeared, in works by writers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, as the name for the broad set of practices responsible for 
regulating the lives of citizens and guaranteeing their happiness, therefore 
securing a thriving State. Drawing from Elements of Police by eighteenth-
century German political theorist Johann von Justi, Foucault highlighted the 
dual nature of the early modern notion of ‘police:’"
The police, [von Justi] says, is what enables the state to increase its 
power and exert its strength to the full. On the other hand, the police has 
to keep the citizens happy—happiness being understood as survival, life, 
and improved living. He perfectly defines what I feel to be the aim of the 
modern art of government, or state rationality, namely, to develop those 
 Ibid. 16
 For Rancière’s acknowledgement of Foucault’s influence on his own work, see, for instance, 17
Jacques Rancière, “Against an Ebbing Tide,” in Reading Rancière, eds. Paul Bowman and 
Richard Stamp (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), 246–247; also, Jacques Rancière, 
“Literature, Politics, Aesthetics: Approaches to Democratic Disagreement,” SubStance 29, no. 2 
(2000), 13.
 See Michel Foucault, “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” in 18
Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Volume 3, ed. James D. Faubion (London: 
Penguin Books, 2002), 314–317.
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elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their 
development also fosters the strength of the state.  "19
Thus, in Foucault’s reading of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political 
thought, ‘the police’ is not a mere law-enforcement agency operating within and 
on behalf of the State but, rather, a technology of government that is particular 
to the rational principle upon which modern States were being built: ‘policing’ 
was the name of all mechanisms responsible for guaranteeing the survival of 
the State through the management of the happiness and lives of its population. 
‘The police’ was not understood as an institution in line with contemporary 
understandings of the work of the role played by security forces, but, instead, a 
way of governing through knowing, a Polizeiwissenschaft, “at once an art of 
government and a method for the analysis of a population living on a territory.”  20
In that sense, and as Rancière noted when discussing Foucault’s usage of the 
term: "
It is the weakness and not the strength of this [police] order in certain 
states that inflates the petty police to the point of putting it in charge of 
the whole set of police functions. The evolution of Western societies 
reveals a contrario that the policeman is one element in a social 
mechanism linking medicine, welfare, and culture. "21
Still, unlike Foucault, Rancière did not reduce the police to the State and its 
technologies of government. In his words:"
I do not, however, identify the police with what is termed the ‘state 
apparatus.’ The notion of a state apparatus is in fact bound up with the 
presupposition of an opposition between State and society in which the 
state is portrayed as a machine, a “cold monster” imposing its rigid order 
on the life of society. […] The distribution of places and roles that defines 
a police regime stems as much from the assumed spontaneity of social 
relations as from the rigidity of state functions. The police is, essentially, 
the law, generally implicit, that defines a party’s share or lack of it. […] 
 Ibid., 322.19
 Ibid., 323.20
 Rancière, Disagreenment, 28.21
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The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of 
ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those 
bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order 
of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible 
and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and 
another as noise. "22
Policing, for Rancière, has first and foremost to do with aesthetics, with all the 
processes that make something visible within a system and not merely a way of 
governing aimed at increasing the strength of a particular State apparatus 
through administrating the lives and managing the happiness of its citizens. In 
his view, the police is irreducible to the State. The police is an order of the 
visible, an arrangement of bodies and of the roles they are expected to play, not 
merely another name for the rational government of existing populations by 
State institutions. As Samuel Chambers noted, Rancière’s concept of ‘police’ is 
intimately connected to his broader concept of ‘distribution of the 
sensible’ (‘partage du sensible’). That is because, in French, “partager” means 
both ‘dividing’ (the world) and ‘sharing’ (it). Division of the world in sensible parts 
is what allows for participation for it is only through division that bodies become 
visible as parts of a system and, as such, are given a voice of their own. In 
Chambers’ words, “[le] partage du sensible determines a certain sort of 
intelligibility, of what ‘is’ because it is made legible by the partage.”  Policing, in 23
Rancière, does not so much manage preexisting populations as it creates 
populations as such."
Furthermore, in turning the social into an aggregate of intelligible parts, policing 
excludes the possibility of any supplement to its order, it denies the possibility of 
noise, of parts that are not accounted for. In other words, “[the] police order 
distributes bodies without a remainder and without exclusion (à l’exclusion de 
tout supplément); there is nothing it does not account for, nothing left over or 
external to its process of counting.”  As such, Rancière’s ‘policing’ is a way of 24
counting that is implicit in the social order it actualises whilst exhausting that 
 Ibid., 29 (emphasis added).22
 Samuel Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 70.23
 Ibid., 43.24
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same order through positive discrimination of its constituent bodies. Because 
the bodies that belong to a certain order are only those that are able to be 
counted as part of it, rather than an oppressive force the police is all about 
consensus; it is an order of agreeable bodies both in the sense of bodies that 
are pleasurable and of bodies that say ‘yes’ for only consensus and pleasure 
guarantee the maintenance of an order with negligible disturbances. For that 
same reason, Rancière’s police order is not, therefore, reducible to the State 
apparatus or understood in terms of Foucauldian relations of power. Whilst, in 
Foucault, ‘policing’ was the name given to a variety of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century practices that, through governing the lives of citizens, 
guaranteed the survival of an existing State apparatus, in Rancière ‘the police’ 
does not come after a certain order in order to maintain it. Instead of a form of 
power that enforces an a priori order, ‘the police’ is, in Rancière, an order in 
itself, a configuration of the visible. As Chambers wrote, “[in] Rancière’s 
untimely account, there can be no clear-cut difference between the distribution 
and its enforcement.”   Furthermore, and as it will be seen in more detail 25
below, whilst Foucault’s ‘police,’ as a form of governmentality, had to do with 
power, ‘power’ is a concept that has no place in Rancière’s political thought.   "26
Still, despite their differences, both Rancière’s and Foucault’s usage of the term 
‘police’ have crucial features in common: in both authors, policing has to do with 
an ordering of the social, with distributing bodies in space and time. Policing is, 
in both views, what happens when information is differentiated from noise 
during an encounter between bodies in which a body becomes tangible and 
recognisable as something. Policing is simultaneously a process of selection, of 
recognition, and of administration of bodies qua parts of a social system, an 
ordering that is then responsible for guiding the ways in which bodies will 
encounter one another and read each other in future encounters, all in the 
name of keeping the levels of entropy of the system to a minimum. In short, 
 Ibid., 71.25
 For more on Rancière’s disagreement with Foucault’s work on “power” see below, pp. 215–26
217.
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policing is what guarantees the survival of a certain social state.  In Todd May’s 27
words:"
Rancière’s use of the term police is not exactly the same as Foucault’s. It 
is not concerned solely with practices of governmentality, and it is not 
embedded in a view of politics that was prevalent in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. However, like Foucault’s treatment, Rancière’s use 
of the term keeps alive the idea of the police as involving a social 
ordering that is enforced not merely by military-style interventions—
armed men in uniforms—but more significantly by the idea of a proper 
social order. "28
It is finally possible to draw some analogies between policing and the general 
theory of performance put forward in previous chapters. As it has been argued 
in Chapter Two, performance is the way in which bodies, understood as 
autonomous beings are able to encounter one another by being translated into 
a contingent informational version of themselves, one that is able to be read 
and interpreted in the phenomenal realm so that it eventually stands as a map 
or trace of the body itself. That is true at all levels of the real, whether in a 
body’s relation to its environment—understood as the system or set of bodies 
that surrounds it—or in a body’s relation to its parts—understood as the 
constituent bodies of a given higher-level system. At whichever level of the real, 
bodies are only able to encounter each other’s performances and never other 
bodies in-themselves. As such, the identity of a body, i.e. its performed persona, 
is not the result of adding up all its body-parts but, rather, a phenomenonal 
pattern that emerges out of the performances of its autonomous parts and that 
the body is able to perceive as meaningful. Similarly, the social body is made 
not of individuals but of their recognisable performances, i.e. of the 
communications that are informationally coherent with the state of the social 
system. "
 The notion of ‘state’ here is used as synonym for the order of a given social system, like when 27
referring to a ‘state of equilibrium’ of a thermodynamic system. Previous and future usages of 
‘the State’ (with capital “S”), on the other hand, are meant to designate the set of institutions that 
govern a national territory. 
 Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality (Edinburgh: 28
Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 42.
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Following the above, policing is the recursive process whereby a system of 
bodies is able to produce and maintain itself as an ordered set by filtering and 
administrating the performances of its parts into lasting recognisable 
informational patterns. In other words, policing is what allows a body to emerge 
as a stable and ordered persona through selection and recognition of the 
performances of its body-parts or by differentiating itself from the performances 
that environ it as its surrounding world. Example: whereas the in-itself of an axe 
is always more than the sum of its parts and always more than any role it might 
play in its encounters with its surroundings, its identity as an axe, i.e. the 
informational pattern or meaningful performance through which it is recognised 
as such, is contingent on its ability to keep on on performing axeness at the 
hands of the lumberjack using it to cut a tree. Policing is, therefore, nothing 
other than the expectation and administration of that pattern, an expectation 
and administration that, as Chambers pointed out after reading Rancière, is 
both the pattern itself and one that does not account for the possibility of 
something ever falling outside of it.  Policing is simultaneously performance to 29
a standard and the enforcement of that standard; it is also, because of that, a 
denial of misperformance, a rejection of performances that are other than 
expected. In the police order, visible bodies are bodies that are recognisable 
and countable as personae, bodies whose performances both make up and 
guarantee the thriving of the order for which they are accountable as parts. By 
that same token, and unlike those bodies that perform countable personae, 
those that misperform don’t play a part in that tangible order and, therefore, play 
no role in the performance of that system of which the others count as parts."
"
Politics!
Following on from the above, if ‘the police’ is to be understood as both a 
standard of performance and a body’s management of that standard through 
discrimination of information from noise—both internally by administrating the 
performance of its parts and externally when responding to the performances of 
its environment—then what does politics stand for?"
 See above, p. 211–212.29
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Going back to Rancière, politics is the challenging of the order of a system, that 
which, in the argument of this thesis, goes against a body’s efforts to maintain 
the performance standards of its parts. Politics is “whatever breaks with the 
tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by 
a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration—that of 
the part of those who have no part.”  "30
In order to understand the idiosyncrasies of Rancière’s concept of ‘politics,’ it is 
useful to start again from his notion of ‘the police’ already discussed above and 
from Foucault’s influence on it."
As it has just been seen, ‘the police’ is, in Rancière’s work, both an order of the 
sensible and the process whereby that order is produced and maintained. 
Although it departed from Foucault’s work on seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century governmentality and State rationality, ‘the police,’ in Rancière, went both 
beyond the institutions of the State apparatus and the Foucauldian notion of 
power. For Rancière, ‘the police’ has nothing to do with power; power is a notion 
that only prevents politics from taking place. In his words:"
What makes an action political is not its object or the place where it is 
carried out, but solely its form, the form in which confirmation of equality 
is inscribed in the setting up of a dispute, of a community existing solely 
through being divided. Politics runs up against the police everywhere. 
We need to think of this encounter as a meeting of the heterogeneous. 
To be able to do this we have to let go of certain concepts that assert in 
advance a smooth connection between them. The concept of power is 
the main such concept. "31
Rancière is, here, referring directly to Foucault and to his celebrated claim that 
“[where] there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”  The 32
disagreement between the two French thinkers arises from the fact that, whilst 
for Rancière politics is the radical breaking with the tangible order of the police 
 Rancière, Disagreement, 29–30.30
 Ibid., 32.31
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley 32
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 95.
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and its distribution of the sensible, for Foucault government, as the exercise of 
power, can only take place provided there is also resistance on the part of those 
who are governed. Thus, whilst in Rancière politics meets the police as a 
“meeting of the heterogeneous,” for Foucault one cannot possibly exist without 
the other. Consequently, to the Foucauldian claim that “everything is political” 
Rancière replied  that “[if] everything is political, then nothing is.” "33
Because, in Foucault’s late work, resistance is a necessary component of 
power, one side of the same coin as it were, ‘power’ is a relationship between 
bodies whereby one body is able to act upon the actions of other bodies only on 
the condition that the body upon which power is exercised is able to remain 
free. In other words, bodies can only be governed if they are able to resist and 
only insofar as they are able to do so. For that reason Foucault’s ‘police’ can 
only be thought alongside resistance whereas Rancière’s ‘police order’ 
demands consensus. As Foucault wrote:"
The relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot 
therefore be separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of 
voluntary servitude (how could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart 
of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the 
recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than 
speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an 
“agonism”—of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal 
incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which 
paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.  "34
Against the Foucauldian view of power and freedom as the two inseparable 
sides of the “permanent provocation” responsible for granting everything a 
political nature,  Rancière claimed instead the essence of politics to be an 
irreconcilable dissensus with the police order. If, in Foucault, freedom and 
resistance were necessary conditions for ‘policing’ to take place as a form of 
governmentality—in his words, “[power] is exercised only over free subjects, 
and only insofar as they are free”—for Rancière the police order is always about 
 Rancière, Disagreement, 32.33
 Foucault, “Afterword: The Subject and Power,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 34
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1982), 221–222 (emphasis added).
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consensus for only consensual bodies are able to be counted as parts of that 
order.  For that same reason, in Rancière, ‘politics’ and ‘policing’ are 35
heterogeneous and irreconcilable realities. In his words:"
I […] proposed to call “politics” the mode of acting that perturbs this 
[police] arrangement by instituting within its perceptual frames the 
contradictory theatre of its “appearances.” The essence of politics is then 
dissensus. But dissensus is not the opposition of interests or opinions. It 
is the production, within a determined, sensible world, of a given that is 
heterogeneous to it.    "36
Rancière’s ’politics’ is an agonistic force. As Samuel Chambers pointed out, 
“[politics] is not; politics disrupts.”  As disruptive action, politics is never part of 37
the police order as resistance was inherent to power in Foucault. If ‘the police’ is 
an order that allows no supplement to it, a way of counting that always 
presumes to count everything, ‘politics’ is a “mode of acting” or, in the terms of 
this thesis, a mode of performing that makes supplements possible and that, 
therefore, calls into question the established police order and the performances 
it naturalises. “[Politics] is an act of impurity” and, as such, it is a mode of 
performing whereby bodies perform unexpectedly, play previously unseen 
personae, and thus disrupt the existing distribution of the sensible.   "38
Therefore, if policing has to do with the management of performance according 
to a given standard, politics is what happens when noise emerges from behind 
identifiable informational patterns and bodies suddenly go from recognisable 
personae to foreign actors in a theatre of estrangement. That can happen when 
one or more recognisable body-parts of a system suddenly start misperforming; 
or it can also happen when bodies whose performances had been unaccounted 
for are suddenly able to reveal their presence and demand to be counted. In 
short, to do politics is to trouble the order of what is visible and taken into 
account, and what is, instead, filtered out as not belonging. Politics is a 
 Ibid., 221.35
 Jacques Rancière, The Philosopher and his Poor, ed. Andrew Parker, trans. John Drury, 36
Corinne Oster, and Andrew Parker (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 226.
 Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, 38.37
 Ibid., 40.38
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misperforming that matters; it is the mattering of misperformance. As Joseph 
Tanke wrote in relation to the politics of subjectivation in Rancière:"
Indeed, for Rancière, it is only through the elaboration of bodies and 
voices not identified in the distribution of the sensible that politics takes 
place. For him, the “overblown promises of identity” must be overcome 
through the creation of a class that belongs to no one in particular and 
thus potentially to everyone. Failing this, politics remains trapped in the 
consensual logic of negotiating interests, which is always a zero-sum 
game. Politics relies upon a unique agent, the dēmos. Its creation allows 
for new forms of part-taking to emerge. "39
Example: within a heterosexist social body, individual performances of 
heterosexual personae are selected as meaningful and emerge as the identity 
of the higher-level social body. Nevertheless, non-heterosexual personae still 
abound in those societies, the difference being simply that they are normally 
filtered out, made invisible, and not counted as belonging to the policed order. 
Thus, whereas heterosexual personae operate as cogs of the heterosexist 
machine, homosexual personae have no part in it. What that means is that, due 
to a body’s regulation of its own performance, only some of its parts have their 
performances selected by the whole as functional components of its identity and 
become, therefore, marked as meaningful and visible. Conversely, the parts 
whose performances could endanger the survival of a given order are silenced 
and made invisible or “subaltern,” to use Gayatri Spivak’s term; in other words, 
they are refused membership as personae of the higher-level body. "40
There are, however, some occasions in which certain personae are granted 
membership of a higher-level system whilst still not being recognised in the 
same way as other, more established, elements of that same system. Those are 
the times in which personae become visible as minority groups or, as Spivak 
noted, when “they can speak, [and] they’re within the hegemonic discourse 
 Joseph Tanke, Jacques Rancière: An Introduction—Philosophy, Politics, Aesthetics (New York 39
and London: Continuum, 2011), 67.
 See Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of 40
Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 
308; and Leon de Kock, “Interview With Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation Writers 
Conference in South Africa,” ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature 23, no. 3 
(1992): 45–46.
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[even if] wanting a piece of the pie and not being allowed.”  Examples of 41
minoritarian personae abound in today’s so-called multicultural societies—
religious, sexual, and ethnic minorities, they are all counted as elements of the 
current liberal police order because they contribute to its thriving as a “free,” 
“democratic,” “diverse” and “multicultural” unit. "
However, things have not always been like that and groups that are today 
considered minorities were before invisible, silent, or unaccounted for—
subaltern. An example of this can be found in the historical emergence of the 
LGBT movement. As it was demonstrated by Foucault’s work on the genealogy 
of sexuality, homosexuality did not emerge as category until the end of the 
eighteenth century. It was only then that, through the appearance of what he 
called a “scientia sexualis,” itself developed thanks to the expansion of 
confessional modes of speech from religious to clinical domains, homosexuality 
emerged not only as a set of practices but as the recognisable identity of a 
minority.  Whereas in the Middle Ages “acts ‘contrary to nature’ […] were 42
perceived simply as an extreme form of acts ‘against the law’,” their prohibition 
being “essentially of a juridical nature,” with the development of a scientia 
sexualis, “[the] nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a 
case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and 
a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology.”  As a result of the West’s will to knowledge, the behaviours 43
deemed ‘contra natura’ that had always been practiced without making its 
practitioners appear any different were now being used to ground and sustain a 
new “pragmatics of self” that urged individuals who engaged in them to ‘come 
out’ as a particular kind of subject, to take up a certain kind of persona. As 
Foucault wrote:"
Taking the example of sexual behavior and the history of sexual morality, 
I tried to see how and through what concrete forms of the relation to self 
the individual was called upon to constitute him or herself as the moral 
subject of his or her sexual conduct. In other words, […] this involved 
 Kock, “Interview With Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” 46.41
 See Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 67–68.42
 Ibid., 38; 43.43
 220
bringing about a shift from the question of the subject to the analysis of 
forms of subjectivation, and to the analysis of these forms of 
subjectivation through the techniques/technologies of the relation to self, 
or, if you like, through what could be called pragmatics of self.  "44
Thus, in line with what was already discussed above when addressing the 
relational nature of his concept of power, the pragmatics of self that, according 
to Foucault, triggered the emergence of the homosexual were not simply a set 
of discourses and disciplinary tactics imposed upon individuals from the outside 
but it also involved a certain degree of freedom and agency on the part of the 
individual who was “called upon” to constitute him or herself as a certain type of 
subject rather than being forced to do so. The expression “called upon” in the 
above quote is of great importance because it highlights how Foucault’s 
pragmatics of self depends as much on a constitutive a priori discursive milieu 
as it does on an individual’s freedom to constitute him or herself as a subject; 
how it simultaneously involves subjugation and autonomy.  Therefore, 45
because, for Foucault, being a subject meant both to be subjected to power and 
to exercise power, rather than leading to a straightforward subjection of 
homosexuals, what the birth of the scientia sexualis also did was trigger the 
birth of the gay liberation movement. As he pointed out:"
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century 
psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses 
on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, 
and “psychic hermaphrodism” made possible a strong advance of social 
controls into this area of “perversity;” but it also made possible the 
formation of a “reverse” discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its 
 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 44
1982–1983, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 5, (emphasis added).
 It should be noted that this view of subjectivation was only put forward by Foucault towards 45
the end of his career, for initially subjectivation was, for him, only a matter of external institutions 
(schools, prisons, hospitals, the military) and their ability to discipline individuals. As Joseph 
Tanke noted, “[the] subject, for the early Foucault, was the result of any numbers of discourses 
and disciplines imposed upon the individual. In his later genealogies of the subject, the picture 
is more complex, with subjectivation understood as the result of the techniques by which human 
beings are constituted and constitute themselves as subjects.” Joseph Tanke, Jacques 
Rancière: An Introduction, 66. See also Samuel Chambers discussion of Foucault’s work on 
subjectivation in Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, 98–101.
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own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or “naturality” be 
acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories 
by which it was medically disqualified. "46
In Rancière’s terms, however, the agency and visibility of homosexuals could 
never be explained by the same logics that led to their subjugation. As it was 
seen above when discussing the differences between Foucault’s and 
Rancière’s notions of politics, for Rancière the becoming-visible of a particular 
set of bodies has nothing to do with the police order from which they had been 
excluded. The police is always an order and politics is always its disruption. The 
police is a way of counting that allows no supplement; politics is what creates 
the possibility of such supplement.  Therefore, if politics is the counting of the 47
previously unaccounted-for, the appearance of the homosexual subject cannot 
be explained by the order it disrupted. Furthermore, whereas, in Foucault, the 
appearance of homosexuality as diagnosis made possible, a posteriori, the 
political struggles of the gay liberation movement, in Rancière that struggle 
could never be addressed as a mere side-effect or consequence of the 
appearance of the homosexual. Instead, the appearance of the homosexual 
was, itself, already a moment of disruption of the visible and, therefore, an 
instance of politics. As Rancière wrote in relation to class struggle: "
The struggle between the rich and the poor is not social reality, which 
politics then has to deal with. It is the actual institution of politics itself. 
There is politics when there is a part of those who have no part, a part or 
party of the poor. Politics does not happen just because the poor oppose 
the rich. It is the other way around: politics (that is, the interruption of the 
simple effects of domination by the rich) causes the poor to exist as an 
entity, […] Politics exists when the natural order of domination is 
interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part. "48
Thus, in line with the theatrics of parts and wholes that is being discussed in this 
chapter, the birth of the homosexual can be described as the moment in history 
when a number of bodies whose misperformances had previously been 
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 101.46
 See above, p. 211–212.47
 Rancière, Disagreement, 11.48
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unaccounted for suddenly became visible, therefore disturbing the existing 
police order and its prescriptive allocation of roles to bodies. In other words, due 
to their persisting failure to perform in a way that would contribute positively to 
the existing distribution of the sensible, those body-parts became increasingly 
visible, a becoming-visible that was, for that same reason, already a moment of 
disruption of the existing heterosexual order. Therefore, the scientia sexualis 
that Foucault saw as the cause of the birth of the homosexual was, in fact, with 
its practices of diagnosis and treatment, not the cause but already a reaction, 
i.e. the response of the disrupted police to the political moment whereby a 
supplement to its mode of counting became apparent. "
As a result of such a disruption, the levels of social entropy increased due to the 
amount of noise that started emerging from beneath meaningful patterns of 
performance. With such an increase in the visibility of ‘broken’ parts that, like 
splinter cancerous cells, started appearing at all levels of the social, from 
legislative chambers to broadcasting corporations, the previously favoured 
order of the sensible was no longer sustainable. A change in the system had to 
take place if it was to survive the homosexual disruption and reach another, 
albeit different and hopefully stable order."
It is at that tipping point that one can locate the shift towards normalisation that 
dominated the LGBT agendas in recent decades, a shift that marked the 
movement of queer identities from silence to visibility and then, finally, to fully 
recognised membership of the new liberal social order. In short, a move away 
from the “we’re here, we’re queer” slogans to “we’re here, and we’re just like 
you.” In what Lisa Duggan identified as a politics of homonormativity—although, 
in the context of the present argument, it should be seen as policing rather than 
politics—the recognition of LGBT individuals as full citizens of the state"
[…did] not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and 
institutions, but [upheld] and [sustained] them, while promising the 
possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, 
depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.  "49
That was achieved through:"
 Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality?: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on 49
Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003), 50.
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[…a] recoding of key terms in the history of gay politics: ‘equality’ [having 
become] narrow, formal access to a few conservatizing institutions, 
‘freedom’ [having become] impunity for bigotry and vast inequalities in 
commercial life and civil society, the ‘right to privacy’ [having become] 
domestic confinement, and democratic politics [having become] 
something to be escaped. "50
By creating both a homosexual desire for assimilation as well as the conditions 
for it, Western social systems have managed to maintain their cohesion and 
induce an inversion of the escalating levels of entropy that had been caused by 
increasing volume of homosexual noise. That is nowhere more evident than in 
the recent concession of the homosexual right to marry and adopt, a 
concession that ultimately did nothing more than guarantee the survival of the 
fundamental pillars of the police that had been in place for centuries before 
homosexuals first came into visibility, i.e. the pillars of family and marriage. As 
such, rather than causing a fundamental shift in the organisation of Western 
social bodies, contemporary LGBT ‘politics’ have simply allowed for the already 
existing structures of governance to remain in place and flourish, and, as a 
consequence, for the system to thrive. As British Prime-Minister David Cameron 
has famously put it to his party conference in 2011 and in what amounted for a 
rather rare moment of lucidity, “I don’t support gay marriage despite being a 
Conservative. I support gay marriage because I am a Conservative.” "51
What the example of the LGBT movement reveals is how often what starts as 
politics in the sense given to it by Rancière ends up being assimilated into 
policing. In other words, how a disturbance in the ways a body performs itself/
its-self often leads to a reorganisation of that body’s performance aimed at a 
reduction of its levels of internal entropy and, ultimately, at its survival. In short, 
and to use terms familiar to readers of Deleuze and Guattari, how, for every 
 Ibid., 65–66.50
 See Patrick Wintour, “David Cameron calls for Britain ‘to show some fight’,” The Guardian, 51
October 6, 2011.
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deterritorialisation, there has to be a reterritorialisation if a system is to 
survive. "52
Thus, as the diagram below illustrates, when an encounter becomes political, a 
body (ψ) witnesses a shift in the performed persona of another body it 
witnesses (ω). That shift, illustrated by the passage from the green to the blue 
personae of body ω, amounts, literally, to a change of character, a movement 
away from a previously performed persona α and towards a new persona β. In 
its passage from performed persona α to performed persona β, the body ω 
goes from being recognised by ψ to becoming estranged, in what constitutes an 
occasion of politics or, in Rancière’s terms, a disruption in the existing order of 
the sensible (Fig. 25). "
However, because bodies will tend towards survival, policing mechanisms are 
triggered to bring a body-part’s disrupting performance into order. Therefore, in 
the diagram below, policing is what happens when the performed persona of 
body ω goes back from unaccounted-for stranger to countable part, a 
movement that is illustrated by the purple arrow signing a return in the 
performed personae of ω from β to α. What that means is that, in order to 
maintain its order, either a return to a previous state was enforced, or that the 
system managed to incorporate the newly visible persona of body ω into its 
system of counting, thus normalising what had theretofore appeared as 
unaccounted-for and, therefore, strange. "
"
"
"
"
 For more on ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation,’ see Gilles Deleuze and Félix 52
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 326, 374; and Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 9–10. Also, for an analysis of 
the different nuances of each concept as they appear in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, as well as 
an example of how they can be used in a systems-theoretical context, see Mark Bonta and 
John Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2004), 78–79, 136.
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Queering Queer Politics!
What, then, is the role played by queer bodies in the game of pushing and 
pulling between politics and policing that has just been sketched and how can 
the idea of queerness be used to talk about nonhuman encounters as it is used 
to talk about human ones? And, more importantly because this was the 
question with which this chapter began, what does an understanding of 
performance as the translation of bodies into informational versions of 
themselves which are are, in turn, encountered by other bodies entail for a 
queer politics beyond the human? "
When performance was proposed as the mechanism through which encounters 
are able to take place, a particular kind of theatron was sketched, one in which 
audiences never encounter performers directly but only the roles they perform, 
i.e. their contingent masks or personae. Those personae are what allows a 
body to either appear as a coherent, functional, and visible entity or to 
disappear and be filtered out as parasitic noise. As a consequence, identity, or 
how a body is accounted for, was conceived as always contingent on the 
encounters of that body with both its own body-parts and the other bodies that 
environ it as its world. Through processes of distinction and selection of the 
personae of its body-parts, a body is able to perform a sustainable identity, i.e. a 
Fig. 25: Diagram of Politics and Policing.
β
α
Politics
Policing  "
Witnessed Body ω"
(Performed persona β)
Witnessed Body ω"
(Performed persona α)
Witnessing Body ψ"
Key:!
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certain mode of appearing that allows for its continued survival with minimal 
disruptions to its internal, policed order.  "
Once formed and thriving, bodies—human, social, political, technological, 
animal, conceptual, etc.—are able to encounter new bodies and eventually 
become parts of higher-level systems of bodies. That, as it was already 
proposed, is done through performance: in forming relations, in encountering 
one another, bodies perform simplified or less entropic images of themselves, 
images that are contingent to each encounter and whose stability depends on 
the filtering out of noise or incoherent data. However, as it was also seen in 
previous chapters, there are moments in which noise is not fully filtered out, 
allowing for previously recognisable bodies to emerge as strangers from behind 
the contingency of their personae which then becomes apparent. Examples of 
such moments already discussed included human encounters with metaphor 
and aesthetic experience. In those cases, the performed persona of the 
encountered body becomes so noisy and excessive that its ability to have its 
performance recognised and counted as part of an a priori system is 
threatened. In Timothy Morton’s words, the body appears as a “strange 
stranger.”  In occasions such as those, a body goes from being accounted for 53
as functional to being classified as broken through its performing in a way that 
had previously not been counted into the established order. In doing so, that 
body reveals that the persona it had been playing did not exhaust the full 
breadth of its being and that, in turn, opens up a theatron of estrangement 
rather than recognition as its appearance as stranger severs the body from the 
existing order of the sensible and allows it to stress its difference from both its 
performed self and its environment. Like in Brecht, it is estrangement that 
guarantees the becoming-political of the theatrical encounter. "
Walter Benjamin’s analysis of Brecht’s epic theatre is useful here to clarify what 
happens when a body suddenly appears as a stranger that makes that 
encounter an occasion of politics. According to Benjamin, Brecht opposed his 
epic theatre to mainstream naturalistic theatre as it had been thought since 
Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle had seen theatre as a tool in the education of the 
citizen thanks to the latter’s cathartic identification with the tragic hero, Brecht 
 See above, p. 185.53
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created instead a theatre that caused distanced astonishment rather than 
empathy. To quote Benjamin, “instead of identifying itself with the hero, the 
audience is called upon to learn to be astonished at the circumstances within 
which he has his being.”  As a result, epic theatre was not so much about 54
portraying actions as it was about unveiling the conditions under which those 
actions were taking place. Epic theatre, unlike naturalistic theatre, revealed the 
artificiality of that which appeared on stage, uncovered its conditions of 
production and, as such, alienated the audiences from the performance through 
a poetics of interruption—by interrupting the perceived continuity between 
performer and action being performed, by allowing the actor to flicker behind the 
role being played, epic theatre highlighted the abyss between an action and the 
conditions of its production, thus enabling the audience to question the 
givenness of history.  As Benjamin wrote, epic theatre "55
[…] will tend to emphasize not the great decisions which lie along the 
main line of history, but the incommensurable and the singular. ‘It can 
happen this way, but it can also happen quite a different way’—that is the 
fundamental attitude of one who writes for epic theatre. "56
Expanding Benjamin’s analysis to all occasions in which bodies reveal the 
distance between themselves and their performed personae, one can argue 
that, when appearing as estranged parts of a system, bodies are able to 
question the givenness of the order of that system and, through that, reveal its 
contingency and potential for change. In short, by appearing as strangers, 
bodies disturb the existent distribution of the sensible, draw attention to the 
theatrical apparatus of all encounters and, therefore, enact politics in Rancière’s 
terms. "
It is in that context that ‘queer’ can become a qualifier for all strange bodies, 
whether human or nonhuman, and only for as long as they remain strange, 
rather than merely being another designation for non-heterosexual human 
identities. Queer is the strange, noisy reality that exceeds whichever role, 
 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock (London and NEw York: Verso, 54
1998), 18.
 See ibid.55
 Ibid., 7–8.56
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character, or persona bodies happen to perform. Like the actor who acts away 
from his or her character in Brecht’s epic theatre, the appearance of a body as 
queer is a moment when politics is instituted as a disturbance of the order of the 
sensible. Because, given their estrangement to one another, bodies are never 
able to reveal themselves fully and, therefore, have to encounter one another 
through the personae they play, queerness is the revelation of the the theatrical 
abyss that will always separate bodies from one another and from the 
contingency of their performances. "
As such, queer is not an identity. Queer is not to become recognisable as a 
category of bodies defined according to the measuring and management of 
their performances. Nor, consequently, can it be reduced to social movements 
organised according to principles of identity politics. Instead, queer is the distant 
core of all bodies, human and nonhuman, that always exceeds the ways in 
which bodies are encountered both by themselves and by others. Queer is that 
which will always remain strange, unspeakable, and unaccounted for. "
But how is that to be thought once nonhumans come into play? Up until now 
most of the argument concerning estrangement has unfolded from a human 
viewpoint. Therefore, some work still needs to be done in order to take politics 
into the nonhuman. Whereas political thought has, throughout its history, been 
primarily concerned with human politics, the vertigo brought about by the 
current ecological age calls for an opening up of the space of politics onto the 
nonhuman so that a better understanding of both nonhuman-nonhuman and 
nonhuman-human encounters might take place. In the end, the planet itself is a 
system of so-called ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ parts and often ‘natural’ encounters 
like clashes of hot and cold weather fronts trigger rather more ‘cultural’ 
consequences such as changes in urban planning whilst the opposite, as the 
Anthropocene thesis clearly implies, is also true. "
"
Strange, Political Bodies!
In order to clarify what politics might mean beyond the human, three very 
different examples of political encounters will now be analysed. The first is the 
case of a broken tool as described by Heidegger; the second, the wasp-orchid 
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assemblage as it was thought by Deleuze and Guattari; and the third is the case 
of the human encounter with bodies known as ‘art’ and their triggering of 
aesthetic experience.  "
"
Heidegger’s Hammer"
The first example of a body enacting politics, i.e. disturbing the state of the 
system to which it belongs, is the Heideggerian case of the broken tool. 
According to Heidegger, the being of a tool is always grasped through its 
readiness to hand rather than through its actual presence. As the philosopher 
wrote, “[equipment] is essentially ‘something in-order-to…’.”  Therefore, tools 57
“never show themselves […] as they are for themselves.”  Instead, their 58
identity as a body is contingent on the function they are expected to perform. A 
hammer, for instance, is only known through its readiness to hammer, the 
hammering being that which retroactively marks it as the tool it is, as a hammer. 
As a result, Heidegger called the kind of being which tools possess, the way 
they manifest themselves as tools, a “readiness-to-hand.”  "59
However, tools sometimes fail. Sometimes the hammer no longer hammers, the 
axe no longer axes, the computer no longer computes. In those occasions, 
when tools fail or break down, something remarkable happens: the tool 
announces its strangeness beyond its function. By failing to perform as 
expected, tools reveal that their being is not exhausted by their readiness-to-
hand or by whichever role they were expected to perform in the encounter in 
which they have been taking part. As Heidegger wrote:"
When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most 
closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly 
adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be 
damaged, or the material unsuitable. […] When its unusability is thus 
discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness 
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 57
Blackwell Publishers, 1962), 97.
 Ibid., 98.58
 Ibid.59
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presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-
hand. […] Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, 
but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which 
one concerns oneself—that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we 
put it back into repair. "60
When a computer breaks down, when it stops performing as expected, it 
reveals itself as it is outside the contingency of the roles it at any moment 
expected to perform. By breaking down, the computer becomes strange, it 
becomes queer, and humans no longer know what to do with it. In breaking 
down, a tool acts politically, it troubles the structure of the human-tool system in 
which it takes part and forces humans to rethink it. More often than not, 
however, the system can recuperate its order, reorganise or reterritorialise itself 
simply by, as Heidegger suggested, sending the tool to be repaired. At those 
times, mechanics, Apple Store geniuses, plumbers, etc., become law-
enforcement agents, policing apparatuses. However, at other times the tool 
simply refuses to perform again as expected, to be re-educated, policed, or 
domesticated, and becomes clutter for the system that, in the name of hygiene 
and efficiency, often disposes of it—the final solution. "
"
Deleuze and Guattari’s Wasp and Orchid"
The second example of a political encounter is the case of the encounter 
between wasp and orchid as it was told by Deleuze and Guattari. In their 
Introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari explained how 
movements of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are always caught up in 
one another. Using the example of the wasp-orchid system the authors 
explained how, during the process of pollination of the orchid by the wasp, the 
orchid is deterritorialised by playing an image of a wasp in order to attract the 
real wasp, whereas the real wasp, although deterritorialised as part of the 
orchid’s reproductive apparatus, does in turn reterritorialise the orchid by 
transporting its pollen.  Following the understanding of politics as a disturbance 61
 Ibid., 102–103.60
 See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 10.61
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in the distribution of the sensible, it is possible to argue that both wasp and 
orchid, in their respective deterritorialisations, call into question the roles they 
are usually expected to perform. By performing waspness while still remaining 
itself, the orchid challenges the orchidness that was granted to it from the 
outside—say, by an external human observer—and, therefore, it becomes 
broken-orchid. At the same time, through its deterritorialised performance as a 
functional part of the orchid—i.e. of its reproductive system—the wasp reveals 
itself to be more than the waspness it has been performing. "
That, however, is only what happens at one level, at the level of the system 
[(wasp x orchid) x observer]. At the other level, at the level of the (wasp x 
orchid) system per se, no longer anchored on a human viewpoint, the dynamics 
of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, or of non-human politics and 
policing, take a different shape. Because, for the wasp, the orchid begins by 
performing as a fellow wasp willing to procreate, politics only happens when the 
orchid fails to perform the wasp, i.e. when it fails to behave as its reproductive 
partner and is, therefore, deterritorialised as orchid. What that shows is that 
politics can only be conceived in relation to a particular system, because what is 
political in the (wasp x orchid) system, i.e. the failure of the orchid to perform as 
wasp, becomes policing in the context of the wider [(wasp x orchid) x observer] 
system, for it is in its failure to effectively perform wasp at the eyes of a human 
observer that the orchid is able to maintain its state of orchidness. In short, 
every system has its preferred state or territory and any troubling of it can only 
be grasped as such by an observer that is also placed within that same system. 
Therefore, what is seen as a disturbance within a given system can appear as 
that which conversely maintains the order of a higher-level system of which the 
former a sub-set. "
To sum up, what has been argued in relation to both the human-tool system and 
the wasp-orchid encounter is that, in both cases, there were bodies that ceased 
to perform as expected, bodies whose performances became noisy and that, as 
a result, became estranged. In doing so, those nonhuman bodies troubled the 
distribution of the sensible within the systems of relations to which they 
belonged and, therefore, became political. To paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, 
in both examples, and thanks to their estrangement, bodies acquired surplus 
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value and increased their valence—they became queer in their becoming-
other. "62
"
The ‘Work of Art’"
A third example of bodies performing politically can be found in the human 
encounter with the type of objects normally described as ‘art.’ As it has been 
proposed throughout this dissertation, all encounters in the world happen 
through performance. From fire burning cotton to human-computer interfaces or 
human-human social systems, no body is ever able to disclose itself fully to 
another. All encounters, as systems theory shows, can only take place and be 
sustained through processes of distinction, selection, and exclusion of 
information from noise. In order to be accounted for as an element of a wider 
body-system, a body-part has to perform a role that contributes for the 
maintenance of the lower levels of entropy of the system in relation to its 
environment. It is through that economic logic of a system that value emerges 
as the result a hierarchisation of body-images according to their ability to 
maintain the state of that system. However, as it was seen, in occasions of 
estrangement, tools break down, bodies cease to perform as expected, and the 
distribution of the sensible upon which the state of the system had been 
dependent is called into question. Those are the times of politics. But how does 
politics happen in the human encounter with ‘art’?"
At the end of Chapter Two above, estrangement was defined by combining 
together Heidegger’s reflections on the ‘work of art,’ Harman’s concept of 
“allure,” and Brecht’s “Verfremdung.” As the dissertation progressed, the notion 
of estrangement was expanded beyond the realm of art practice and posited as 
a potential political outcome of all kinds of encounters. Now, it is time to go back 
to the ‘work of art’ and to further analyse the conditions under which it can 
become strange and, therefore, perform politically."
In The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière claimed that “[artistic] practices are ‘ways 
of doing and making’ that intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing 
and making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and 
 Ibid.62
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forms of visibility.”  Following on from that claim, it is possible to argue that 63
aesthetics, understood as the specific encounter between a human spectator 
and a ‘work of art,’ is political because the way in which the ‘work of art’ 
performs points towards some withdrawn, inaccessible reality, therefore 
affecting the established distribution of the sensible. As in all other occasions of 
estrangement beyond the human spheres of ‘art’ and ‘Culture,’ that intervention 
is done by having a body perform in such a way that the theatrical conditions of 
the encounter are highlighted and the body is brought forward as a stranger. In 
short, following Rancière, in the aesthetic encounter the ‘work of art’ is 
encountered in the same way that Heidegger encountered its broken hammer: 
with astonishment and surprise."
That, for instance, was what happened, when, in 2001, South African artist 
Steven Cohen performed an intervention in the shanty town of Newtown, 
Johannesburg. For that performance, which the artist called Chandelier: To 
Bring to Light, Cohen arrived in Newtown wearing a chandelier as if it was a 
tutu, tights, and giant high-heels. The bare parts of his body were covered in 
make-up, fake eyelashes had been glued to his eyelids, and a star of David 
made out of crystals had been drawn on his forehead (Fig. 26)."
  "
Fig. 26: Steven Cohen, Chandelier, 
2001. Photo: John Hogg.
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London and New York: 63
Routledge, 2006), 13.
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Faced with the sight of Cohen’s queer body—a mixture of man and woman, 
white Jewishness and ‘chandelierness,’ some men became angry and insulted 
the artist, whilst others seemed to want to have sex, to kill him, or both. The 
women, on the other hand, appeared to have a very different reaction to the 
presence of such strange body, with some referring to the artist as ‘angel’ or 
‘Jesus’ and, along with the only albino man present at the scene, offering 
themselves as human shields to protect the artist from the angry men who, at 
one point, tried to reach him. The performance went on until nightfall, with 
Cohen often falling down on his knees due to tiredness, the weight of the 
chandelier hanging from his shoulders, and the difficulty of trying to walk on 
enormous high-heels amongst all the debris on the ground (Fig. 27)."
  "
The performance was recorded by Cohen’s partner, produced as a DVD, and 
eventually screened during one of the sessions of the Visual Cultures MPhil/
PhD seminars at Goldsmiths in 2010. The response to the video from the PhD 
cohort was generally negative: issues of race kept coming up, as did issues of 
colonialism. In the end, Cohen was a white man arriving at a shanty town of 
Johannesburg populated exclusively by poor black people in order to, according 
to the subtitle of the intervention, bring them light. It seems fair to claim the work 
is problematic due to the race relations, colonialist exploitation, and the white-
man Enlightenment that it seems to reenact or at least depict. However, it is 
also possible to see something else happening there, in Newtown, and also 
Fig. 27: Steven Cohen, Chandelier, 2001. Photo: John Hogg.
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here (or there) in London. True, it can be argued that Cohen arrived in Newtown 
like the white coloniser arrived in Africa, carrying the light of Western ideas, 
religion, and morals. It can also be argued that, by making a commercial DVD 
out of it, the artist ended up furthering his exploitation of the black people of 
Newtown. Nevertheless, the work seems to have a different side to it, one that 
is highlighted by the queerness that Cohen revealed about himself, by the 
difficulty that both the black people of Newtown and the PhD cohort in London 
have had in grasping Cohen’s performance in a clear, unequivocal way. "
Cohen did not just appear in Newtown as a white man, a coloniser. Rather, his 
performance of identity was noisy from the start, a fact that is evidenced by the 
divergent reactions to it found amongst both the people of Newtown and the 
Visual Cultures PhD cohort. Cohen’s performance, aimed simultaneously at the 
people living in the shanty town and at his western audiences, was broken and 
incoherent from the moment he arrived to the moment he left that shanty town. 
By simultaneously performing roles that would usually be seen as 
incommensurable with one another—i.e. masculinity, femininity, thingness, 
European master, Jewish slave, etc.—Cohen was able to push his performance 
to its limit and, in doing so, appear broken, political, like the computer that stops 
computing when overloaded with too much data, with too much noise. The 
result of that is nowhere more evident than in the different reactions the people 
of Newtown had to his presence, not knowing whether to attack him or pray to 
him, whether to desire or kill him. In that way, Chandelier disrupted the order of 
the sensible, understood from the point of view of both Newtown’s social order 
and the Western colonial history. Not only has Cohen pushed his work beyond 
performances of race, gender, and sexuality, and dichotomies of coloniser/
colonised recognisable in South Africa, but he has also appeared in Western 
eyes as a troubling of their own white, male, heterosexual, Christian, and 
imperial history. "
Faced with disruptions of the sensible such as the one enacted by Steven 
Cohen’s work, the systems in which those disruptions take place will only have 
two options: they can either readjust themselves in order to accommodate the 
previously unaccounted for performances, or they can face dissolution. 
However, because normally systems tend towards survival, the most efficient 
solution is a reorganisation of the sensible so that queer performances can 
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become normalised and entropy levels reduced. That, as it was already seen 
above, was what happened with the normalisation of homosexuality. It was also 
what happened with the commodification of radical ideologies in late capitalism, 
illustrated by the mass circulation of Che Guevara t-shirts, the appropriation of 
punk aesthetics by the fashion industry, or the inclusion of anarchist rhetoric in 
the discourse of financial capitalism. And it has also happened at the level of 
gender identity. "
As an example, transgender individuals are often quoted referring to a 
progressive realisation that their bodies were not working in sync with their own 
image of themselves, with their own sense of identity. In those cases, the 
individuals appear broken, their bodies do not perform as expected. A distance 
is encountered between an individual’s body, his own self-identity, and the 
identity ascribed to him or herself by other individuals. A disruption in the order 
of the visible takes place and the body appears alien to itself. If the disruption is 
too strong, the individual will attempt to readjust to his or her new situation by 
renegotiating all the performances of the different parts of his or her body into a 
new stable identity that will be able to guarantee his or her survival, be it ‘male,’ 
‘female,’ or any other established gender category. If that readjustment does not 
take place, more often than not suicide appears as the logical solution—if the 
body cannot perform coherently, it will often lead itself to destruction. For that 
reason, different strategies were put in place to administrate that queer body, 
starting with the confession of a different gender identity and going all the way 
to the modern provision of gender reassignment surgery and hormonal 
treatments. Because bodies tend to pursue lower levels of entropy, most 
instances of queer gender identity end up restructured and reconfigured into 
one of two options available, either male or female. In that sense, gender 
reassignment is also a process of policing, one that tries to administer the 
political disturbance that was a body’s incoherent performance of gender. "
It is that same kind of dialectic of politics and policing that can also be found in 
the eventual normalisation of works of art that had previously been deemed 
valueless or threatening to the state. By including previously ignored or rejected 
pieces in museums and galleries, by managing their appearance through wall 
and catalogue texts, and by turning them into mere commodities traded around 
the world for prohibitive sums of money, modern society has been able to turn 
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bodies of work that could otherwise perform dangerously into tools of 
reaffirmation of the value of its own history and cultural identity. By framing 
strange bodies within the boundaries of institutions that mediate their encounter, 
Western civilisation managed to turn the potentially dangerous into the 
politically neutral and perfectly functional. In short, by creating a canon of its 
own art works, social systems were able to turn estranged bodies into cogs 
operating for the maintenance of the state. "
One of the latest examples of the constant game of pushing and pulling 
between politics and governmentality can be found in the progression of 
performance art from marginal art form to hot topic in mainstream cultural 
circuits. Whereas, only in 1960, Samuel Delany was struggling to make sense 
of Allan Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts at a Manhattan flat, recent 
years have seen, amongst others, the MoMA host the blockbuster show “Marina 
Abramović: The Artist is Present,” the release of its homonymous feature-length 
documentary, the opening of Tate Modern’s Tanks dedicated to time-based art, 
the nomination of Spartacus Chetwynd for the Turner Prize, the award of the 
Golden Lion for Best Artist in the International Exhibition to Tino Sehgal at the 
Biennale di Venezia, the design and successful crowd-funding of the Marina 
Abramović Institute, and the release of Jay Z’s Picasso Baby: A Performance 
Art Film, in which the millionaire rapper is seen rapping and dancing in front of 
the likes of Marina Abramović, Andres Serrano, Alan Cumming, or Roselee 
Goldberg at New York’s Pace Gallery (Fig. 28).   "64
Such an upgrade of the cultural status of performance art appears even more 
dramatic once one considers that, not that long ago, in 1993, Peggy Phelan 
 See “Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present,” MoMA, accessed August 27, 2013, http://64
www.moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/965; “Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present,” Show 
of Force LLC and Mudpuppy Films Inc., accessed August 27, 2013, http://marinafilm.com; 
Charlotte Higgins, “Tate Modern unlocks Tanks—and introduces live art into mainstream,” The 
Guardian, July 17, 2012; “Turner Prize 2012,” Tate, accessed August 27, 2013, http://
www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/exhibition/turner-prize-2012; David Batty, “Tino Sehgal 
wins Golden Lion for best artist at Venice Biennale, The Guardian, accessed August 27, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/jun/01/tino-sehgal-golden-lion-best-artist; 
Roslyn Sulcas, “Marina Abramovic Kickstarter Campain Passes Goal, Arts Beat: The Culture at 
Large (blog), The New York Times, August 26, 2013,  http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/08/26/marina-abramovic-kickstarter-campaign-passes-goal/; Guy Trebay, “Jay-Z is 
Rhyming Picasso and Rothko,” The New York Times, accessed August 27, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/fashion/jay-z-is-rhyming-picasso-and-rothko.html; and “Jay Z 
‘Picasso Baby: A Performance Art Film,’” YouTube video, 10:46, posted by JAY Z’s Life+Times, 
August 2, 2013, http://youtu.be/xMG2oNqBy-Y.
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declared performance “the runt of the litter of contemporary art […clogging] the 
smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of 
capital.”  Jay-Z’s “performance art film” might do many things, but damaging 65
the smooth circulation of capital does not appear to be one of them."
  "
The passage of performance art from underground spaces to the biggest stages 
of contemporary art is widely praised in mainstream media as a coming-of-age 
for the genre.  However, whether it is a coming-of-age or not, the reality is that, 66
like with many other cultural products that have moved from underground to 
mainstream, the incorporation of performance art into the contemporary art 
canon has resulted in a policing of its reception and, therefore, in a loss of its 
politics through the framing of the ways in which it is expected to be 
encountered. By entering the sanitised walls of the world’s biggest art spaces, 
performance art has found itself inside a safe space where, no matter what it 
Fig. 28: RoseLee Goldberg dances with Jay-Z during the filming 
of Picasso Baby: A Performance Art Film, 2013. Photo: 
liachavez on Instagram "
(http://instagram.com/p/bmB6ZiAQDj/).
 Phelan, Unmarked, 148.65
 See, for instance, Matthew Cain, “Making performance art mainstream at the Tate,” Cain on 66
Culture (blog), Channel 4, July 16, 2012, http://blogs.channel4.com/culture/tate-modern-
launches-gallery-performance-art/3043; and, Robin Pogrebin, “Once on Fringe, Performance Art 
is Embraced,” The New York Times, October 28, 2012.
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does, it can do it without causing any disturbance to the world outside. If, added 
to that, one considers the ego-driven project of the Marina Abramović Institute, 
dedicated, amongst other things, to teaching the “Abramović Method,” a series 
of workshops aimed at helping the public “develop skills for observing long 
durational performances,” it becomes clear that, today, there are strong cultural 
forces aiming to turn performance art from a stranger into something much 
more familiar.  As a result of those moves, the actualisation of the political 67
potential of performance art is becoming increasingly rare for, as this chapter 
has argued, the political agency of a body is inversely proportional to the 
familiarity of its roles."
Heretofore, this chapter has claimed that, once bodies become estranged, they 
cause a disturbance in the order of the sensible and, therefore, their 
performance becomes political. In other words, this chapter has shown that 
politics happens every time bodies break down, every time they fail to perform 
coherently or as expected. Because, in doing so, bodies reveal the contingency 
of their performances, entropy levels rise, and the internal order of systems 
emerge as fragile and ephemeral phenomena. Further to that, the chapter has 
also claimed that, for every occasion of politics, there is normally a response in 
the form of policing; for every deterritorialisation, a reterritorialisation; for every 
border crossed, another one that is built not too far away. Moreover, the chapter 
has shown that to be the case with all political encounters whether between 
humans and humans, humans and nonhumans, or nonhumans and 
nonhumans. Now, before this section is drawn to an end, it is time to consider 
what kind of practical consequences will all of that entail for humans, for the 
human understanding of belonging, and for the ways humans choose to act in 
the world. In short, it is time to consider how the argument presented so far can 
trigger the emergence of other, more ecological, experiences of community. "
"
"
"
 “The Abramovic Method,” Marina Abramović Institute, accessed August 25, 2013, http://67
www.marinaabramovicinstitute.org/mission/the-abramovic-method.
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Performance, Politics, and the Community to Come!
For Rancière, the distribution of the sensible is that which “reveals who can 
have a share in what is common to the community.”  Therefore, estrangement, 68
through its reshuffling of the sensible, is able to evoke a new kind of community, 
what Deleuze and Guattari called “a people to come.”  But what kind of people 69
is that “people to come”? What community is the coming community?"
When thinking about performance in its relationship to community, there is one 
author whose work is unavoidable: Victor Turner. In The Ritual Process, Turner 
used the term communitas to identify the feeling of belonging that individuals 
experience during the liminal stage of a ritual. Whereas outside the space-time 
of that stage of a ritual the world is structured and organised, i.e. governed, 
during the liminal phase the pre-ritual boundaries between individuals as well as 
the hierarchies amongst them are blurred, allowing for the group to emerge as 
an unstructured, i.e. undifferentiated, “community, or even communion of equal 
individuals who submit together to the general authority of the ritual elders.”  70
Referring to Arnold van Gennep’s classification of the three phases of rituals of 
passage, Turner pointed out that rituals are characterised by a first stage
—“separation”—in which individuals or groups are detached from the social 
structure, which is then followed by a second state—“margin” or “limen”—in 
which the ritual subject appears as having ambiguous, unclassifiable 
characteristics. Finally, a third stage—”aggregation”—in which the individuals 
are returned back to the social order albeit transformed by the ritual experience 
they have been through.  "71
Turner’s schematisation of ritual processes are close to what has been already 
discussed in this chapter in relation to politics in that rituals of passage are also 
a game of pushing and pulling between politics, understood as a disturbance 
that is performed in the visible order of the system, and policing, taken to mean 
 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 12.68
 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 176.69
 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (New Brunswick and London: 70
AldineTransaction, 1995), 96.
 See ibid., 94–95, 129.71
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the processes through which a disturbed system is able to reorganise itself in 
order to lower its levels of entropy and survive."
Crucially, it is during the second phase of ritual that communitas is felt. Having 
reached an ambiguous or incoherent state during the liminal stage, individuals 
are then, according to Turner, able to "
elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate 
states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here 
nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and 
arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. […] Among 
themselves, neophytes tend to develop an intense comradeship and 
egalitarianism. Secular distinctions of rank and status disappear or are 
homogenized. "72
Liminality and order of a system are, therefore, diametrically opposed. Whereas 
an organised social system is characterised by partiality, heterogeneity and 
structured differentiation of its parts based on systems of nomenclature, sexual 
and gender distinctions, visibility, etc., liminality is instead marked by transition, 
homogeneity, equality, anonymity, communitas, and silence.  "73
However, and still following Turner, liminality is not just a characteristic of rituals 
of passage. All conflicts within social systems are solved through a similar 
dialectic of liminality and order in what Turner called “social drama” due to its 
similarities with theatre: "
[In social dramas, a] person or subgroup breaks a rule, deliberately or by 
inward compulsion, in a public setting. Conflicts between individuals, 
sections, and factions follow the original breach, revealing hidden 
clashes of character, interests, and ambition. These mount toward a 
crisis of the group’s unity and continuity unless rapidly sealed off by 
redressive public action, consensually undertaken by the group’s 
leaders, elders, or guardians. "74
 Ibid., 95 (emphasis added).72
 See ibid., 106.73
 Victor Turner, “Dewey, Dilthey, and Drama: An Essay in the Anthropology of Experience,” in 74
The Anthropology of Experience, eds. Victor Turner and Edward Bruner (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1986), 39.
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Following that logic, both rituals and social dramas are responsible for the 
opening up of a space for communitas where the liminal subjects, i.e. those who 
break out of the order of the system, recognise what they have in common and 
acknowledge each other as comrades, as equals, before being once again 
differentiated, given roles, and brought back into order. "
However, although similar to the dynamics of politics and policing described 
above, there is something in the dialectic of liminality and order identified by 
Turner in rituals of passage and social dramas that does not fit in with the view 
of politics proposed earlier in this chapter. In Turner, as it has just been seen, 
communitas takes place when an individual identifies with another individual. 
What triggers that identification is, as Turner also argued, a human being’s 
recognition of his fellow humans. Communitas has to do with the shared 
“human condition” that is seen uniting all humans regardless of their 
differences.  "75
Because the understanding of politics posited in this chapter is grounded on 
estrangement rather than recognition, Turner’s thesis whereby communitas has 
to do with the identification of that which is common to all is irreconcilable with 
the position advanced heretofore. If politics happens when tools stop 
functioning or orchids become wasps that become orchids, then the idea that 
somehow, in those broken encounters, the participating bodies will be able to 
recognise something of themselves in one another is, to say the least, rather 
improbable. Expecting to directly identify oneself with a hammer that has just 
stopped hammering, or with a computer that has just stopped computing does 
not seem very realistic. If anything, when the computer breaks down while being 
used, the distance between user and machine is not reduced to the point of 
becoming an encounter of equals but, rather, increases exponentially to a stage 
of absolute, irreconcilable difference. Claiming that politics will allow humans to 
form new communities of equals that will include beings such as hammers, 
computers, icebergs, orchids, concepts, double-decker buses, and political 
manifestos, does not seem feasible. Even if all elements being considered were 
human, still that idyllic identification with the other through the recognition of 
something shared would almost certainly not happen. Human societies have 
 See Turner, The Ritual Process, 130.75
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already been through many centuries of trying to unite all humans under the 
banner of a shared ‘Humanity’ and it’s well known where that has led—different 
human communities are still increasingly estranged from one another, 
multiculturalism doesn’t seem to have worked, and contemporary Islamophobia 
doesn’t seem to go away by claiming that, despite everything, muslims are still 
human. Furthermore, the task of building communities based in recognition and 
identification becomes harder under the light of the current ecological crisis and 
the ways in which it troubles what have heretofore been the certainties of the 
human and its epistemological paradigms. If the boundaries between ‘Nature’ 
and ‘Culture’ have been blurred in such a way that humans have been forced to 
accept the contingency of all encounters whilst simultaneously realising the 
depth and complexity of the entanglement of bodies, human and nonhuman, 
then identification and recognition are no longer tenable in the long run. "
There is yet another, ecological problem that emerges out of the practices of 
recognition and identification on which communitas as defined by Turner has 
been grounded. That is the problem of moral considerability or of who or what 
deserves to be on the receiving end of one’s consideration. As Thomas Birch 
noted in his brilliant essay “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration,” 
traditional views on moral considerability usually presuppose the need for a 
criterion according to which some beings are classified as possessing moral 
standing and, therefore, given moral consideration.  When, for instance, 76
P.E.T.A. had an advertising campaign with actress Traci Bingham, naked, 
sporting the names of different beef cuts written on the corresponding parts of 
her body, its defence of vegetarianism was grounded on the equation of animals 
with (female) humans (Fig. 29). If, as the advertisement read, “All Animals Have 
the Same Parts”—if, that is, ‘they’ are just like ‘us’—and if ‘we’ deserve moral 
consideration, then ‘they’ must deserve it to."
What the example of P.E.T.A. illustrates is a general view on moral 
considerability that, according to Birch, presupposes the following:"
(1) that when it comes to moral considerability, there are, and ought to 
be, insiders and outsiders, citizens and non-citizens (for example, slaves, 
 See Thomas Birch, “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration,” Environmental 76
Ethics 15, no. 4 (1993): 315.
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barbarians, and women), “members of the club” of consideranda versus 
the rest; (2) that we can and ought to identify the mark, or marks, of 
membership; (3) that we can identify them in a rational and non-arbitrary 
fashion; and (4) that we ought to institute practices that enforce the 
marks of membership and the integrity of the club, as well, of course, as 
maximizing the good of its members. "77
  "
The problem with that view is that, because it operates by distinguishing 
information from noise, efficient performances from inefficient ones, it ought to 
be seen as an instance of governmentality or policing rather than an occasion 
of ecological politics from which a community of strangers can finally emerge 
and be sustained. Therefore, and as Birch argued:"
[The] institution of any practice of any criterion of moral considerability is 
an act of power over, and ultimately an act of violence toward, those 
others who turn out to fail the test of the criterion and are therefore not 
permitted to enjoy the membership benefits of the club of 
consideranda. "78
Fig. 29: Traci Bingham for P.E.T.A., All Animals Have the Same Parts, 
2002. Print advertisement.
 Ibid.77
 Ibid., 317.78
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 That is not, however, the only problem found in Turner’s notion of communitas 
when analysed from the standpoint of this dissertation’s take on politics. As it 
has hopefully become clear by now, politics is understood throughout this 
chapter as that which happens when bodies break out of character, reveal the 
distance that separates the contingency of their roles from the absolute 
strangeness of their being, and, in doing so, end up troubling the state of the 
system in which they had been included. As a consequence, because the only 
thing bodies will ever be able to grasp unequivocally during an encounter is the 
insurmountable theatron separating them regardless of how entangled they 
might be at any given moment, they won’t ever be able to identify with one 
another or to enter into sustainable relations of kinship. "
As a consequence, a different understanding of communitas is needed if indeed 
the only certain community is a community of strangers. Such new 
understanding must depart from the absolute alterity that is unveiled through 
estrangement rather than from the contingent recognitions and identifications 
that are only conceivable once one ignores the theatrical space of all 
encounters. Communitas needs to emerge from the realisation that all 
performances are contingent, ephemeral, and unable to exhaust the being of 
the bodies they refer to. What is needed is a sense of community that does not 
take identity as an a priori but that knows that what is today recognised might 
tomorrow appear strange. "
A notion of communitas similar to the one being looked for here can be found in 
the work of Roberto Esposito. In his book Communitas: The Origin and Destiny 
of Community, Esposito troubled dominant definitions of community by 
analysing the etymology of ‘communitas.’ For the Italian philosopher, the 
definition of community that dominates contemporary political and philosophical 
debates—the one encountered, for instance, in the work of Victor Turner—is 
highly contradictory: according to it, what is shared by the members of a 
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community is both private property of each individual and also, paradoxically, 
something that belongs to them all.  "79
Against that deeply contradictory definition, Esposito highlighted that, "
[in] all neo-Latin languages […], “common” […] is what is not proper […], 
that begins where what is proper ends: “Quod commune cum alio est 
desinit esse proprium.” It is what belongs to more than one, to many or to 
everyone, and therefore is that which is “public” in opposition to “private” 
or “general” […] in contrast to “individual” […]. "80
The latin maxim quoted by Esposito, “Quod commune cum alio est desinit esse 
proprium” does indeed highlight the paradox at the centre of dominant notions 
of community. Attributed to Roman rhetorician Quintilian, the sentence 
translates into English as “what we share with another ceases to be our own.”  81
The paradox is, thus, evident: community cannot be thought of as the totality of 
those who have something in common—say, a shared humanity—because it 
already implies that, somehow, individuals who share their possessions end up 
losing them. What starts by being private so that it can be shared becomes 
public once shared; therefore, it is no longer owned by any of the individuals 
doing the sharing. Going back to Turner, if individuals were to discover their 
shared humanity through ritual and social drama, then they would have to, 
paradoxically, let go of the humanity they thought to possess in the first place. In 
short, by claiming that “I am just like you,” one is actively disposing of whatever 
it is that makes oneself and the other two modes of the same substance, two 
individuals of the same species."
As a consequence, rather than being gained, in communitas there is always 
something that is given away. Esposito stresses that aspect by once again 
going back to the etymological history of the term when noting that the meaning 
 As he put it:"79
“[the] truth is that these conceptions [of community] are united by the ignored assumption that 
community is a ‘property’ belonging to subjects that join them together […]: an attribute, a 
definition, a predicated that qualifies them as belonging to the same totality […], or as a 
‘substance’ that is produced by their union.” Roberto Esposito, Communitas: The Origin and 
Destiny of Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 2.
 Ibid., 3.80
 Jon Stone, ed. The Routledge Dictionary of Latin Quotations: The Illiterati’s Guide to Latin 81
Maxims, Mottoes, Proverbs, and Sayings (Abingdton and New York: Routledge, 2005), 101.
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of ‘munus,’ from which ‘communitas’ was derived, oscillates between ‘duty’ or 
‘obligation’ (‘onus’ or ‘officium’) and ‘gift’ (‘donum’). Communitas is not about 
possessing something that the other also possesses and, therefore, forming a 
community around that shared possession. Instead, communitas is 
fundamentally about owing something to the other, about an unconditional duty 
of giving. Against Turner, communitas “doesn’t by any means imply the stability 
of a possession and even less the acquisitive dynamic of something earned, but 
loss, subtraction, transfer. It is a ‘pledge’ or a ‘tribute’ that one pays in an 
obligatory form.”  Thus, the ‘common’ in ‘communitas’ is not the property of all 82
by being the property of every single one; it is, rather, the “voiding […] of 
property into its negative.”  As Esposito explained:"83
[In communitas,] subjects do not find a principle of identification nor an 
aseptic enclosure within which they can establish transparent 
communication or even a content to be communicated. They don’t find 
anything else except that void, that distance, that extraneousness that 
constitutes them as being missing from themselves; […] Therefore the 
community cannot be thought of as a body, as a corporation […] in which 
individuals are founded in a larger individual. Neither is community to be 
interpreted as a mutual, intersubjective ‘recognition’ in which individuals 
are reflected in each other so as to confirm their initial identity; […
Communitas] isn’t the subject’s expansion or multiplication but its 
exposure to what interrupts the closing and turns it inside out: a 
dizziness, a syncope, a spasm in the continuity of the subject. "84
Therefore, Communitas is founded on the absolute absence or lack of a 
ground, on the recognition that nothing is ever fully shared. Communitas is 
vertiginous. It can only be said of those who, as absolute strangers, are found 
to always differ from both each other and their own performed images of 
themselves. The being of community, in Esposito’s words, “is the interval of 
difference, the spacing that brings us into relation with others in a common non-
 Esposito, Communitas, 5.82
 Ibid., 7.83
 Ibid. (emphasis added).84
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belonging, in this loss of what is proper that never adds up to a common 
‘good’.” "85
In the communitas that real politics opens up the impossibility of belonging is 
recognised through the unveiling of the absolute strangeness of all bodies, 
human and nonhuman, of their ultimate and non negotiable difference from 
each other and from any of their performed personae. The community that, after 
Rancière and Deleuze and Guattari, is to come through a troubling of the order 
of the sensible, is not a community of shared possessions. Instead, it is a 
community of those that either have nothing in common or that, in having 
something in common, they won’t ever be able to recognise it with absolute 
certainty. By revealing the contingency of all the ways in which bodies 
encounter one another, the contingency of every order of the sensible, of every 
state/State, politics not only questions the givenness of the phenomenal world, 
but it also insists on the other-worldliness of the real. As such, in its revelation of 
the indisputable strangeness of bodies, politics calls for an ethical duty of care, 
albeit one that is not aimed at one’s own siblings but at the truly Other that is to 
be found both around and inside oneself. Because politics reveals the 
ephemeral nature of the performed structures upon which worlds are built, it 
calls for universal consideration for all Others, humans and nonhumans, as 
strangers in their own world; it calls for consideration for all beings due to their 
inability to ever be fully known either by themselves or by one another. By 
revealing that a real body is always in excess of the ways in which it appears in 
the world, such a politics of estrangement turns the impossibility of ever fully 
knowing the other into an opportunity for respecting it, a respect that arises from 
the acknowledgement of that body’s singularity and not of the qualities or 
identity it might appear to share with other bodies or with oneself. In a 
Levinasian sense, it is only the recognition of the absolute strangeness of the 
face—not of the mask, not of the persona—of another body brought forth by 
politics that can, in Lévinas’ words, announce the “ethical inviolability of the 
Other.”  As Lévinas wrote in a way that resonates with the argument presented 86
so far:"
 Ibid., 139.85
 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 195.86
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The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot 
be comprehended, that is, encompassed. […]"
The Other is not other with a relative alterity as are, in a comparison, 
even ultimate species, which mutually exclude one another but still have 
their place within the community of a genus […]. The alterity of the Other 
does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me, for a 
distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that 
community of genus which already nullifies alterity. "87
In that sense, politics is the discovery of the strangeness of the other beyond 
the contingency and ephemerality of its performances. It therefore allows for 
ethics to emerge as a gesture aimed at the whole universe and at all of its parts, 
aimed, that is, at human and nonhuman bodies alike and always in accordance 
with the ultimate foreignness of their being. Only by bringing forth a community 
of irreconcilable strangers will a more ecological future be possible beyond the 
contingencies of recognition and temporary structures of kinship. Only when the 
question of whether or not a body deserves to be considered ethically is fully 
ruled out, will all bodies be able to inhabit a world in which consideration is 
given a priori to all bodies and where the entanglement of humans and 
nonhumans will be allowed to emerge as a reality not to be avoided but, rather, 
to be honoured and taken care of in all its ungraspable but always seductive 
strangeness. In Dipesh Chakrabarty’s words:"
[Climate] change poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, 
pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes our capacity to 
experience the world. It is more like a universal that arises from a shared 
sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global approach to politics without 
 Ibid., 194. It is important to note that, although Lévinas did not think that encounters with 87
nonhuman faces could ever trigger ethical responses, when, for instance, claiming that “[the] 
absolutely foreign alone can instruct us. And it is only man who could be absolutely foreign to 
me […]” (Ibid., 73), nonetheless there is a strong argument that some authors have made in 
support of the adequacy of Levinasian ethics to encounters with nonhumans for, indeed, the 
actual logic of Levinas’ argument concerning the position of the Other does call for its extension 
into the nonhuman as a subject of ethics. For more on that discussion, see Matthew Calarco, 
Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 55–77.
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the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian universal, it cannot 
subsume particularities.  88
 Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History,” 222.88
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—CONCLUSION— !
Performance After the End of the World!
"
"
‘Why are you wearing that stupid bunny suit?’!
‘Why are you wearing that stupid man suit?’!
—Donnie Darko "1"
"
"
"
"
"
"
It’s July 2013 and the news hasn’t been cheerful for a while. Between the most 
recent scandal concerning the leaked existence of illegal global surveillance 
apparatuses whose smoothly-running algorithms put any wannabe-007 to 
shame to the Summer Arctic ice cap that some expect to fully melt for the first 
time already this decade; from the bacteria that have become fast learners and 
now deflect the attacks of the strongest antibiotics to the torrential Summer 
rains that have taken the Vltava and the Danube indoors, the human condition 
in the first decades of the 21st century is anything but human. As a species, as 
one amongst an ever growing number of different taxa of bodies, humans find 
themselves increasingly entangled in and conditioned by realities that for many 
centuries were thought to be contained outside the human sphere, there where 
they could be safely mastered. "2
While scientists discover with surprise the increasingly tight enmeshment of 
realities whose boundaries can no longer be safely told apart, critical paradigms 
of scholarly work that had kept the human at the centre of the world start to 
 Donnie Darko, directed by Richard Kelly, DVD, colour, 113 min (Enfield: Prism Leisure 1
Corporation, 2004).
 For more on those news, see Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, “NSA Prism program 2
taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others,” The Guardian, June 7, 2013; David Kramer, 
“Scientists alarmed by rapidly shrinking Arctic ice cap,” Physics Today 66, no. 2 (2013), 17; Ian 
Sample, Fiona Harvey and Denis Campbell, “UK raises alarm on deadly rise of superbugs,” The 
Guardian, June 12, 2013; and Reuters, “Floods inundating central Europe kill at least seven 
people,” The Guardian, June 4, 2013.
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progressively be questioned: humans themselves are being accepted as 
slippery beings and their knowledge of the world approached as just one 
episode in a huge number of encounters that happen every day between all 
kinds of bodies. Today, one can argue that such a world of cross-taxa 
entanglements and hybridisation has brought about the realisation that, despite 
all that has gone since Kant, humans no longer occupy an exceptional position 
as the rulers of the real.  In an age marked by the realisation that the planet’s 3
ecosystems have reached tipping points which, in turn, have accelerated the 
unfolding of a series of global ecological disasters that humankind won’t be able 
to master let alone reverse, divisions of knowledge into comfortable disciplines
—some preoccupied solely with human ‘Culture,’ others exclusively concerned 
with nonhuman ‘Nature’—are being questioned by the realisation that the 
boundaries that separate those two realms, in being there, have become 
blurred and hard to pin down. "
Nevertheless, despite deeply entangled in one another, bodies can never fully 
grasp, let alone master each other—relations appear today to always be 
contingent and the way in which bodies encounter one another as relata seems 
to always leave parts of those bodies untranslated, i.e. unreadable, whilst also 
always attaching new accidental qualities to them.  If that were not the case, i.e. 4
if bodies could be exhausted by their encounters, nothing of their being would 
survive the removal of the other bodies on whose encounter their existence had 
been predicated. And similarly, if bodies were to give themselves fully to one 
another in every encounter no surprises would ever happen, discoveries would 
not be made, disasters would be averted, and knowledge would have to always 
be absolute and, therefore, also stagnant."
As a consequence, with the rediscovered perversion in the ways bodies get 
down with and affect one another, with the realisation that appearances are 
always co-created, contingent, and never exhaust the being of the bodies for 
which they stand, questions eventually started being raised concerning the 
nature of what had hitherto been seen as the exclusive domain of the human 
 See Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?.3
 This point was introduced above as part of Chapter Two, developed from readings of Graham 4
Harman’s version of Object-Oriented Ontology clearly synthesised in Harman, L’Objet 
Quadruple.
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and of its ‘Culture.’ If, following the postulates of Object-Oriented Ontology, 
there is always an inaccessible real lying behind the contingencies of all 
‘worldings,’ always something about the ‘in-themselves’ that will not be included 
in the ‘in-them-for-us,’ always a filtration of noise preceding the selection of 
patterns that eventually stand in for bodies; if all encounters depend as much 
on who or what is encountered as on who or what encounters, as much on who 
or what is witnessed as on who or what does the witnessing; and if, therefore, 
all relations are phenomenal entanglements, then the work being done today in 
the Humanities could benefit not only from thinking the contingency and opacity 
of its object of study but also from addressing the significant amount of 
nonhuman agency that is often at work in every inch of ‘humanity’ one 
encounters in the world. "
With the discovery of the increasing and unavoidable enmeshment of bodies of 
which the Anthropocene is only the latest symptom, as well as the 
insurmountable distance that prevents all bodies from fully mastering both 
themselves and one another, the world appears to have once again become 
theatrum mundi, a system of bodies that encounter one another through the 
contingency of the personae they play, one in which performance becomes the 
process whereby body-parts are able to relate to one another and form new 
wholes despite being kept at a distance from each other—something like the 
neurones that communicate with one another despite remaining separated by 
the theatrical space of the brain synapses. In this theatron of which theatre and 
performance art are only parts, bodies are reiterated and emerge anew every 
time a performer meets an audience, every time something or someone acts, 
plays, or functions for something or someone else that watches, witnesses, or is 
otherwise involved in an encounter. That was the case in Pina Bausch’s Café 
Müller, where chairs alternated between acting as obstacles to the moving body 
of the dancers and standing in as indexes for everybody who had once sat on 
them and then left.  It happened, too, with Chernobyl, a city that went from 5
playing home to its inhabitants to signifying the darkest side of nuclear power. 
Or with Kira O’Reilly’s Stair Falling, where the stairs that were known for little 
more than their ability to be walked up and down suddenly were seen playing 
the quiet confidante for a body with whom they exchanged their most intimate 
 For a reading of Bausch’s Café Müller, see above, pp. 141–146. 5
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features, step by step and very slowly. Or, as discussed at length above, with 
Blue, where ultramarine blue went from merely performing blueness to 
representing blindness, disease, death, void, or even Derek Jarman, the artist, 
himself.  Or, even still, with Heidegger’s tool in its path from being a hammer 6
that performs hammering to becoming ungraspable in its strange thingness. Or, 
finally, with Deleuze and Guattari’s orchid, sophisticatedly playing wasp without 
ceasing to be orchid, or the wasp that suddenly became part of the orchid’s 
reproductive system while never really having given up the waspness of its 
being. "7
In this theatron to which both recognition and surprise belong, performance was 
opened up as simultaneously technē and poiēsis, enactment and revelation. It 
emerged as repetition and transformation, presence and mediation. 
Performance, it was argued, is both communication and translation, information 
filtered out of noise within and beyond the confines of human cultural production
—performance as the way in which all bodies, human and nonhuman, play 
themselves to one another whilst always holding something back like some 
bearer of divine secrets.  "8
In such an ecological context where the only thing all bodies appear to do is 
perform to one another, what methodologies are available for the scholar 
interested in somehow grasping those encounters? Can Performance Studies, 
a field already infamous for the perversity of its methods and objects of study, 
expand its “broad spectrum” in order to address the encounter between bodies 
beyond the old certainties of ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’? What happens on the 
stages of the world once the human exits the scene? Can performance theory 
help us think that?"
One of the questions that immediately follows the realisation that 1) 
performance is not limited to human cultural production, and 2) what is 
performed does not exhaust the bodies of the performers, is the question of 
how to highlight the theatrical space of all encounters and the inaccessible 
reality of the bodies involved in it. The solution for that problem, it was argued, 
 See above, Chapter Four, pp. 172–197.6
 See above, pp. 229–232.7
 See above, pp. 71–126.8
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could pass through the catalysis of what was called strange encounters. 
Bringing together Heidegger’s thoughts on the origin of the ‘work of art,’ 
Graham Harman’s “allure,” and the “Verfremdungseffekt” Brecht aimed to 
convey with his epic theatre, strange encounters were defined as particular 
instances of performance in which the theatrical distance between a body and 
the role it plays is revealed, making the body appear as a stranger, 
inexhaustible by the contingency of its performances."
Strange encounters are also those same encounters that, as argued in Chapter 
Three, are facilitated by the conscious embrace of the long tradition of 
ekphrastic writing and of its performative nature. By taking up writing as 
performance and deliberately hyperbolising the metaphorical strategies through 
which bodies appear in and as ‘world,’ scholars could be able to highlight the 
performative nature of all encounters and, therefore, to evoke the strange reality 
of the bodies for which their writing stands, very much like the Heideggerian 
hammer that only becomes present once broken, or the computer that only 
announces the hidden core of its being once it crashes in overload. In doing so
—no longer marked by the critical attitude that turned scientific knowledge into a 
function of an all-too-human observer position—scholars could align themselves 
with recent advancements in theoretical physics and philosophy of science 
where bodies have been posited as entities expanded in space-time and only 
partially accessible at any given instant, very much like a frame that is frozen 
and then extracted from a film.  As a consequence, and in the same way that 9
some physicists have rejected the claims that quantum mechanics supports 
social constructivism, arguing instead that quantum is nothing but realism, so 
could the use of performative writing defended in this dissertation no longer 
claim the subjective nature of all knowledge but, instead, become a legitimate 
way to bring-forth the strange reality of bodies beyond the contingency of their 
encounters with one another. "
A particularly successful example of performative writing as a way of 
highlighting the strangeness of bodies can be found in Derek Jarman’s Blue, not 
only because of the sophisticated way in which the artist used performative 
metaphors as tools for knowing more and knowing better, but also because of 
 For the reasons behind this claim see above, pp. 118–119, particularly note 228. 9
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the particularly wide scope and fleeting nature of the reality he tried to tackle, 
HIV/AIDS. As it was argued in Chapter Four, Blue is a film that uses the 
performative power of metaphor to operate as metareality, as a quasi-
philosophical reflection on the nature of the real and of one’s knowledge of it. In 
that way, the film is rather successful in conveying in a really strong manner the 
paradoxes of the real that have been underlined by the argument of this 
dissertation: Firstly, that bodies, whichever their nature, are both enmeshed in 
and distant from one another. In other words, bodies are constantly affecting 
and being affected by one another while remaining ungraspable, strange, 
inexhaustible by each encounter. Secondly, and following from the first paradox, 
that the strangeness of bodies is, in fact, their reality and not a mere 
consequence of a limited and deficient human knowledge, for what deficient 
knowledge brings about is, instead, the false realism that suggests bodies can 
be exhausted by the ways they appear in the world. It is in that way that the 
metaphorical ultramarine blindness of Blue allows for a clearer vision, albeit one 
that is also, because of that, fuzzier—Blue as weird realism.   "10
What one can achieve by claiming that all encounters are performative because 
they enact worlds, and that sometimes performances break down and make 
otherwise familiar bodies become estranged, is a more expanded framework for 
thinking community in an ecological way, beyond the contingencies of 
recognition and identity politics. If performed roles are approached as being 
always ephemeral and unable to exhaust the being of a body; if all bodies, 
human and nonhuman, are addressed as ultimately foreign to one another, then 
lasting community formations need not to depart from a selection of the 
attributes granting bodies the right to belong but can start, instead, from the 
realisation that communitas can come about when bodies welcome one another 
as strangers. If performed appearances are, as it was argued, the result of 
processes of selection, filtration, and governance of bodies, and if bodies can 
 The term ‘weird realism’ is borrowed from Graham Harman. Writing in his book on H.P. 10
Lovecraft, Harman noted the following:"
“The title Weird Realism suggests that our plan is to work through Lovecraft towards a deeper 
conception of realism than is usual. Most philosophical realism is ‘representational’ in character. 
Such theories hold not only that there is a real world outside all human contact with it, but also 
that this reality can be mirrored adequately by the findings of the natural sciences or some other 
method of knowledge. […However, no] reality can be immediately translated into 
representations of any sort. Reality itself is weird because reality itself is incommensurable with 
any attempt to represent or measure it.” Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and 
Philosophy  (Alresford: Zero Books, 2012), 51.
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become political, appear otherwise, and disturb the order of any systems of 
relations in which they take part, then communities could perhaps be built on 
the strangeness of all encounters rather than having their existence dependent 
on the recognition of patterns of class, gender, race, species, or of any other 
taxonomic qualifiers. "
If humans accept that they are members of a universe-wide, borderless, 
community of strangers, then the ethical debates that will follow will have to 
concern themselves with how to best approach one’s neighbours regardless of 
their nature as humans, animals, or ‘things,’ and no longer depend on 
judgements of whether a particular set of neighbours satisfies whichever 
conditions humans have found necessary for something or someone to be 
worthy of consideration. As a consequence, new forms of community where 
strangers are allowed to belong can fulfil the ecological needs from which this 
thesis departed, for they will take as their principles the tight enmeshment of 
human and nonhuman bodies and their ability to affect and be affected by one 
another, whilst never forgetting that all bodies are irreplaceable and 
inexhaustible by any of the roles they perform to one another. "
Through the rediscovery or, at least, re-embrace of the ecosystemic nature of 
the real that the above entails, performance was given a broader than broad 
spectrum beyond the ‘Nature’/‘Culture’ divide. What such a move aimed to 
achieve was the decoupling of performance from ‘Culture,’ allowing for the roles 
played by nonhumans in everyday encounters to become increasingly evident. 
Yet, in doing so, the thesis put forward here did not represent an attack on the 
work that Performance Studies has been doing since its inception as a 
discipline. Instead, its aim was to try to push even further one of the founding 
gestures of the field: the opening of performance theory to events taking place 
outside black boxes and white cubes. Such a gesture, in its willingness to think 
the parallels between what goes on inside a theatre and what takes place in 
wider social settings, can be said to have been the first attempt at 
understanding performance from an ecological viewpoint, a gesture that tried to 
look at the place of performance within the proverbial ‘bigger picture.’ Through 
placing itself in line with that field-defining move and its broadening of the 
spectrum of performance, this thesis aims to contribute to a project that started 
some fifty years ago with Richard Schecher and that was only made more 
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pertinent by the scale of the current ecological crisis and the uncertainties it has 
raised about the future of human and nonhuman collectives—a project that is, 
for all that matters, far from being over. "
In doing so, there is an aspect of performance theory that this thesis has 
attempted to reconfigure, and that is the rejection of theatre that, as it was seen 
in Chapter Two, was central for the initial development of the field. Thus, and 
against the views that have often separated theatre as a place of artifice and 
repetition from performance as something ephemeral because contingent on 
the live encounter of bodies, this thesis has attempted to reunite the two back 
together. The way it has tried to do so was by stressing the theatrical cleavage 
between witnessing and performing bodies that is necessary for performance to 
take place, while simultaneously maintaining the ephemeral and contingent 
nature of all performative encounters in which personae are enacted to stand 
for bodies. "
Through its broadening of performance onto the nonhuman field and stressing 
of the dependence of performance on theatron, this thesis has also opened up 
a wider ecological context that can frame the study of more ‘traditional’ or 
human instances of cultural performance. As it has hopefully been 
demonstrated by the Interlude dedicated to works by Art Orienté Objet and Pina 
Bausch, once artists and audiences become aware of the ways in which all 
bodies depend on performance for encountering one another, then black boxes 
and white cubes can be put in context and be used as wider ecological 
laboratories for the study of the myriad of ways in which strange bodies of all 
kinds encounter one another ‘out there’ in the world. As Che Le Cheval Vive en 
Moi and Café Müller have shown, once performance works are approached as 
ecosystems—as systems of relations between humans and nonhumans—
bodies are able to emerge as deeply enmeshed strangers that oscillate 
between performing their expected roles and revealing their inaccessibility to 
one another."
For that reason, too, performance theory can become a very useful tool for 
making sense of the wider world in the Anthropocene, after the blurring of the 
divide between ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture.’ Because it ought not to be restricted to 
artistic, social, or even corporate spheres, performance can be a crucial 
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concept illuminating both existing and future works concerned with rethinking 
both the place of humans in the broader ecosphere, as well as imagining a 
future in which all bodies are cast equally as agents of the world. "
From philosophy to ecology, from computer science to speculative physics, 
Performance Studies could help clarify the ways in which bodies interact with 
one another at both macro- and micro-levels of the real.  As such, and in line 
with the promise of its broader than broad spectrum argued heretofore, perhaps 
the current ecological crisis does not so much mark the end of the world as it 
does signal the dawn of a new age, an age of performance.  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—FUGUE—!
Speaking in Tongues!
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
The West African priest summoned the sacred. From behind a sculpture carved 
out of wood, the sacred flickered and announced its unfathomable presence. 
The congregation started singing and dancing in awe and reverence while, a 
few miles away on the coast, an army of conquerers disembarked a flotilla of 
ships flagging the colours of ‘civilisation.’ Scared of the power wielded by the 
carved wooden fetish, Western priests, soldiers, and philosophers quickly took 
over the reins of knowledge and claimed the supremacy of the human and its 
immunity to the flickering presence of the nonhuman, to its inhuman attraction. 
Today, if nonhumans are to keep any kind of glimmer, their glimmer is that of the 
commodity; if they are to wield any power, their power is that of demanding 
consumption. In our societies, deprived as they are of shamanic rituals first by 
the autocracy of the church and then by the priesthood of reason, nonhuman 
bodies can only find their lost glimmer in the shopping jungle of our high streets 
or within the sweaty walls of fetish clubs, the last remaining temples where they 
are still allowed to glimmer beyond their givenness in experience, where, for 
instance, a pair of leather trousers is always so much more than what you will 
ever do with it—touch them, wear them, smell them, lick them, and still you will 
never be able to exhaust their being."
Nevertheless, and to the increasing despair of the lords of the land, nonhumans 
do sometimes still surprise us when we least expect it. Say, in this moment 
(right now) when I sit here reading the words on this sheet of paper. As I get on 
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with it, I know the paper only inasmuch as it works as a blank support for the 
words I’m reading (right here, right now). I can say, when asked what am I 
doing, that “I am reading this piece of paper.” However, what I am in fact doing 
is reading the words printed on it (right here, right now). This is my current 
relation to this sheet of paper; this is metonymy: knowing this piece of paper 
through the words that are contiguous with it."
Another relation can follow the first one (however, only if I allow it): if, right here, 
right now, I am suddenly taken by a childlike curiosity and a scholarly devotion 
to knowledge, I cease to be satisfied with knowing this piece of paper simply 
through the words printed on this page and my eyes start wandering over it, 
attempting to probe its being—top, bottom, left, and right. All of a sudden, the 
black ink of these words becomes merely accidental to the being of the paper, it 
matters no more. I realise that other words could have been written right 
→here← and still the paper would have remained the same. I look beyond 
these accidental words and, with a smile on my face, I dive into the blankness 
of the page (right here →      ←, right now). The paper becomes these 11.69 by 
8.27 inches of whiteness and I feel reassured: I must be on to something. Still, 
there must be more—there is always something more—as I become aware of 
all the qualities of the paper I had hitherto not taken into account: its touch, its 
texture, its ability to be turned into a boat, a hat, or a paper plane; its capacity to 
be burnt by an unexpected fire or to soak up the water from a puddle into which 
it has been thrown and then quickly forgotten… I am drawn to accept the blank 
canvas I had previously thought this sheet of paper to be as just an instance of 
the innumerable metonymic relations I may come to establish with it, as one of 
the many roles it can play for me."
An yet, yet here I am (right here, right now), not having really grasped the true 
substance of this piece of paper and suddenly aware that I might never be able 
to do so. No matter how differently I may have approached it—with my eyes or 
with my hands, with my nose or with my ears, with my tongue or with my 
thought—this piece of paper kept on refusing to fully disclose itself to me. Like 
the black leather trousers I wear when the lights are dim and touch and smell 
replace sight, this piece of paper, like any other fetish, has proved to always be 
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more than what I will ever make of it and, in doing so, it has made me aware of 
the ultimate strangeness of its being.     "
A burning question now arises (and, quickly, I put my hands under cold running 
water to prevent any blisters): if I can never really access the hidden being of 
this piece of paper, if the closest I can get to it is by letting myself notice (and be 
obfuscated by) its glimmering aura, by becoming aware of its presence while 
still never really knowing it, then what is this thing we call knowing? How can I 
know something without ever being in direct contact with it, if my relation to it 
will always be tangential, metonymic? How can I summon the opposite margin 
of a river I won’t ever be able to cross (because no engineering will ever be able 
to bridge the here and the there; because no matter how much you love 
something or someone, you will always be loving at a distance, all touch never 
really touching, all distance never really being walked—Zeno’s paradox)? What 
is this world we live in, a world in which, no matter how enmeshed we are in one 
another, we are always far away from each other? What is the real if not a world 
of fourth walls, of walls that have never really been broken down, of walls that 
will always exist between the tips of our fingers or the edge of our noses, 
between the surface of our tongues or the retina of our eyes, between the 
membrane in our ears or the thoughts in our heads, and everything else that we 
touch, smell, taste, see, hear or think? "
This is a world of theatrics, a world of performers and audiences, where every 
encounter happens at a distance, where communication is always both partial 
and noisy—the information being transmitted hitting bumps and holes, rubbing 
up against other messages and other bodies that refract it on its way from body 
to body, from performer to audience. The whole world is a theatron, a place for 
seeing, one in which communication often carries parasitic information, 
accidental data, feedback noise. On its rocky path from here to there, from body 
to persona, information becomes a contingent, incomplete, and provisional 
translation of a shy original, and it carries with it the traces of the innumerable 
obstacles it has encountered in the space between you and me. No window is 
ever fully clear, no telescope can ever look that far away, no performance can 
ever provide full access to the being of the performer, be it human, animal, or 
thing, material or abstract, dream or reality. No matter how devoted I am to this 
piece of paper, to the stuff of its paper-being; no matter how much strength and 
 263
dedication I expend in trying to know it, the only thing I will ever get from it is 
one of its masks, one of its personae, one of its characters, one of its 
performances: sometimes… sometimes it plays the surface for my writing, 
sometimes the raw material for my paper boat; sometimes it convinces me it is 
a letter, sometimes it reminds me it is nothing but evidence of a once living, 
once standing, once thriving tree. (Cue the army of forensic investigators.)"
Understood in that way, performance implies the translation of an always coy 
body into an extroverted phenomenon, of idea into movement or sound, of 
matter into image, of environment into world. And stage after stage, 
performance after performance, I keep on chasing it, from tree to paper to letter 
to boat, trying hard to overcome the white blindness caused by the stage lights 
that follow me on my crusade. However, no matter how fast I run or how 
educated I am in the thespian arts, I can never reach the dressing room 
backstage where (in my dreams at least) bodies calmly remove their costume 
and clean up their make-up before lying there, naked, on the sofa by the lit 
mirror, waiting for me to come knocking on their door."
Having said that, you must never think bodies perform only for us. In the end, 
the show is open, free, and everyone and everything has been invited. (Advice: 
come early if you don’t want to sit on the floor at the back of the room.) Imagine 
the black ink of these words, for instance. Even if, unlike me, it can access the 
paper’s capacity to absorb liquids by, itself, being absorbed, it still can’t 
experience its shade of white or its capacity to be turned into a paper plane. Or, 
to expand this scene slightly, imagine a tree being cut by an axe (it can, if you 
want, be the same tree that produced the cellulose for this sheet of paper—it’s 
always good to keep things in the family, you know?). So the axe hits the trunk 
of the tree (once, twice). The tree trunk screams open with the impact of the 
blade.  An axe-imprint, an image or a performance, is left on the inner surface of 
the trunk, now exposed to the atmosphere and bleeding dry at the mercy of the 
elements. Yet the tree grasps nothing of the axe but the shape and momentum 
of its blade; it has no access to its colour and is oblivious to the shape of the 
handle attached to it, to its temperature, texture, or even to the muscled arm of 
the hot lumberjack holding it. The axe hits again (and again, and again), 
expanding the surface of the cut, licking open the wound. The tree falls and 
becomes paper for this writing, canvas for these words. And still (and again), 
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while the ink penetrates the paper and slowly dries in the empty spaces 
amongst its cellulose fibres, it remains blind to the tree that the paper once was 
and to the particular shade of white it has in my eyes. "
Now we are back at the beginning, just before I realised this piece of paper 
must be more than the words written on it, more than its blankness, more than 
its look, touch, taste, smell or sound; more than any thought I will ever have on 
it, more than any use I will ever give to it."
And so, both here with this piece of paper and out there where the trees keep 
on growing, the world has suddenly become a play in a theatre where the lights 
don’t go out, one of those in which the cleavage between audience and 
performer, and between the latter and its role remains highlighted. That, 
however, is not due to the fact that the masks are too loose or the acting not up 
to scratch. It has only to do with a particular way of encountering, one that 
makes us aware of the absolute strangeness of all bodies beyond any masks, 
roles, or personae through which they make themselves appear to us. So don’t 
be fooled, more than being about a specially crafted autonomous body on the 
stage or gallery wall waiting for you to see through it, estrangement is first and 
foremost about trying to reach beyond the contingency of images, characters, or 
roles, beyond givenness in experience; it is about glimpsing beyond the 
ordinary in search of the world’s hidden surprises while nevertheless knowing 
that what lies beyond the reassuring certainties of the ordinary will always 
remain dark, silent, and ultimately inaccessible. And as such, it is as much 
about ‘Art’ as it is about ‘Science,’ as much about poetry on a page or paint on a 
canvas as it is about all other bodies, some big, some really small, some 
human, some not, some bright, some fragile, some dark, some strong, that we 
must remember to encounter everyday as strangers with which we share the 
world. "
This, therefore, is neither a game of mastery nor a game to be won. This is a 
game about the rediscovered importance of playing, not about playing to 
accumulate victories. And it is happening everywhere: it is happening here, it is 
happening out there in theatres and gallery spaces, it is happening everywhere 
else where bodies, human and nonhuman, are able to get together despite still 
retaining their strangeness to one another: from the internet to the ozone layer, 
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from the mountains of Congo to the Palace of Westminster, from microwaves to 
dreams of better life, from libraries with books to read to squares where books 
have been burnt, from you and me, here, to the rusting metal of the benches 
outside. You just need to look around and consider your fellow strangers. "
"
"
"
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